情商2：影响你一生的社交商（第3版）

现在，大多数人之所以记得17世纪的英国哲学家托马斯·霍布斯，是因为他的一句名言：无政府状态下的自然生活状态是“肮脏、粗野和浅薄”的，人与人之间必定处于一种一切人反对一切人的战争状态。尽管霍布斯态度强硬、愤世嫉俗，但是他也有温柔的一面。

一天，当霍布斯走在伦敦的大街上时，他遇到一位患病的老人在乞求施舍。这一情景触动了霍布斯的心，于是他给了老人一笔数目相当可观的钱。

一个朋友问他，如果宗教或者哲学里没有扶危救困的道义原则，那么他是否还会给老人钱。霍布斯回答说，即使没有，他还是会帮助那位老人。他的理由是：当他看到那位不幸的老人时，他自己也感到痛苦，所以给老人钱不但会减轻老人的痛苦，“也使我感到轻松”。^[24]

这个故事表明，在帮助别人时往往有利己主义的心理在起作用。受霍布斯的影响，现代经济学的一个流派认为，富翁们之所以会向慈善机构慷慨解囊，有一部分原因是他们可以从受益人将因此而减轻痛苦的想象中得到快乐，或者说他们会因此而减轻自己因为同情别人而产生的痛苦。

这一理论的近代版本把利他行为理解为对自私心理的掩盖。^[25]他们中有部分人认为，用同情行为掩盖“自私的基因”是为了获取最大的利益。^[26]

也许这一理论只适用于一些特例。

另外一种观点的解释可能更加恰当。比如，早在霍布斯之前，中国古代圣人孟子在公元前3世纪就提出：恻隐之心，人皆有之。^[27]

现在，神经科学也验证了孟子的说法，为这场旷日持久的辩论添加了新的材料。当我们看到别人痛苦时，我们的大脑中会产生同理心共鸣，从而引发同情。当婴儿哭泣的时候，这种反射会引起父母大脑神经系统的类似活动，从而促使他们想尽办法来安慰孩子。

善意是我们大脑的自然反应。所以，我们会下意识地去帮助一个因为恐惧而尖叫的孩子，或者会去拥抱一个微笑的婴儿。这种情感冲动的好处在于，它们会引发我们下意识的瞬间反应。从同理心产生到做出反应的过程如此迅速而又自然，这表明这一过程是由小路神经系统控制的。因此，感受到痛苦就会激发起我们帮助别人的欲望。

当我们听到一声极其痛苦的尖叫时，它会激发我们大脑中经历这种痛苦的区域，以及运动前区皮质，示意我们准备回应。同样地，听某人用一种阴郁的音调讲述一个悲伤的故事会激发听者脑中指导动作的运动皮层区和杏仁核，还有相关的悲伤回路。^[28]这一共享的状态进而向我们大脑中的运动区域发送信号，使我们为相关的行为做准备。最初的认知促使我们做好行动准备。^[29]

早在1872年，查尔斯·达尔文就在一篇关于情感的学术论文里预测到了这一点，他的这篇论文至今仍然备受推崇。^[30]达尔文把同理心看作一种生存手段，但是许多人都误认为他的进化论强调了诗人丁尼生所说的“大自然血红的牙齿和利爪”。这句话曾被社会达尔文主义者广泛引用来形容进化的无情和冷酷，他们把进化思想歪曲成了使贪婪合理化的理论。

达尔文认为所有情绪都有产生某种行为后果的倾向，比如恐惧会使人呆住或者逃跑，愤怒会驱使人们战斗，喜悦则使人们彼此拥抱。对大脑的成像研究表明他的观点是正确的。感受到任何情绪都会促使人们产生相应的行为。

小路神经系统的活动又使这种情绪和行为之间的连接扩展到人与人之间。举例来说，当我们看到别人表现出来的恐惧，哪怕仅仅是从他们的动作或者姿势中看出来的时候，我们大脑中控制恐惧的神经系统也会被激活。除了这种瞬间的情绪传染，大脑中负责处理恐惧情绪的区域也会被激活。其他各种情绪，比如愤怒、喜悦和悲伤等也是如此。因此，情绪传染不仅仅传播情绪，它还会使大脑自动做好应对的准备。^[31]

大自然的拇指法则认为，一个生态系统应该尽可能少地消耗能量。在这里，大脑的感知和对行为的支配靠的都是相同的神经细胞的活动，可以说效率非常高。大脑里这种高效的活动相当常见。比如，当看到别人苦恼的时候，这种感知与行动的连接就会使人们自然而然地去帮助他。正因为我们产生了同样的感觉，所以我们才会去帮助别人。

一些数据表明，在大多数情况下，人们往往会帮助自己喜爱的人，而不是陌生人。即便如此，如果我们与一个陌生人产生了情感共鸣，我们就会像帮助自己喜爱的人一样去帮助他。比如，人们看到一个无家可归的孤儿时越是伤心，就越有可能捐钱给他，甚至还有可能为他提供一个临时住所，不管他们之间的社会地位差别有多大。

当我们与痛苦或者窘迫的人面对面地交流时，我们就不会只想帮助那些和我们有共同之处的人了。面对面地交流时，大脑间的连接会使我们体会到别人的不幸，也会使我们立即打算去帮助他们。^[32]在人类历史上相当长的时间里，人们的交流都近在咫尺，因此很容易直接体会到别人的不幸。而现在却不同了，科技的发展把人们之间的距离越拉越远了。

但是，如果大脑的神经系统真的能够使我们感受到别人的不幸并随时准备帮助别人的话，那为什么在现实生活中人们并不总是这样去做呢？社会心理学家们做了不计其数的实验，想要解答这个问题。他们认为原因是多方面的，其中最简单的一个原因就是现代生活的影响：那些需要帮助的人们都离我们很远。这也就意味着我们体验的是“感知”上的同理心，而不是直接受到感染。或者，我们只是同情，也就是说我们只是为他们感到难过，而体会不到他们的苦恼。^[33]这种疏远的关系削弱了我们帮助别人的本能冲动。

就像普莱斯顿和德瓦尔所说的那样：“现代社会，人们通过电子邮件交流，经常搬家，极少参加社区活动，这种状态下的人们是无法自动精确地感知他人的心理状态的。而缺少了这一因素，同理心是不可能产生的。”现代社会中人们之间的社会地位差距和实际物理距离越来越大，虽然我们对此已经见怪不怪了，但这是很不正常的。这种距离扼杀了同理心，从而也扼杀了利他行为。

对于人性到底是本善还是本恶这个问题的争论由来已久。本善论者认为人们天生就是富有同情心的，只不过有时候会有些丑陋的表现而已。反对这一观点的例子很多，支持它的科学理论却很少。让我们尝试一下下面的思维实验吧。想象一下今天世界上有可能做出反社会行为（比如强奸、谋杀，或者粗暴、欺骗等）的人的数量，然后把这个数字作为分母，分子则是今天实际做出这些行为的人的总和。

实际上，这种潜在罪恶和实际罪恶之间的比例每天都接近于0。如果分子是某一天慈善行为的总和的话，这种善举与罪恶的比例则总是大于1。

哈佛大学的杰罗姆·卡根做这个实验是为了说明人性本善：人们的善良要远远超过卑鄙。“尽管人类有愤怒、嫉妒、自私、粗暴、好斗或者暴力的天性，”卡根说，“但是他们仁慈、悲悯、合作、爱和教养的天性更为强烈，特别是对那些需要帮助的人。”他还补充说，这种内在的伦理观是“人类这个物种的生物特征之一”。^[34]

神经学理论中关于同理心可以引发同情的发现无疑为哲学中利他本能的普遍性提供了科学支持。这样，哲学家们就不必再去费力解释大公无私的行为，而是要转而考虑为什么还会有自私自利行为的存在了。^[35]

1. On the Good Samaritan experiment, a classic in social psychology, see J. M. Darley and C. D.Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27 (1973), pp. 100–8. I cited the study in my 1985 book, Vital Lies, Simple Truths.
2. As with the rushed students, social situations influence the degree of looping that seems appropriateand even whether looping occurs at all. We would, for instance, feel little need to rush to help someonemoaning if we see ambulance attendants also approaching them. And since we loop most readily withpeople who seem similar to us, and progressively less so the more differences we perceive, we are morelikely to offer help to a friend than to a stranger.
3. On the Good Samaritan and helping, see, for example C. Daniel Batson et al., “Five Studies TestingTwo New Egoistic Alternatives to the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis,” Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology 55 (1988), pp. 52–57.
4. English seems to be missing a word with the meaning of kandou, which Asian languages havenamed. In Sanskrit, for example, the word mudita means “taking pleasure in the goodness done by orreceived by someone else.” But, English has readily adopted Schadenfreude, the exact opposite ofmudita. See also Tania Singer et al., “Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but Not SensoryComponents of Pain,” Science, 303 (2004) pp. 1157–62.
5. See Jonathan D. Haidt and Corey L. M. Keyes, Flourishing: Positive Psychology and the Life WellLived (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association Press, 2003).
6. On fish brains, see Joseph Sisneros et al., “Steroid-Dependent Auditory Plasticity Leads toAdaptive Coupling of Sender and Receiver,” Science 305 (2004), pp. 404–7.
7. If the baby feels tired or upset, he does the opposite, moving in ways that close down his perceptualsystems, as he curls himself up waiting to be held or caressed for calming. See Colwyn Trevarthen,“The Self Born in Intersubjectivity: The Psychology of Infant Communicating,” in Ulric Neisser, ed.The Perceived Self: Ecological and Interpersonal Sources of Self-knowledge (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1993) pp. 121–73.
8. On empathy in evolution and across species, see Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (1872;Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
9. S. E. Shelton et al., “Aggression, Fear and Cortisol in Young Rhesus Monkeys,”Psychoneuroendocrinology 22, supp. 2 (1997), p. S198.
10. On sociable baboons, see J. B. Silk et al., “Social Bonds of Female Baboons Enhance InfantSurvival,” Science 302 (2003), pp. 1231–34.
11. Earlier thinking on what allowed humans to develop such a large and intelligent brain had fixed onour ability to hold and make tools. In recent decades the utility for survival—and for raising childrenwho survive into parenting age—that a sociable life offers has drawn more proponents.
12. Stephen Hill, “Storyteller, Recovering from Head-on Crash, Cites ‘Miracle of Mother’s Day,’ ”Daily Hampshire Gazette, May 11, 2005, p. B1.
13. The notion that empathy entails an emotional sharing has a long history in psychology. One of theearliest theorists, William McDougall, proposed in 1908 that during “sympathy” the first person’sphysical state is elicited in the second. Eighty years later Leslie Brothers suggested that understandingthe emotion of another person required that we experience the same emotion to some degree. And in1992 Robert Levenson and Anna Reuf, reporting a concordance of heart rate in partners having anemotional discussion, suggested this physiological similarity could be a basis for empathy.
14. The neuroscientist is Christian Keysers of the University of Groningen in the Netherlands, quotedin Greg Miller, “New Neurons Strive to Fit In,” Science 311 (2005), pp. 938–40.
15. Constantin Stanislavski is quoted in Jonathan Cott, On a Sea of Memory (New York: RandomHouse, 2005), p. 138.
16. Neural circuitry for our own and others’ feelings is discussed in Kevin Ochsner et al., “Reflectingupon Feelings: An fMRI Study of Neural Systems Supporting the Attribution of Emotion to Self andOther,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (2004), pp. 1746–72.
17. On circuitry active during observing or imitating an emotion, see Laurie Carr et al., “NeuralMechanisms of Empathy in Humans: A Relay from Neural Systems for Imitation to Limbic Areas,”Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100, no. 9 (2003), pp. 5497–502. The areasactivated: premotor cortex, inferior frontal cortex and anterior insula, and right amygdala (whichshowed a significant increase from levels during observation alone to levels during imitation).
18. For Einfühlung, see Theodore Lipps cited in Vittorio Gallese, “The ‘Shared Manifold’ Hypothesis:From Mirror Neurons to Empathy,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 8, no. 5–7 (2001), pp. 33–50.
19. On empathy and the brain, see Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B. M. de Waal, “Empathy: ItsUltimate and Proximate Bases,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2002), pp. 1–20.
20. This similarity, however, does not inevitably indicate empathy. It could be that at the currentresolution of our measuring instruments, happiness from two different neural sources looks similar.
21. On brain circuitry in empathy, see Stephanie D. Preston et al., “Functional Neuroanatomy ofEmotional Imagery: PET of Personal and Hypothetical Experiences,” Journal of CognitiveNeuroscience: April Supplement,126.
22. In technical terms, this neural shorthand is “computationally efficient,” both in the processing ofinformation and in the space needed to store it. Preston and de Waal, “Empathy.”
23. On the felt sense, see Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens (New York: Harcourt,2000).
24. On Hobbes, see J. Aubrey, Brief Lives, Chiefly of Contemporaries, set down by John Aubrey,Between the years 1669 and 1696, ed., A. Clark (London: Clarendon Press, 1898), vol. 1.
25. A softer version of “every man for himself” was put forth by the eighteenth-century Britishphilosopher Adam Smith, who championed the creation of wealth in a laissez-faire economic system.Smith urged us to trust that individual self-interest would produce equitable markets, one of theeconomic assumptions underlying the free market system. Both Hobbes and Smith have frequentlybeen cited in modern attempts to analyze the driving force of human behavior, particularly by thosewho favor pure self-interest—brutal in the case of Hobbes, rational in Smith.
26. Stephanie D. Preston and Frans de Waal, “The Communication of Emotions and the Possibility ofEmpathy in Animals,” in S. Post et al., eds., Altruism and Altruistic Love: Science, Philosophy, andReligion in Dialogue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), argue that the selfish versus altruisticdistinction is irrelevant from an evolutionary perspective, which can read a wide range of behaviors astechnically “selfish.”
27. Mencius quoted in Frans de Waal, The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections by aPrimatologist (New York: Basic Books-Perseus, 2001), p. 256. Mencius proposes that if a child isabout to fall into a well, anyone who sees has the impulse to help.
28. Jean Decety and Thierry Chaminade, “Neural Correlates of Feeling Sympathy,” Neuropsychologia41 (2003), pp. 127–38.
29. Ap Dijksterhuis and John A. Bargh, “The Perception-Behavior Expressway: Automatic Effects ofSocial Perception on Social Behavior,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 33 (2001), pp. 1–40.
30. Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, with commentary by PaulEkman (1872; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
31. Beatrice de Gelder et al., “Fear Fosters Flight: A Mechanism for Fear Contagion When PerceivingEmotion Expressed by a Whole Body,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 101 (2004),pp. 16701–06. The medial prefrontal-anterior cingulate circuit that responds to social stimuli likepictures of people in distress in turn recruits other brain systems according to the nature of thechallenge.
32. On similarity see, for example, Dennis Krebs, “Empathy and Altruism: An Examination of theConcept and a Review of the Literature,” Psychological Bulletin 73 (1970), pp. 258–302; C. D. Batson,The Altruism Question: Toward a Scientific Answer (Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1991). Conventionalexperimental paradigms in social psychology may not present human need in an urgent enough mannerto tap the empathy-action pathways. A checklist asking whether one would donate to a charity appealsto cognitive as well as emotional systems. But an equivalent of Mencius’ test—seeing a baby about tofall in a well—should tap into a different neural circuit and so yield contrasting results.
33. Preston and de Waal, “Communication of Emotions,” propose an emotional gradient in relating tosomeone else’s distress. Emotional contagion elicits the same intense state in the observer as in thedistressed person, softening the boundary between self and other. In empathy the observer takes on asimilar—though weaker—emotional state but maintains a clear self-other boundary. In cognitiveempathy the observer arrives at a shared state through thinking about the predicament of the one indistress at a distance. And sympathy is a sense of the other’s distress, with little or no sharing of thatstate. The likelihood of helping increases with the strength of the emotional sharing.
34. On the case for kindness, see Jerome Kagan in Anne Harrington and Arthur Zajonc, eds., TheDalai Lama at MIT (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
35. One philosophical approach that offers a way to reconcile these positions: Owen Flanagan,“Ethical Expressions: Why Moralists Scowl, Frown, and Smile,” in Jonathan Hodge and GregoryRadick, The Cambridge Companion to Darwin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).