情商2：影响你一生的社交商（第3版）

人们把欧洲足球场上喜欢寻衅滋事、打架斗殴的球迷称为“足球流氓”。

不管在哪一个国家，足球场上的骚乱都是差不多的。这一小撮组织严密的狂热球迷总是在比赛开始几个小时前就到达球场，唱着俱乐部的队歌，喝酒狂欢。

然后，当大部分观众到达球场的时候，他们就开始挥舞队旗，锣鼓喧天地唱队歌，并且羞辱对方球队。他们通过这种方式吸引人们不断加入，使他们的队伍变得越来越庞大。当他们和对方球迷混杂在一起时，羞辱谩骂就逐渐升级为直接威胁。一旦他们中的核心人物开始动手打对方球迷，其他人也会加入。于是斗殴的范围就越来越大。

从20世纪80年代初开始，这样的群众性暴力骚乱不断发生，导致了不少悲剧。^[32]在好斗的酒鬼中间传播暴力情绪再适合不过了，因为酒精放松了神经细胞对冲动的控制。所以当核心人物开始动手时，这种情绪很容易传染给其他人，使他们也跟着打起来。

在《群众与权力》（Crowds and Power ）一书中，埃利亚斯·卡内提说过，个体的“同一种激情”使一群独立的个体组成一个有凝聚力的群体，正是这种激情使他们采取一致行动，这就是群体性传染。^[33]一种情绪可以很快在群体中传播开来，显示了个体生理状态的一致。^[34]

群体中行为的迅速传播似乎是镜像神经元活动的结果。一个群体做出集体决定的时间大约是几秒钟，这很可能就是镜像神经元使人们产生共鸣所用的时间（当然，这一点还没有得到证实）。

比较平和的群体性传染也有很多例子。比如在一场精彩的演出中，演员或者演奏者可以带来现场效应，他们调节着观众的情绪，就像演奏乐器一样。戏剧、音乐会和电影都可以使我们与许多陌生人产生同理心。用心理学家的话来说，乐观情绪会自我加强，也就是说处在一个欢快的环境里，会让人们感到开心。

即使只有三个人，群体性传染也会发生。比如三个人面对面地坐在一起，什么也不说。如果他们之间没有地位差异的话，那么几分钟后，脸上表现出来的情绪最强烈的那个人就决定了整体氛围。^[35]

在人们需要协商解决问题的时候，传染更容易发生。让我们来看一个关于高风险决策的实验吧。志愿者们需要进行讨论，然后决定公司每一名员工年终奖的数额。每一个人都要为某一名员工争取到最大利益，同时还要达到总体分配方案的公平合理。

这种争论很容易引起紧张疲劳的状态。当会议结束的时候，每个人都感觉很郁闷。但是在另外一个小组，尽管他们的目标和第一个小组一样，但是当讨论结束的时候，每个人都表示非常满意。

这两次讨论都是耶鲁大学进行的一个经典商务模拟实验的组成部分。志愿者们被分成两组来讨论奖金分配方案。^[36]他们并不知道每个小组中都有研究人员特意安排的一名经验丰富的演员。在第一个小组中，演员的任务是跟大家唱反调，而在另一个小组中他的任务则是鼓励、帮助大家。

结果，两个小组的志愿者们情绪都发生了明显变化，一组变得郁闷，一组变得开心。但是，志愿者们都不知道他们的情绪为什么会发生改变。

他们的情绪在不知不觉的情况下按照研究人员引导的方向发生了改变。

一个小组成员间传递的情绪可以左右他们讨论的方式，从而左右他们的决定。^[37]所以，在任何一个决策过程中，大家除了应该注意彼此的语言之外，还应该对现场气氛加以足够的重视。

关系亲密的人们，比如亲人、同事和朋友之间，就像存在一个微妙的磁场一样，它如同地球引力一般的力量吸引着人们的思想和情感朝着同一个方向发展。

1. On fear, mimicry, and contagion, see Brooks Gump and James Kulik, “Stress, Affiliation, andEmotional Contagion,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72 (1997), pp. 305–19.
2. See, for example, Paul J. Whalen et al., “A Functional MRI Study of Human Amygdala Responsesto Facial Expressions of Fear Versus Anger,” Emotion1(2001), pp. 70–83; J. S. Morris et al.,“Conscious and Unconscious Emotional Learning in the Human Amygdala,” Nature 393 (1998), pp.467–70.
3. The person who sees the face of someone in terror experiences the same inner arousal but lessintensely. One main difference is in their level of autonomic nervous system reactivity, which ismaximal in the terrorized person and far weaker in the one who sees that person. The more thewitness’s insula activates, the stronger their emotional response.
4. On mimicry, see J. A. Bargh, M. Chen, and L. Burrows, “Automaticity of Social Behavior: DirectEffects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action,” Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology 71 (1996), pp. 230–44.
5. On speed of perception of fear, see Luiz Pessoa et al., “Visual Awareness and the Detection ofFearful Faces,” Emotion 5 (2005), pp. 243–47.
6. For the discovery of mirror neurons, see G. di Pelligrino et al., “Understanding Motor Events: ANeurophysiological Study,” Experimental Brain Research 91 (1992), pp. 176–80.
7. On the pinprick neuron, see W. D. Hutchinson et al., “Pain-related Neurons in the Human CingulateCortex,” Nature Neuroscience 2 (1999), pp. 403–5. Other fMRI studies find that the identical brainareas activate when a person observes a finger movement and when they make that same movement; inone, activity was highest when the person made the movement in response to someone else doing so—that is, when mimicking the person: Marco Iacoboni et al., “Cortical Mechanisms of Human Imitation,”Science 286 (1999), pp. 2526–28. On the other hand, some studies have found that observing amovement activated a different set of neural areas than did imagining making the movement; theinterpretation was that the areas involved in recognition of movements differ from those that contributeto the actual production of the movement—in this case, grasping an object. See S. T. Grafton et al.,“Localization of Grasp Representations in Humans by PET: Observation Compared with Imagination,”Experimental Brain Research 112 (1996), pp. 103–11.
8. On mirroring in humans, see, for example, L. Fadiga et al., “Motor Facilitation During ActionObservation: A Magnetic Stimulation Study,” Journal of Neurophysiology 73 (1995), pp. 2608–26.
9. That blocking is by inhibitory neurons in the prefrontal cortex. Patients with damage in thisprefrontal circuitry are notoriously uninhibited, saying or doing whatever pops into their head. Theprefrontal areas may have direct inhibitory connections, or posterior cortical regions, which have localinhibitory connections, may be activated.
10. To date, mirror neurons have been found in several areas of the human brain in addition to thepremotor cortex, including the posterior parietal lobe, the superior temporal sulcus, and the insula.
11. On mirror neurons in humans, see Iacoboni et al., “Cortical Mechanisms.”
12. See Kiyoshe Nakahara and Yasushi Miyashita, “Understanding Intentions: Through the LookingGlass,” Science 308 (2005), pp. 644–45; Leonardo Fogassi, “Parietal Lobe: From Action Organizationto Intention Understanding,” Science 308 (2005), pp. 662–66.
13. See Stephanie D. Preston and Frans de Waal, “The Communication of Emotions and thePossibility of Empathy in Animals,” in Stephen G. Post et al., eds., Altruism and Altruistic Love:Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Dialogue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
14. If another person’s actions hold high emotional interest for us, we automatically make a slightgesture or facial expression that reveals that we feel the same. This “preview” of a feeling ormovement, some neuroscientists suggest, may have been essential for the development of language andcommunication among humans. One theory holds that in prehistory, the evolution of language stemmedfrom the activities of mirror neurons, initially for an idiom of gesture and then a vocal form. SeeGiacomo Rizzolatti and M. A. Arbib, “Language Within Our Grasp,” Trends in Neuroscience 21(1998), pp. 188–94.
15. Giacomo Rizzolatti is quoted in Sandra Blakeslee, “Cells That Read Minds,” New York Times,January 10, 2006, p. C3.
16. Daniel Stern, The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday Life (New York: W.W.Norton, 2004), p. 76.
17. Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage (New York:W.W. Norton, 1985).
18. Robert Provine, Laughter: A Scientific Investigation (New York: Viking Press, 2000).
19. On the brain’s preference for happy faces, see Jukka Leppanen and Jari Hietanen, “Affect andFace Perception,” Emotion 3 (2003), pp. 315–26.
20. Barbara Fraley and Arthur Aron, “The Effect of a Shared Humorous Experience on Closeness inInitial Encounters,” Personal Relationships 11 (2004), pp. 61–78.
21. The circuitry for laughing resides in the most primitive parts of the brain, the brain stem. SeeStephen Sivvy and Jaak Panksepp, “Juvenile Play in the Rat,” Physiology and Behavior 41 (1987), pp.103–14.
22. On best friends, see Brenda Lundy et al., “Same-sex and Opposite-sex Best Friend InteractionsAmong High School Juniors and Seniors,” Adolescence 33 (1998), pp. 279–88.
23. Darryl McDaniels is quoted in Josh Tyrangiel, “Why You Can’t Ignore Kanye,” Time, August 21,2005.
24. Legend was quoted in “Bling Is Not Their Thing: Hip-hop Takes a Relentlessly Positive Turn,”Daily News of Los Angeles, February 24, 2005.
25. On memes, see Susan Blakemore, The Meme Machine (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press,1999).
26. For a more thorough account of priming, see E. T. Higgins, “Knowledge Activation: Accessibility,Applicability, and Salience,” Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles (New York: GuilfordPress, 1996).
27. On priming for politeness, see Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, “Automaticity of Social Behavior,” p.71.
28. On automatic trains of thought, see John A. Bargh, “The Automaticity of Everyday Life,” in R. S.Wyer, ed., Advances in Social Cognition (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1997), vol. 10.
29. On mind-reading accuracy, see Thomas Geoff and Garth Fletcher, “Mind-reading Accuracy inIntimate Relationships: Assessing the Roles of the Relationship, the Target, and the Judge,” Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology 85 (2003), pp. 1079–94.
30. On the confluence of two minds, see Colwyn Trevarthen, “The Self Born in Intersubjectivity: ThePsychology of Infant Communicating,” in Ulric Neisser, ed. The Perceived Self: Ecological andInterpersonal Sources of Self-knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 121–73.
31. The emotional merge occurred whether or not the duo felt they had become close friends.Cameron Anderson, Dacher Keltner and Oliver P. John, “Emotional Convergence Between People overTime,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84, no. 5 (2003), pp. 1054–68.
32. At the infamous Heysel disaster in 1985, British hooligans charged Belgian fans, causing a wall tocollapse and thirty-nine deaths. In the intervening years there have been fatal or near-fatal soccer riotsthroughout Europe.
33. Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power (New York: Continuum, 1973).
34. The rapidity of group mood sweeps is noted in Robert Levenson and Anna Reuf, “EmotionalKnowledge and Rapport,” in William Ickes, ed., Empathic Accuracy (New York: Guilford Press,1997), pp. 44–72.
35. On sharing emotions, see Elaine Hatfield et al., Emotional Contagion (Cambridge, U.K.:Cambridge University Press, 1994).
36. On emotional contagion in teams, see Sigal Barsade, “The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagionand Its Influence on Group Behavior,” Administrative Science Quarterly 47 (2002), pp. 644–75.
37. Looping in a group helps everyone stay on the same wavelength. In decisionmaking groups itfosters the kind of connection that can allow airing differences openly, without fear of blow-ups.Harmony in a group allows the widest range of views to be considered fully and the very best decisionsto be made—provided people feel free to bring up dissenting views. During a heated argument it’s hardfor people to take in what another says, let alone attune.
38. Meme是英国的理查德·道金斯在其《自私的基因》一书中创造的新词，其基本意思是指人的观念、思想、理论体系等。——译者注