民主的弱点：民意如何成为世界强权操弄的政治武器

序言 兵临城下的民主体制

1 For this book, the author interviewed twenty-six former advisers to Presi-dent Obama, including fourteen who were serving in his administration as Russia’s operation unfolded.
2 Wallander, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2019; Michael Daniel, phone interview by author, July 19, 2019.
3 Nuland, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Feb. 22, 2019.
4 Clapper, interview by author, Fairfax, Va., Jan. 3, 2019.
5 Lisa Monaco, interview by author, New York, Sept. 25, 2019; R. Sam Garrett, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2018), fas.org. In “Increasing the Security of the U.S. Election Infrastructure,” Herbert Lin, Alex Stamos, Nate Persily, and Andrew Grotto further explain, “In accordance with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, systems for voter registration are centralized at the state level. The administration of voter registration databases entails a number of large-scale tasks, including (1) maintaining the correct status of indi-viduals who are properly registered to vote and their relevant information on voter registration lists, (2) removing individuals who are no longer eligible to vote (e.g., those who have moved out of the jurisdiction) off registration lists, and (3) delivering precinct-by-precinct registration lists to the individual precincts where in-person voting occurs (e.g., creating and delivering paper-based or electronic poll books). By contrast, vote casting systems are decentralized down to the county level. Each county within the same state can use a different electronic voting system, which must include the following: (1) electronic voting systems that record ballots cast by citizens in person at individual precincts, (2) tabulation systems that record absentee ballots via postal mail, and (3) programs that tabulate vote totals at levels higher than the precinct.” Herbert Lin et al., “Increasing the Security of the U.S. Election Infrastructure,” in Securing American Elections: Prescriptions for Enhancing the Integrity and Independence of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election and Beyond, ed. Michael McFaul, Stanford University, June 2019, 17, fsi.stanford.edu.
6 Brennan, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2018.
7 Johnson, interview by author, New York, July 29, 2019.
8 Carol E. Lee, “Obama, Putin Meet as Syria Deal Stalls,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 5, 2016, www.wsj.com.
9 Monaco, interview by author.
10 Haines, interview by author, New York, Feb. 23, 2019; Daniel, interview by author. Of Russia’s probes of electoral infrastructure through October and early November, Lisa Monaco told me, “We did not see a spike. We didn’t see an escalation. It was a steady state.”11 Nuland, interview by author.
12 David Sanger, “Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking,” New York Times, Dec. 29, 2016, www.nytimes.com.
13 Finer, interview by author, New York, Feb. 20, 2019; Blinken, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Jan. 3, 2019; Clapper, interview by author.
14 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1967), 301; Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2007), 10; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 20.
15 Brennan, interview by author.
16 The digital age, as defined in this book, took hold during the first decade of the twenty-first century, when, David A. L. Levy and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen write, there was a “rapid spread of increasingly sophisticated forms of internet access and use throughout the developed world and in many emerging economies.” David A. L. Levy and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, The Changing Business of Journalism and Its Implications for Democracy (Oxford, U.K.: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2010), 7. In the year 2004 alone, Facebook was founded, Google launched Gmail, and Amazon announced its first-ever full-year profit. See Harry McCracken, “How Gmail Happened: The Inside Story of Its Launch 10 Years Ago,” Time, April 1, 2014, time.com; Ellen Rosen, “Student’s Start-up Draws Attention and $13 Million,” New York Times, May 26, 2005, www.nytimes.com; Saul Hansell, “Amazon Reports First Full-Year Profit,” New York Times, Jan. 28, 2004, www.nytimes.com.
17 Avril Haines, “Trump’s ‘Ridiculous’ Spy Claim,” interview by Michael Isikoff and Dan Klaidman, Skullduggery, Yahoo News, May 25, 2018, play.acast.com; Haines, interview by author.
18 McMaster, phone interview by author, Oct. 17, 2018.
19 U.S. Congress, Senate, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, S. 133, 115th Cong., www.congress.gov.
20 Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018), 47, 251. A country can hold elec-tions, of course, but not be a democracy, as captured by Nic Cheeseman and Brian Klaas’s How to Rig an Election (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni-versity Press, 2018). Larry Diamond of Stanford describes the democratic model as including four basic elements: not just (1) a political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections, but also (2) the active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; (3) protection of the human rights of all citizens; and (4) a rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens. See Larry Diamond, “What Is Democracy?” (lecture at Hilla University for Humanistic Studies, Hilla, Iraq, Jan. 21, 2004), diamond-democracy .stanford.edu.
21 Professor Don H. Levin has assembled a universe of cases for U.S.-and Russia-led electoral interference operations. He has found that between 1946 and 2000 the United States interfered in eighty-one foreign elec-tions and the Soviet Union/Russia interfered in thirty-six foreign elections. Levin classifies nearly two-thirds of these interventions as covert. See Don H. Levin, “Partisan Electoral Interventions by the Great Powers: Intro-ducing the PEIG Dataset,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 36, no. 1 (2016): 94–95.
22 Clinton, phone interview by author, April 4, 2020.
23 By 2016, nearly two-thirds of U.S. adults were getting at least some of their news from social media. See Jeffrey Gottfried and Elisa Shearer, “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016,” Pew Research Center, May 26, 2016, www.journalism.org.
24 Baker, phone interview by author, Oct. 17, 2018.
25 Stamos, phone interview by author, May 28, 2018.
26 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Chal-lenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” translated from Russian by Robert Coalson, pub-lished originally in Mndiulisttarriya-lIKurier, Feb. 27, 2013.
27 Robert Kagan, “The Strongmen Strike Back,” Washington Post, March 14, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com. See also Olivia Beavers, “National Security Experts Warn of Rise in Authoritarianism,” Hill, Feb. 26, 2019, thehill.com.

第一章 列宁登场

1 Kalugin, interview by author, Rockville, Md., Aug. 7, 2018. For more on Kalugin’s backstory, see Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West (New York: Basic Books, 1994). Technically, the KGB was not named as such until 1954. Christo-pher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin explain, “The term KGB is used both generally to denote the Soviet State Security organisation throughout its history since its foundation as the Cheka in 1917 and, more specifically, to refer to State Security after 1954 when it took its final name.” Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, “The Evolution of the KGB, 1917–1991,” in The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret His-tory of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
2 Steven Lee Myers, “Russia Convicts a Former K.G.B. General Now Living in U.S.,” New York Times, June 27, 2002, www.nytimes.com; Scott Shane, “From Soviet Hero to Traitor,” Baltimore Sun, June 26, 2002, www.baltimoresun.com.
3 Kalugin, interview by author.
4 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Pen-guin Books, 2005), 103. Historian Odd Arne Westad similarly argues that World War I “jump-started the destinies of the two future Cold War Superpowers. It made the United States the global embodiment of capital-ism and it made Russia a Soviet Union, a permanent challenge to the capitalist world.” Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 26–27.
5 Trevor Barnes, “The Secret Cold War: The C.I.A. and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946–1956. Part I,” Historical Journal 24, no. 2 (1981): 399. Of the interwar period, Westad explains, “How could the Soviet system, based on terror and subjugation, appeal to so many people around the world? The Great Depression provided the opportunity. If it had not been for capitalism doing so very badly, Communism would not have won the affection of large numbers of dedicated and intelligent people everywhere A massive majority of Americans, 95 percent in 1936, thought that the United States should stay out of any war in Europe.” Westad, Cold War, 35, 40.
6 John Ridell, Founding the Communist International: Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress: March 1919 (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1987), 1, 75, 161.
7 “Ruse of Soviet to Stir Revolts Officially Shown,” New York Times, April 19, 1920, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin (London: Palgrave, 1996), 17.
8 McDermott and Agnew, Comintern, 20–23. Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, Harvey Klehr, and John Earl Haynes, Secret Cables of the Comintern, 149333–19 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2014), 44.
9 McDermott and Agnew, Comintern, 21–22. By 1922, the Comintern had an annual budget of $21.5 million (in 2020 dollars) and dispersed between $1.1 and $3.7 million each to the German, American, British, Italian, and Czech Communist Parties. Firsov, Klehr, and Haynes provide these figures in Secret Cables of the Comintern, 39. Conversion to 2020 values executed by U.S. Inflation Calculator, www.usinflationcalculator.com.
10 Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), chap. 1.
11 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 60–62.
12 Firsov, Klehr, and Haynes, Secret Cables of the Comintern, 30–31 52–57, which further explains that Spain’s Communist Party relied on the Comintern’s payments, in part, to fund the Mundo Obrero, a left-wing propaganda source.
13 Ibid., 39.
14 McDermott and Agnew, Comintern, 122.
15 Westand, Cold War, 30, 32. The U.S. government went so far as to estab-lish a “concentration camp for Reds” at Camp Upton in New York, reported The New York Times, and to arrest and deport hundreds of allegedly radical leftist immigrants, including 249 “undesirable aliens” who were moved out of the country aboard a U.S. military ship nick-named the Soviet Ark. See “Begin Procedure to Deport Reds,” New York Times, Jan. 6, 1920, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “‘Ark’ with 300 Reds Sails Early Today for Unnamed Port,” New York Times, Dec. 21, 1919, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “Soviet Ark Lands Its Reds in Finland,” New York Times, Jan. 18, 1920, timesmachine.nytimes.com. For further read-ing on the general paranoia of this period, see Robert Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955); Beverly Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in Its First Age of Terror (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), chap. 14.
16 Founded in 1920, the British Communist Party received at least £55,000 from the Comintern to jump-start its activities (£2,476,739 in 2019 val-ues), followed by annual subsidies of varying amounts, from £24,000 in 1921 (£1,183,688 in 2019 values) to £16,000 in 1925 (£980,043 in 2019 values). See McDermott and Agnew, Comintern, 22, 56. Conversions to 2019 values executed by the Bank of England’s Inflation Calculator, www.bankofengland.co.uk.
17 Gill Bennett, The Zinoviev Letter: The Conspiracy That Never Dies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 267–69; “Civil War Plot by Social-ists’ Masters,” Daily Mail, Oct. 25, 1920. Of the agreements between Moscow and London, Bennett explains, “By early August, after a brief breakdown in the talks, agreement had been reached on two draft treaties, a general Anglo-Soviet treaty and a commercial treaty, with provision for a third whereby the British government would guarantee a loan to the Soviet Union Although more than one treaty had been negotiated, for the Soviet government the key treaty was the general Anglo-Soviet treaty whose ratification would pave the way for a loan,” in The Zinoviev Letter, 26, 284. See also Uri Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 298.
18 Bennett, Zinoviev Letter, 66–68.
19 A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914–1945 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Uni-versity Press, 1978), 219, in which Taylor concludes the letter “undoubt-edly was” a forgery.
20 Bennett, Zinoviev Letter, 1.
21 Franz Borkenau, World Communism: A History of the Communist International (New York: W. W. Norton, 1939), 428. Separately, Stalin’s purges of the Comintern’s ranks had undermined its functionality, as explained by McDermott and Agnew in Comintern, 145–55. For further reading on Stalin and his domestic terror, see Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History (New York: Doubleday, 2003), chaps. 1–23; Golfo Alexopou-los, Illness and Inhumanity in Stalin’s Gulag (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2017); Snyder, Bloodlands, chaps. 1 and 3; Stephen Kot-kin, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 (New York: Penguin Books, 2017).
22 Firsov, Klehr, and Haynes, Secret Cables of the Comintern, 49.
23 Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 45.
24 Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944– 1956 (New York: Doubleday, 2012), chap. 9; Delbert Clark, “Soviet Grip Broken By Berlin Election,” New York Times, Oct. 22, 1946, times machine.nytimes.com; “Leader of Anti-Reds in Berlin Threatened,” New York Times, Dec. 10, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Delbert Clark, “Soviet Forces Out Kaiser, German Opposition Leader,” New York Times, Dec. 21, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “Kaiser Ouster Disliked,” New York Times, Dec. 23, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “Kaiser Carries On as Exile in Berlin,” New York Times, Dec. 24, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
25 Applebaum, Iron Curtain, chap. 9; Richard F. Staar, “Elections in Com-munist Poland,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 2, no. 2 (1958): 210.
26 Applebaum, Iron Curtain, chap. 9; “Hungarian Leader Seized by Rus-sians,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Bur-nett Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 551.
27 “Excerpts from Communique Adopted by Cominform,” New York Times, Nov. 30, 1949, timesmachine.nytimes.com. On the formation of the Cominform, see Westad, Cold War, 96; Csaba Békés, “Soviet Plans to Establish the COMINFORM in Early 1946: New Evidence from the Hungarian Archives,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 10 (March 1998): 135–36. On American policy making toward the countries of Eastern Europe in the immediate postwar period, see Marc Trachtenberg, “The United States and Eastern Europe in 1945: A Reas-sessment,” Journal of Cold War Studies 10, no. 4 (2008): 94–132.
28 Judt, Postwar, 143. Historian Silvio Pons argues that “the formation of the Cominform was more a sign of retreat than a shift toward the offen-sive.” Silvio Pons, “Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe,” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 2 (2001): 26.
29 The Soviet Union had possessed intelligence services since its incep-tion, known at various times as the Cheka, the OGPU, and the NKVD. Their work reflected the priorities of the top. Lenin and Stalin used these agencies, above all, to crush perceived enemies at home. Andrew and Mitrokhin explain, “To understand Soviet intelligence operations between the wars, it is frequently necessary to enter a world of smoke and mirrors where the target is as much the product of Bolshevik delusions as of real counter-revolutionary conspiracy.” Take the Cheka, which brutally tortured and killed many thousands of people during the Russian Civil War, or the NKVD, which carried out Stalin’s Great Terror in the late 1930s. In December 1920, Moscow did establish a foreign intelligence directorate—and it did penetrate the highest levels of the British and American governments—but eventually most of its officers fell victim to Stalin’s purges. For most members of this unit, “torture and confession to imaginary crimes were followed by a short walk to an execution chamber and a bullet in the back of the head.” See Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield,02.2–8

30 Kalugin, interview by author.

第二章 中情局在义大利

1 For further reading on containment, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Dean Acheson, the famed secretary of state, details foreign policy making during the Truman years in Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969). See also James Chase, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998). For further reading on Truman, see David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
2 On the establishment of the CIA, the ultimate successor to the wartime Office of Strategic Services, see Barnes, “The Secret Cold War: The C.I.A. and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946–1956. Part I”; Daniel Yer-gin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Secu-rity State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977); David F. Rudgers, Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943– 1947 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); Burton Hersch, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Scribner’s, 1992); Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
3 The economic ruin of Europe presented Moscow and Washington with opportunities for influence. Westad explains, “The Cold War between capitalism and Communism, and between the United States and the Soviet Union, fit the European disaster to a T. Not only had the military outcome of the war left the Americans and the Soviets in command of the continent, but Europeans, hungry for a miracle, or just plain hungry, looked to Washington or Moscow for answers The disasters that had befallen Europe put the prestige of the new masters of the continent—the Americans and the Soviets, or the Superpowers as Europeans had started calling them—into sharp relief.” Westad, Cold War, 72–73.
4 Huntington Smith, “Unemployment, Overcrowding Seen Bolstering Reds in Southern Italy,” New York Times, April 17, 1948, timesmachine .nytimes.com.
5 Robert Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy: Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 25, 52.
6 John Foot, The Archipelago: Italy Since 1945 (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 17, 22, 72; Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 49. See also Rosario Forlenza, On the Edge of Democracy: Italy, 1943–1948 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2019), chaps. 2 and 4.
Westad explains that the Communist Parties of Western Europe attracted major followings in the immediate postwar period, not only because they “had a model ready for Europe’s transformation,” but also because they “were genuinely admired by many for their role in the resis-tance to German occupation, including by people who regretted their own failure at taking up weapons.” He continues, “In the first postwar western European elections, the Communists made inroads everywhere. In Norway they got 12 percent of the vote, in Belgium 13 percent, in Italy 19 percent, in Finland 23.5 percent, and in France almost 29 percent.” Westad, Cold War, 54, 74.
7 “Crisis in Italy,” New York Times, Jan. 22, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes .com; Kaeten Mistry, The United States, Italy, and the Origins of Cold War: Waging Political Warfare, 1945–1950 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 48. See also James E. Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” Diplomatic History 7, no. 1 (1983): 37.
8 Silvio Pons, “Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe,” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 2 (2001): 3–27. For further reading, see Alessandro Brogi, Confronting America: The Cold War Between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Donald Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Communism in Italy and France (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); James E. Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940–1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).
9 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” March 10, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States (here-after cited as FRUS), 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 521, history.state .gov.
10 Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves,” 37–43; Arnaldo Cortesi, “Communists Widen Riots in Italy,” New York Times, Nov. 12, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Carlo Sforza, “Italy, the Marshall Plan, and the ‘Third Force,’ ” Foreign Affairs, April 1948, www.foreignaffairs.com; Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 62, 75.
11 Arnaldo Cortesi, “Italian Socialists Vote Unity with Communists for Elections,” New York Times, Jan. 24, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Arnaldo Cortesi, “Leftist Campaign Is Begun in Italy,” New York Times, Feb. 2, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
12 Arnaldo Cortesi, “Italian Communist Aim Is to Win 1948 Election,” New York Times, Dec. 14, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 6.
13 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” Jan. 21 and Feb. 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, docs. 506 and 511, history.state.gov.
14 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” March 1, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 515, history.state.gov. Dunn had been serving as the U.S. ambassador in Italy since February 1947. A navy veteran and experienced diplomat, he had advised several secretaries of state before arriving in Italy. On his back-ground, see Mistry, United States, Italy, and the Origins of Cold War, 75.3–5

15 Wyatt, interview by CNN for Cold War, Nov. and Dec. 1995, web .archive.org/web/20010831150516/http://www.cnn.com. See also Cen-tral Intelligence Agency, “Possible Soviet Moves to Influence Elections,” April 12, 1948 (declassified Sept. 2006), www.cia.gov; D. W. Ellwood, “The 1948 Elections in Italy: A Cold War Propaganda Battle,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio, and Television 13, no. 1 (1993): 19–33.
16 Central Intelligence Agency, “Communist Party Plans All-Out Election Effort,” Jan. 28, 1948 (declassified July 2005), www.cia.gov.
17 Central Intelligence Agency, “Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means,” March 5, 1948 (declassified Aug. 1993), www.cia.gov.
18 Camille Cianfarra, “Last U.S. Troops Quit Italy; Rome Hails Truman Pledge,” New York Times, Dec. 15, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Bertram Hulen, “Truman Promises Watch to Uphold Italian Freedom,” New York Times, Dec. 14, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
19 Hulen, “Truman Promises Watch to Uphold Italian Freedom.”20 “NSC 1/1: The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy,” Nov. 14, 1947, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 440, history .state.gov.
21 Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves,” 43. The U.S. Congress, in 1976, found, “As the elections in 1948 and 1949 in Italy and France approached, the democratic parties were in disarray and the possibility of a Com-munist takeover was real. Coordinated Communist political unrest in western countries combined with extremist pressure from the Soviet Union, confirmed the fears of many that America faced an expansionist Communist monolith. The United States responded with overt economic aid—the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan—and covert political assistance. This latter task was assigned to the Office of Special Projects, later renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The Office was housed in the CIA but was directly responsible to the Departments of State and Defense. Clandestine support from the United States for European democratic parties was regarded as an essential response to the threat of ‘international communism.’ OPC became the fastest growing element in the CIA.” See U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Govern-mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence, bk. 1, Final Report, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, S. Rep. 94-755, 22.
22 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), 50. See also Sarah-Jane Corke, U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare, and the CIA, 1945–53 (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2007), 48; Robin Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 380.
23 Jeffreys-Jones, CIA and American Democracy, 50; John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (New York: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 39; Forlenza, On the Edge of Democracy, chap. 3. Winks explains, “On December 19 the National Security Council, by its directive NSC 4/A, ordered the director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoet-ter, to do what he could, including the use of covert activities, to prevent a Communist victory Hillenkoetter assigned the Italian puzzle to the Office of Special Operations The OSO promptly established a Special Procedures Group, or SPG, and on December 22 it began to shape its plans.” Winks, Cloak and Gown, 381. See also Robert J. Donovan, Con-flict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945–1948 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), chap. 33.
24 Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves,” 48.
25 U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, 49.
26 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” Feb. 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 511, history.state.gov.
27 George Marshall, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in London,” March 2, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 516, history .state.gov.
28 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” Feb. 7 and 21, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, docs. 511 and 513, history.state.gov. Just three days before Marshall’s speech, Dunn had reiterated, in a cable marked “urgent,” that Front officials were “becloud[ing] this most damaging argument” that U.S. aid would cease, were they to win the election. See James Clement Dunn, “The Ambas-sador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” March 16, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 525, history.state.gov. On the Soviet Union and the Marshall Plan, see Westad, Cold War, 92–94. On the broader impact of the Marshall Plan on international politics, Charles Maier concludes, “The Marshall Plan, in effect, was the single most important policy in confirming, but not initiating, the division of Europe,” in “The Marshall Plan and the Division of Europe,” as part of a spirited dialogue between Michael Cox, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Marc Trachtenberg, John Bledsoe Bonds, László Borhi, and Günter Bischof in Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 1 (2005). For further reading, see Nicolaus Mills, Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America’s Coming of Age as a Superpower (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2008); Greg Baneh, rm The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007); Gregory A. Fossedal, Our Finest Hour: Will Clayton, the Marshall Plan, and the Triumph of Democracy (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1993).
29 George Marshall, “World-Wide Struggle Between Freedom and Tyranny” (speech, University of California, Berkeley, March 19, 1948), New York Times, March 20, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com. For further reading on Marshall’s career and character, see Ed Cray, General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990); George Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1817–19 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976); Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, The China Mission: George Marshall’s Unfinished War, 1945–1947 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2018).
30 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” March 20 and June 16, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, docs. 528 and 543, history.state.gov.
31 George Marshall, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy,” March 24, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 531, history .state.gov; Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves,” 48–49; “Pleas to Italy Ask Vote Against Reds,” New York Times, April 8, 1948, timesmachine .nytimes.com; Eric Martone, Italian Americans: The History and Culture of a People (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2016), 41.
Decades later, Jimmy Carter, the U.S. president from 1977 to 1981, sought to turn the page. Olav Njølstad explains, “Carter took steps to change the policy of not granting visas to Communist Party members, a practice established before the 1948 election to discourage Italian voters with relatives in the United States from voting for the PCI.” Olav Njøl-stad, “The Carter Administration and Italy: Keeping the Communists Out of Power Without Interfering,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 3 (2002): 65.
32 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” Feb. 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 511, history.state.gov; Samuel A. Tower, “Interim Aid Steps Rushed by Com-mittees in Congress,” New York Times, March 21, 1948, timesmachine .nytimes.com; Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves,” 49. See also Norman Armour, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour),” Feb. 18, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 512, history.state.gov; Willard Thorp, “Memoran-dum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (Thorp),” April 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 536, history.state.gov; David Ellwood, “The Propaganda of the Marshall Plan in Italy in a Cold War Context,” Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 2 (2003): 225–36.
33 George Marshall, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy,” Feb. 4, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 510, history.state.gov; Arnaldo Cortesi, “De Gasperi Wins a Record Vote After Denying U.S. Rules Italy,” New York Times, Dec. 19, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com. See also “Italy Signs Pact with U.S. on Aid,” New York Times, Jan. 3, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
34 Leonard Dinnerstein and David Reimers, Ethnic Americans: A History of Immigration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 50.
35 C. Edda Martinez and Edward A Suchman, “Letters from America and the 1948 Elections in Italy,” Public Opinion Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1950): 112.
36 Ibid., 112–115. About a decade later, Anfuso, by then a congressman, secretly approved of Christian Democrats reselling American aid in order to raise campaign funds. See Leopoldo Nuti, “The United States, Italy, and the Opening to the Left, 1953–1963,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 3 (2002): 50.
37 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” April 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 535, history.state.gov; Mistry, United States, Italy, and the Origins of Cold War, 142; Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 63.
38 Martinez and Suchman, “Letters from America,” 111, 119; Ellwood, “1948 Elections in Italy,” 21; “Letter Campaign Denounced,” New York Times, April 9, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
39 “Pleas to Italy Ask Vote Against Reds”; Mistry, United States, Italy, and the Origins of Cold War, 141; Stephen Gundle, “Hollywood Glamour and Mass Consumption in Postwar Italy,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 3 (2002): 102; Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves,” 49–51, in which he details how the U.S. government rejected a proposed get-out-the-vote tour by Sinatra as too brazen. For further reading on the Italian Com-munist Party’s struggles with modernity, see Stephen Gundle, Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian Communists and the Challenge of Mass Culture, 1943–1991 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000).
40 Arnaldo Cortesi, “Fear of Red Coup Drives Lira Down,” New York Times, March 6, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com. See also Drew Middleton, “Britons Are Fearful That Italy May Be Next Victim of Red Coup,” New York Times, March 11, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” March 1, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 514, history.state.gov.
41 “The Text of President Truman’s Address to the Joint Session of Con-gress,” New York Times, March 18, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves,” 46–48. For elaboration on Western reac-tions to the Czechoslovak coup, see Peter Svik, “The Czechoslovak Factor in Western Alliance Building, 1945–1948,” Journal of Cold War Studies 18, no. 1 (2016): 133–60.
42 Camille Cianfarra, “Clergy Ordered to Vote in Italy,” New York Times, Feb. 25, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Camille Cianfarra, “Vatican Will Back Regime in Election,” New York Times, Feb. 13, 1948, times machine.nytimes.com. See also Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, chap. 3.
43 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” March 10, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 521, history.state.gov; Camille Cianfarra, “Pope Tells Clergy to Combat Reds,” New York Times, March 11, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
44 Cianfarra, “Pope Tells Clergy to Combat Reds”; Arnaldo Cortesi, “Pope Sees World Facing Critical Danger This Year,” New York Times, March 29, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “Text of the Easter Address by Pope Pius to Romans,” New York Times, March 29, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
45 “Pravda Sees Plots by U.S. and Vatican,” New York Times, Dec. 25, 1947, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Foot, Archipelago, 46.
46 Central Intelligence Agency, “Measures Proposed to Defeat Communism in Italy,” Feb. 9, 1948 (declassified Sept. 2006), www.cia.gov. (However, in this memorandum, one of the steps Dunn recommended remains clas-sified.) Central Intelligence Agency, “US Plans Support of Italy,” March 8, 1948 (declassified Sept. 2006), www.cia.gov.
47 Wyatt, interview by CNN; Jeffreys-Jones, CIA and American Democ-racy, 51; Corke, U.S. Covert Operations, 48. Technically, Hillenkoetter was the director of Central Intelligence, which was the title of the official in charge of the CIA until 2005, when Congress created the position of director of the Central Intelligence Agency. For consistency and in accor-dance with other texts, this book refers to holders of either role as the CIA’s director.
48 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelli-gence Activities: Covert Action, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 4 and 5, 1975, 66, www.intelligence.senate.gov. Also in 1948, CIA Director Hillenkoet-ter told lawmakers that some challenges abroad required an immediate operational response. Citing an example, he said, “Any possible action in connection with the Italian election.” See U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, 494.
Clifford was a close adviser to Presidents Harry Truman, John F. Ken-nedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. For more on the circumstances surround-ing his testimony, see chapter 5 of this book, as well as Loch K. Johnson, “Witness Testimony from the Church Committee Hearings on Covert Action, 1975,” Intelligence and National Security 34, no. 6 (2019): 899– 913. For Clifford’s personal recollections, see Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991). For further reading on voter reactions to overt electoral interference—the issue to which Clifford alluded—see Stephen Bloom and Stephen Shulman, “The Legitimacy of Foreign Intervention in Elections: The Ukrainian Response,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 2 (2012): 445–71; Daniel Corstange and Nikolay Marinov, “Taking Sides in Other People’s Elections: The Polarizing Effect of Foreign Intervention,” American Jour-nal of Political Science 56, no. 3 (2012): 655–70.
49 “NSC 1/3: Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means,” March 8, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. III, Western Europe, doc. 475, history.state.gov.
50 Robarge, interview by author, McLean, Va., July 19, 2019.
51 Ibid.; Wyatt, interview by CNN; Gregg, interview by author, Armonk, N.Y., March 17, 2018.
52 Robarge, interview by author; Mistry, United States, Italy, and the Origins of Cold War, 135. Conversion to 2020 values executed by U.S. Inflation Calculator, www.usinflationcalculator.com.
53 Robarge, interview by author.
54 Ibid.; Wyatt, interview by CNN.
55 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” June 16, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 543, history.state.gov.
56 John Lewis Gaddis captures Kennan as a man of “authority,” “eloquence,” and “grand strategic” instincts in George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 694.
57 George Kennan, “Measures Short of War,” George F. Kennan Lectures, National War College, Washington, D.C., Sept. 16, 1946. In February 1946, Kennan had submitted an unusually lengthy cable, known as the Long Telegram, advocating a strategy of containment. Gaddis explains, “If the task at hand was to shift Washington’s policy from afar—and Kennan had been trying to do that since the summer of 1944—then . . . the ‘long telegram’ expressed what Kennan knew, in a form suited for policy makers who needed to know, better than anything else he ever wrote. No other document, whether written by him or anyone else, had the instantaneous influence that this one did.” Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 222. For further reading on Kennan, see Walter L. Hixson, George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); John Lukacs, George Kennan: A Study of Character (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007); Nicholas Thompson, The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War (New York: Henry Holt, 2009).
58 Robarge, interview by author.
59 George Kennan, “The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” March 15, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 523, history.state.gov. On Kennan’s mindset when he sent this cable, see Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 305–7.
60 Kennan, “Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” March 15, 1948.
61 Arnaldo Cortesi, “Fear of a Red Coup Rises in Italy; Adriatic Arms Smug-glers Hunted,” New York Times, Feb. 5, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” Jan. 12 and 21 and Feb. 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, docs. 505, 506, and 511, history.state.gov.
62 Arnaldo Cortesi, “Rome Denies Plan to Delay Election,” New York Times, Feb. 15, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Central Intelligence Agency, “Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means”; Winks, Cloak and Gown, 385; “Le mani sull’Italia,” Panorama, May 2, 1974, in Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe, ed. Philip Agee and Louis Wolf (Secaucus, N.J.: L. Stuart, 1978), 171.
63 “Soviet Press Plays Up Italy,” New York Times, April 18, 1948, times machine.nytimes.com; Arnaldo Cortesi, “The Great Issue in Italy: Russia or the U.S.,” New York Times, April 18, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Arnaldo Cortesi, “Millions in Italy at Party Rallies,” New York Times, April 12, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “Italy to Hold Mass Early on Voting Day,” New York Times, April 16, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Mistry, United States, Italy, and the Origins of Cold War, 150.
64 James Clement Dunn, “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” April 20, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, doc. 541, history.state.gov; C. L. Sulzberger, “Italian Reds Rule Out Coup; Two Arms Depots Attacked,” New York Times, April 19, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Arnaldo Cortesi, “Communists Lose in Italy; De Gasperi Leads by 3 to 2 and May Hold a Majority,” New York Times, April 20, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
In a letter dated March 26, 1948, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, had instructed the Soviet ambassador in Italy to warn Togliatti against launching an armed insurrection. Silvio Pons, in his analysis of this letter, explains, “Stalin had concluded that any significant involvement by either the Soviet Union or the newly solidified ‘socialist camp’ in a conflict in a Western country would be a grave mistake.” Pons, “Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe,” 20–21.
65 Camille Cianfarra, “Pope Expresses Joy over Vote; 3 Nations Offered Him a Haven,” New York Times, April 20, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “Truman Hails Outcome of Elections in Italy,” New York Times, April 23, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “First ERP Ship Reaches Italy,” New York Times, June 1, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
Thomas Dewey, Truman’s Republican opponent, also commented on the outcome of the election, telegraphing De Gasperi that “our hopes and prayers have been answered by the smashing triumph of free men over totalitarian communism.” See “Dewey Hails Italy’s Vote,” New York Times, April 21, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com. For further reading, see Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 419840–19 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974).
66 “Tagliatti Admits Reds Lost 1,000,000 Votes,” New York Times, May 6, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “Italian Reds Accuse Clergy on Elec-tion,” New York Times, June 9, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Ven-tresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 20.
67 “Appeal to Voters in Italy Assailed,” New York Times, April 15, 1948, timesmachine.nytimes.com. On the penetrability of U.S. elections during the Cold War, see chapter 5 of this book.
68 Wyatt, interview by CNN; Inman, interview by author, Austin, Tex., Nov. 2, 2018; Negroponte, phone interview by author, May 21, 2019.
69 Robarge, interview by author.
70 Wippl, phone interview by author, Nov. 8, 2018.
71 Central Intelligence Agency, “Analysis of the Power of the Communist Parties of France and Italy and of Measures to Counter Them,” by Allen Dulles, Sept. 15, 1951 (declassified Dec. 2006), www.cia.gov. In Italy’s 1951 local elections, this memorandum records, the Christian Democrats lost their “substantial popular majority.” On July 9 of that year, represen-tatives from the CIA, the State Department, and the Defense Department gathered in Harriman’s office to discuss, in part, how to covertly weaken Italy’s Communist Party. A few weeks later, Dulles held a meeting at the U.S. Embassy in Rome with the same agenda.
For further reading on Harriman, see Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891–1986 (New York: Wil-liam Morrow, 1992); Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986). For further reading on Dulles, see Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994); Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War (New York: Times Books, 2013).
72 Central Intelligence Agency, “Analysis of the Power of the Communist Parties of France and Italy and of Measures to Counter Them,” cover note. U.S. officials expressed concerns similar to Dulles’s continually. In 1953, the CIA compiled reports on “the continuing strength of the Italian Communist Party” and the “uncertain future” of De Gasperi’s govern-ment. Another CIA memorandum, written a few years later, assessed the various sources of the Communist Party’s strength in Italy, including its well-funded and “massive propaganda campaigns.” See Central Intelli-gence Agency, “The Continuing Strength of the Italian Communist Party,” May 28, 1953 (declassified Jan. 2002), www.cia.gov; Central Intelligence Agency, “The Italian Elections,” June 9, 1953 (declassified Aug. 2000), www.cia.gov; Central Intelligence Agency, “Status and Strength of the Italian Communist Party (PCI),” exact date of issuance unclear (declassi-fied July 2001), www.cia.gov.
73 Central Intelligence Agency, “Analysis of the Power of the Communist Parties of France and Italy and of Measures to Counter Them,” cover note.
74 These figures and dates are from a memorandum that emerged while the U.S. Congress was investigating the CIA in the mid-1970s, taken from CIA: The Pike Report (Nottingham, U.K.: Spokesman, 1977), 204–6. Conversion information from U.S. Inflation Calculator, www.usinflation calculator.com, using a baseline of 1958.
75 Central Intelligence Agency, “Analysis of the Power of the Communist Parties of France and Italy and of Measures to Counter Them,” exhibit 3.
76 William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 109, 110, 116. Bobby Inman, the former CIA deputy director, told me that “Colby made his reputation in the Italian elections.” While in Italy, Colby worked closely with Clare Boothe Luce, who became the U.S. ambassador there in 1953. Alessandro Brogi, “Ike and Italy: The Eisenhower Administration and Italy’s ‘Neo-Atlanticist Agenda,’” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 3 (2002): 5–35; Inman, interview by author. For further reading on Colby’s career, see John Prados, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
77 Fina, interview by Charles Kennedy, May 21, 1992, Association for Dip-lomatic Studies and Training, www.adst.org; Colby, Honorable Men, 119, in which he further explained, “Washington wanted the ability to place stories in non-American media around the world and then cause its other ‘outlets’ to pick up and publicize it.”78 Colby, Honorable Men, 120. Stansfield Turner, CIA director between 1977 and 1981, explained in his memoirs that cutouts enabled the agency to pass “funds to foreign groups that needed help without those groups knowing their source was the CIA.” During his tenure, he continued, the CIA used cutouts to direct more than $10 million annually to “useful and friendly groups” overseas. Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 77.
79 Dulles, “Analysis of the Power of the Communist Parties of France and Italy and of Measures to Counter Them,” cover note. See also Mario Del Pero, “The United States and Psychological Warfare in Italy, 1948–1955,” Journal of American History 87, no. 4 (2001): 1304–34.
80 Central Intelligence Agency, “Analysis of the Power of the Communist Parties of France and Italy and of Measures to Counter Them,” exhibit 3.
81 Central Intelligence Agency, “Memorandum for the Record,” Jan. 29, 1953 (declassified Aug. 2000), www.cia.gov.
82 Colby, Honorable Men, 114, 130. Indeed, Richard Drake writes, “For decades the Soviet Union gave more money to the [Italian Communist Party] than to any other non-ruling Communist party.” Richard Drake, “The Soviet Dimension of Italian Communism,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 3 (2004): 116.
83 “NSC 68,” April 14, 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 85, history.state.gov. For elaboration on NSC 68 and its impact, see Ken Young, “Revisiting NSC 68,” Journal of Cold War Studies 15, no. 1 (2013): 3–33; Curt Caldwell, NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War (New York: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2011); Ernest May, American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston: St. Martin’s, 1993).
84 While investigating the CIA decades later, a congressional committee found, “Covert action projects were first designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe and were, at least initially, a limited and ad hoc response to an exceptional threat to American security. Covert action soon became a routine program of influencing governments and covertly exercising power—involving literally hundreds of projects each year. By 1953 there were major covert operations underway in 48 countries, consisting of propaganda, paramilitary and political action projects.” U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, 153. For a general history of the CIA’s Cold War operations, see James Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War: US Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009).
85 Miles Copeland, Without Cloak or Dagger: The Truth About the New Espionage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), 11.
86 Shelton-Colby, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 18, 2019.

第三章 爆炸

1 Robarge, interview by author, McLean, Va., July 19, 2019. See also note 21 of the introduction of this book.
2 Inman, interview by author, Austin, Tex., Nov. 2, 2018. For further consideration of Cold War power dynamics, see Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?,” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 1 (2001): 36–60; William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
3 Westad, Cold War, 627; Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3.
4 Muñoz, phone interview by author, July 20, 2019.
5 This figure became part of the public record after the Soviet Union col-lapsed, when Russian prosecutors investigated where the Soviet Politburo had directed state funds. See Celestine Bohlen, “Gorbachev Enabled Party Money to Be Invested, a Hearing Is Told,” New York Times, Feb. 11, 1992, www.nytimes.com. Conversion information from U.S. Inflation Calculator, www.usinflationcalculator.com, using a baseline of 1985.
6 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 293–97, which further explains that Moscow’s support did have its limits. In early 1972, Luigi Longo, Italy’s Communist leader, requested increasingly more money as an election approached. In a personal reply, Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, granted Longo another $500,000 while emphasizing “at the pres-ent time, there is no more that we can do.”Officials in Moscow also valued the influence they established over the foreign parties they funded. “The tight link between Moscow and the West European Communist parties required the parties to subordinate their interests to those of the Soviet Union,” writes Silvio Pons in “Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe,” 5.
7 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 305, 451–55. For further reading on Marchais, see Jeffrey Vanke, “Georges Marchais and the Decline of French Communism,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (2004): 90–94.
8 Westad thus writes, “U.S. involvements were perceived in America as defensive interventions, mainly against left-wing or Communist move-ments,” in Global Cold War, 111, regarding America’s interventionist activities generally. The CIA was also active in the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, executing operations that had nothing to do with elections. For example, the CIA helped organize and fund Radio Free Europe, which broadcast pro-U.S. propaganda across the Eastern bloc. See A. Ross Johnson, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010); Sig Mickelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Lib-erty (New York: Praeger, 1983). For more general reading, see Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propa-ganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
9 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 16986, 4–19 vol. 29, pt. 2, Japan, doc. 1, history.state.gov; Robarge, interview by author.
10 Tim Weiner, “C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50’s and 60’s,” New York Times, Oct. 9, 1994, www.nytimes.com.
11 Dean Rusk, “Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson,” Feb. 6, 1964, FRUS, 61986, 4–19 vol. 32, Dominican Repub-lic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, doc. 371, history.state.gov; “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 61986, 4–19 vol. 32, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, doc. 370, history.state.gov.
12 “Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee,” March 17, 1967, FRUS, 61986, 4–19 vol. 32, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, doc. 421, history.state.gov.
13 “Editorial Note,” doc. 370; Richard Meislin, “Guyana’s Leader Dies; Suc-cessor Is Sworn In,” New York Times, Aug. 7, 1985, www.nytimes.com.
14 Henry Kissinger, “Memorandum for the President: Exploitation of Ten-sions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,” April 9, 1970, taken from CIA General Records (declassified Feb. 2010), www.cia.gov. For further reading on Kissinger, see Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).
15 Henry Kissinger, “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” n.d., FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 12, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, doc. 149.
16 Goss, interview by author, Florida Keys, Fla., Dec. 26, 2018.
17 “Allende, a Man of the Privileged Class Turned Radical Politician,” New York Times, Sept. 12, 1973, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Simon Collier and William Sater, A History of Chile, 1808–2002 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 258; Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 19–24. For further reading on the evolution of Allende and the Chilean left, see Peter Winn, Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile’s Road to Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 3.
18 Ferocious critiques of American foreign policy followed in the public square. The CIA tracked these criticisms internally. For example, the agency cataloged an article published by Willard Barber, a former State Department official, titled “Are We Losing Latins to Reds?,” in which he warned of “Russian and Chinese Communists efforts” to establish influence over countries like Chile. See Willard Barber, “Are We Los-ing Latins to Reds?,” Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1963, taken from CIA General Records (declassified June 2000), www.cia.gov. Similarly, the CIA recorded a column by Robert Morris, a conservative politican, titled “Reds Map Plan to Win Latins,” in which he complained about Washington’s passive response to Moscow’s plan “to conquer the world.” According to an Eastern defector, Morris continued, Castro and Moscow had resolved to create “what is called in the Kremlin—the USRLA—the United Socialist Republics of Latin America.” Within a few years, he went on, this leftist alliance would include Chile. See Robert Morris, “Reds Map Plan to Win Latins,” publication unclear, Oct. 23, 1963, taken from CIA General Records (declassified March 2001), www.cia.gov. On international reactions to Castro’s rise, see Tanya Harmer, “The ‘Cuban Question’ and the Cold War in Latin America, 1959–1964,” Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 3 (2019): 114–51.
19 Kalugin, interview by author, Rockville, Md., Aug. 7, 2018; Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 21, 34, 36; Central Intelli-gence Agency, “Communist Penetration of Latin America,” NSC Brief-ing, Dec. 15, 1959, www.cia.gov. On the differing strategies of Castro and Allende, see Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (London: Verso Press, 2005), 30.
20 Robert A. Hurwitch, “Letter from the First Secretary of the Embassy in Chile (Hurwitch) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” June 19, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 259, history.state.gov; “Telegram from the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State,” April 22, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 251, history.state.gov.
The CIA reported in a memorandum that Allende’s Socialist Party “usually follows the Communist line,” and forecast in the president’s daily brief that “the Communists [would have] a large say” in an Allende-led government. See Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Intelligence Mem-orandum: Chilean Congressional Elections of 5 March 1961,” Feb. 7, 1961 (declassified Aug. 2001), www.cia.gov; Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Intelligence Checklist,” March 17, 1964 (declassified July 2015), www.cia.gov.
21 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 4. John F. Kennedy had announced the Alliance for Progress in 1961, declaring in his inaugural address that it would “assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty.” By 1964, America had directed more than $1.5 billion into this initiative. Chile received the most support per capita of any country in the region. In all, between 1962 and 1970, the United States provided Chile $1.2 billion in economic grants and loans, as well as $91 million in military aid. See John F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address” (speech, Washington, D.C., Jan. 20, 1961), Avalon Project, avalon.law.yale.edu; “Fruitful Year Is Forecast for Alliance for Progress,” New York Times, Jan. 17, 1964, www.nytimes.com; Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New Press, 2003), 5–6.
22 Hurwitch, “Letter from the First Secretary of the Embassy in Chile”; “Chile: The Crucial Choice,” Time, April 17, 1964, taken from CIA General Records (declassified March 2012), www.cia.gov. From the per-spective of the CIA, David Robarge writes, “US policymakers believed a socialist regime in Chile would give the Soviet Union a satellite in Latin America that potentially was more useful than Cuba for starting a radical ‘chain reaction’ in unstable countries in the region, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia.” David Robarge, John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence, 1961–1965 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelli-gence Agency, published internally in 2005, declassified in April 2015), 286.
23 MITN 2/22, entries 343 and 368, Papers of Vasili Mitrokhin, Churchill College, Cambridge University.
24 Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 32.
25 MITN 2/22, entry 368, Papers of Mitrokhin.
26 Kalugin, interview by author.
27 Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Intelligence Checklist,” March 21, 1964 (declassified July 2015), www.cia.gov; Central Intelli-gence Agency, “The President’s Intelligence Checklist,” April 23, 1964 (declassified July 2015), www.cia.gov.
28 Robarge, John McCone, 284; U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, bk. 1, 46, 57, which found that fewer than one-fifth of all covert action projects reached the Special Group.
29 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 5, 14; Ralph Dungan, “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Dungan) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” Jan. 18, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 246, history.state.gov.
30 “Chile’s Leftist Candidate Vows Legal Seizure of U.S. Concerns,” New York Times, June 7, 1964, www.nytimes.com.
31 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 15; Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 44; “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 258, history.state.gov.
32 Gordon Chase, “Memorandum from Gordon Chase of the National Secu-rity Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” March 19, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 249, history.state.gov.
In 1962 and 1963, the Special Group had sanctioned one-off, non-attributable payments to Chile’s Christian Democratic Party and the more reliably conservative Democratic Front. But in early 1964, the Democratic Front, made up of the Radical, Liberal, and Conservative Parties, disbanded. Frei, who identified as a non-Marxist, thus became the only viable alternative to a candidate whom Washington associated with Soviet influence. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 5, 15.
33 “Memorandum Prepared for the Special Group,” April 1, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 250, history.state.gov.
34 Ibid. In 1964, it seems, American officials would not consider supporting a military coup against a prospective Allende administration. The U.S. Congress later found, “On July 19, 1964, the Chilean Defense Council, which is the equivalent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to [the outgo-ing Chilean president] to propose a coup d’état if Allende won. This offer was transmitted to the CIA Chief of Station, who told the Chilean Defense Council through an intermediary that the United States was absolutely opposed to a coup.” U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile,71.6–1

35 Joseph Caldwell King, “Memorandum from the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (King) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone,” Jan. 3, 1964, FRUS, 16986, 4–19 vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 245, history.state.gov.
36 “Memorandum Prepared for the Special Group,” doc. 250.
37 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 16.
38 “Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intel-ligence McCone and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann),” April 28, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 252, history.state.gov; Thomas Mann, “Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Rusk,” May 1, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 253, history .state.gov.
39 “Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann),” June 11, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968 vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc 16, history.state.gov.
40 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 9, 15.
41 Ibid., 15; Margaret Power, “The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile’s 1964 Presidential Election,” Diplomatic History 32, no. 5 (2008): 933, 939, in which Power further explains that in the 1958 elec-tion “women’s electoral preferences were decisive to determining which candidate won,” and “this realization explains why the U.S. government viewed capturing women’s votes as critical to winning the 1964 presiden-tial election.”42 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 7–8, 15.
43 Ibid., 16; “Editorial Note,” doc. 258; “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1964– 1968, vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 262, history .state.gov.
44 “Editorial Note,” doc. 262. Bundy found some comfort in internal poll-ing, informing Johnson, in July, that forecasts were promising but that victory still was not assured. “The Christian Democrats are coming from behind,” Bundy warned. “They now have a good organization but they have to guard against over-confidence and fight all the way to the finish line if they hope to win.” See McGeorge Bundy, “Information Memoran-dum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson,” July 8, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 261, history.state.gov.
45 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 1, 9. Conversion to 2020 values executed by U.S. Inflation Calculator, www.usinflationcalculator.com.
46 McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson,” Aug. 13, 1964, FRUS, 61986, 4–19 vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 265, history.state.gov. In Washington, the CIA had forecast ahead of time that Chile might terminate its relations with Cuba before the election. See Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Intelligence Checklist,” Aug. 10, 1964, www.cia.gov.
47 Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Intelligence Review,” July 29–31, Aug. 26–28, and Aug. 29–Sept. 1, 1964 (declassified July–Aug. 2015), www.cia.gov; “Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency,” Sept. 1, 1964, FRUS, 61986, 4–19 vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 268, history.state.gov. On the environment in Chile just before the election, see Henry Raymont, “Chile Acts to Insure Orderly Presidential Voting,” New York Times, Sept. 1, 1964, times machine.nytimes.com; Henry Raymont, “Candidate Seeks Nonaligned Chile,” New York Times, Aug. 31, 1964, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
48 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 31, South and Central Amer-ica; Mexico, doc. 269, history.state.gov; Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Intelligence Checklist,” Sept. 5, 1964 (declassified July 2015), www.cia.gov; Henry Raymont, “Frei, a Moderate, Elected to the Presidency of Chile,” New York Times, Sept. 5, 1964, www.nytimes.com.
49 Thomas Hughes, “Intelligence Note from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk,” Sept. 5, 1964, FRUS, 16986, 4–19 vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 270, history.state.gov; Henry Raymont, “Frei, Victor in Chile, Vows Cooperation with the U.S.,” New York Times, Sept. 6, 1964, times machine.nytimes.com; Henry Raymont, “Chileans Install Frei as Presi-dent,” New York Times, Nov. 4, 1964, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
50 Robarge, interview by author; Central Intelligence Agency, “The Presi-dent’s Intelligence Checklist,” Sept. 5, 1964 (declassified July 2015), www.cia.gov; “Editorial Note,” doc. 269.
51 “Editorial Note,” doc. 269; “Transcript of the President’s News Confer-ence on Foreign and Domestic Matters,” New York Times, Sept. 6, 1964, www.nytimes.com. See also Henry Raymont, “Prospect of a Marxist Victory in Chilean Election Causes Wide Concern in Hemisphere,” New York Times, Sept. 3, 1964, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
52 McLaughlin, phone interview by author, Sept. 5, 2019.
53 Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Intelligence Checklist,” Sept. 3, 1964 (declassified July 2015), www.cia.gov; “Chile: The Cru-cial Choice”; Raymont, “Frei, a Moderate, Elected to the Presidency of Chile.”54 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 54. Gustafson explains, “The United States had effectively, and with consent, undermined the credibility of the Frei government and the [Christian Democratic Party] by aligning too closely with them.” Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 49.
55 Tom Wicker, “Johnson Says He Won’t Run,” New York Times, April 1, 1968, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “Vietnam War Casualty Statistics,” National Archives, accessed online; John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 133. On Moscow’s relationship with the Frei administration, see Rafael Pedemonte, “A Case of ‘New Soviet Internationalism’: Relations Between the USSR and Chile’s Christian Democratic Government, 1964–1970,” Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 3 (2019): 4–25.
56 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973, 57; “Memo-randum for the 303 Committee, Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election,” March 14, 1969, FRUS, 17696, 9–19 vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 3, history.state.gov. The U.S. Senate further found, “In the years between 1962 and 1969, Chile received well over a billion dollars in direct, overt United States aid, loans and grants both included.” U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 4. In addition to this overt aid, Kornbluh explains, the United States “pressured major U.S. corporations, particularly the two copper giants, Anaconda and Ken-necott, which dominated the Chilean economy, to modernize and expand their investments and operations.” Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 5.
57 Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Daily Brief,” Feb. 7, April 2, May 2, and July 24, 1968 (declassified July 2015), www.cia.gov; Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Memorandum: The Chilean Economy: Trends Under Frei and Prospects for 1969–1970,” April 1969 (declassified Jan. 2012), www.cia.gov.
58 Henry Kissinger, “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” July 11, 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 17, history.state.gov; Central Intelligence Agency, “Chilean Problems and Frei’s Prospects,” March 4, 1968 (declassified Aug. 2006), www.cia.gov. According to the U.S. Senate, “To deal with the American copper companies, Frei proposed ‘Chileanization,’ by which the state would purchase majority ownership in order to exercise control and stimulate output. Frei’s reforms, while impressive, fell far short of what he had promised.” U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 5. See also John Fleming, “The Nationalization of Chile’s Large Copper Companies in Contemporary Interstate Relations,” Villanova Law Review 18, no. 4 (1973), digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu.
59 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 20; “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1964–1968 vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 273, history.state.gov; “Memorandum for the 303 Committee,” Jan. 25, 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968 vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 277, history.state.gov; William Broe, “Memorandum from the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (Broe) to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines),” April 26, 1968, FRUS, 1964–1968 vol. 31, South and Central America; Mexico, doc. 304, history.state.gov; “Memorandum for the 303 Committee,” doc. 3.
60 “Memorandum for the 303 Committee,” doc. 3; “Telegram from the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State,” March 25, 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976 vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 5, history.state.gov; “Memo-randum for the Record, Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 15 April 1969,” April 17, 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 7, history.state.gov.
61 “Chilean Left Finally Picks Allende to Run for President,” New York Times, Jan. 23, 1970, www.nytimes.com; Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Daily Brief,” Jan. 24, 1970, www.cia.gov; “Memoran-dum for the 40 Committee, Political Action Related to 1970 Chilean Presidential Election,” March 5, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976 vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973 doc. 29, history.state.gov.
Frei, term-limited, could not run for president in 1970. See Haslam, The Nixon Administration, 37.
62 “Memorandum for the 40 Committee,” doc. 29.
63 “Memorandum for the Record, Discussion of U.S. Government Activities Leading Up to the Chilean Election in September 1970,” Jan. 19, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976 vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 28, history.state.gov.
64 Viron Vaky, “Memorandum by Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff,” March 25, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976 vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 30, history.state.gov; U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 43.
65 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 21–22; Devine, interview by author, New York, Feb. 21, 2019.
66 Malcolm Browne, “Most Parties in Chile Find C.I.A. a Useful Target,” New York Times, Dec. 24, 1969, www.cia.gov; “Memorandum for the 40 Committee,” doc. 29.
67 Richard Helms, “Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kis-singer),” June 16, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 34, history.state.gov; “Memorandum for the Record: Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee,” June 27, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976 vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 41, history.state.gov; Viron Vaky, “Memo-randum from Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” June 23, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 39, history.state.gov.
68 Henry KHissinger, White House Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 667.
69 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 20. Helms, in his memoirs, wrote that “the cost and extent” of the CIA’s electoral interference opera-tion “was but a fraction of the Soviet and Cuban effort in Chile.” Richard Helms, A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003), 400.
70 MITN 2/22, entry 368, Papers of Mitrokhin.
71 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 72; MITN 2/22, entry 41, Papers of Mitrokhin.
72 MITN 2/22, entry 368, Papers of Mitrokhin.
73 Henry Kissinger, “National Security Study Memorandum 97,” July 24, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 46, history .state.gov.
74 “NSSM 97—Chile,” FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. E-16, Documents on Chile, doc. 13, history.state.gov. NSSM 97 also contained a secret CIA annex analyzing whether and how to stage a coup d’état in Chile, were Allende to win. This annex concluded that this policy should be pursued only if the United States believed that Allende posed “a security threat . . . sufficiently great to justify a covert effort to overthrow him.” See “Annex NSSM 97,” FRUS, 71696, 9–19 history.state.gov. vol. E-16, Documents on Chile, doc. 14,75 Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Daily Brief,” Dec. 3, 1969, June 30, Sept. 3, and Sept. 4, 1970 (declassified April 2016), www.cia.gov.
76 Juan de Onis, “Allende, Chilean Marxist, Wins Vote for Presidency,” New York Times, Sept. 6, 1970, www.nytimes.com; John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 163.
77 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Memorandum: Reactions in Latin America to Allende’s Victory in Chile,” Sept. 17, 1970 (declassi-fied Feb. 2008), www.cia.gov. For elaboration on overseas reactions to Allende’s triumph, see Sebastián Hurtado-Torres, “The Chilean Moment in the Global Cold War: International Reactions to Salvador Allende’s Victory in the Presidential Election of 1970,” Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 3 (2019): 26–55.
78 Robarge, interview by author; Devine, interview by author.
79 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 54; Kissinger, White House Years, 669.
80 Of Nixon’s immediate reaction to Allende’s victory, Westad writes, “In Washington Allende’s victory in the 1970 elections set off near panic. President Nixon thought Chile would develop into a second Cuba, with enormous consequences for Latin America and for the Cold War in the rest of the world. Détente with Moscow did not diminish this perspective. On the contrary, both Nixon and Kissinger believed that if Allende was able to succeed in Chile, then the Soviets would be less likely to cooperate with the United States elsewhere. With Allende’s victory in a democratic election, the Soviets had a ‘Red sandwich’ between Havana and Santiago, which could engulf all of Latin America, Nixon asserted later.” Westad, Cold War, 356.
81 “Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Review Group,” Aug. 19, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 53, history.state.gov.
82 Charles Meyer, “Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) to the Under Secretary of State for Politi-cal Affairs (Johnson),” Aug. 31, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973 doc. 58, history.state.gov.
83 On Alessandri, see Joseph Novitski, “Political Deal Urged in Chile to Keep Allende from the Presidency,” New York Times, Sept. 12, 1970, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Daily Brief,” Sept. 11, 1970 (declassified April 2016), www.cia.gov. On Washington’s decision making, see Edward Korry, “Telegram from the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State,” Sept. 8, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976 vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 68, history.state.gov; U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 23–25. Back in June, Korry had advocated authorizing funds for vote buying, but the 40 Committee had opted to delay “any decision on the buying of congressional votes” until after the election, because “the risks in eventually embarking on this course were apparent.” See “Memorandum for the Record,” doc. 41; Viron Vaky, doc. 39.
84 “Memorandum for the Record, Discussion of Chilean Political Situation,” Sept. 14, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 89, history.state.gov. See also Joseph Novitski, “Chile’s Christian Democrats Fail to Decide on Presidential Vote,” New York Times, Oct. 5, 1970, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
In a series of intelligence briefings between September 7 and 14, the CIA reported that Allende would almost certainly win the congressional vote. See Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Daily Brief,” Sept. 7, 8, and 14, 1970 (declassified April 2016), www.cia.gov.
85 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 24.
86 “Memorandum for the Record, Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Com-mittee,” Sept. 8, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 70, history.state.gov.
87 “Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Chile,” Sept. 9, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 72, history.state.gov.
88 “Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Sept. 12, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 82, shtiasteo.rgyo.v.
89 “Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rog-ers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Sept. 14, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 88, history.state.gov.
90 Viron Vaky, “Memorandum from Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Sept. 14, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969– 1973, doc. 86, history.state.gov.
91 For a detailed account of CIA operations in Chile after Allende’s victory in the 1970 election, see Gustafson, Hostile Intent, chaps. 3–7; Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, chap. 1–2.
92 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 93, history.state.gov; U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 23.
93 “Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Chile,” Oct. 16, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 154, history.state.gov; William V. Broe, “Memorandum for the Record,” Sept. 16, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile, 1969–1973, doc. 94, history.state.gov; U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 2.
94 Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA Activities in Chile,” Sept. 18, 2000, www.cia.gov; U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 26.
95 Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA Activities in Chile.” For the sequence of events that resulted in Schneider’s death, see Haslam, The Nixon Administration, 70; Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 22–28. John Dinges further explains, “The CIA provided three submachine guns to one group of plot-ters at 2 A.M. on the day of the kidnapping. The CIA has always insisted that the weapons were never used and that a different group killed Schnei-der. Weapons and money were also promised to that second group but were never delivered, according to the CIA. The distinction between the two groups seems insubstantial, however, since the CIA never abandoned the tactic of kidnapping the army chief and was providing support to plot-ters on the same day it actually happened. The United States thus gave its operational endorsement to acts of terrorism in furtherance of the cause of anti-Communism.” John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: New Press, 2004), 19.
96 Joseph Novitski, “Chile Buries General as Martyr,” New York Times, Oct. 27, 1970, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Joseph Novitski, “Military Leader Dies in Santiago,” New York Times, Oct. 26, 1970, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
97 Juan de Onis, “Rightist Withdraws in Chile, Endorsing Allende,” New York Times, Oct. 20, 1970, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Joseph Novitski, “Allende, Marxist Leader, Elected Chile’s President,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 1970, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Juan de Onis, “3 Commu-nists Given Key Economic Posts in Chilean Cabinet,” New York Times, Oct. 31, 1970, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Juan de Onis, “Allende Sworn; Urges Sacrifice,” New York Times, Nov. 4, 1970, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
Later, in December 1970, the CIA reported that “in Chile, the Com-munist Party has publicly boasted of its important role in the Allende government.” Central Intelligence Agency, “The President’s Daily Brief,” Dec. 1, 1970 (declassified June 2016), www.cia.gov.
98 U.S. Congress, Senate, Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973, 27. In Feb-ruary 1973, a besieged Allende hosted a KGB employee at his villa, where he described plans to reform Chile’s security services so that their “main focus” would be “finding out about and suppressing American subversion.” Of this meeting, the KGB archives continue, “Allende really counts on Soviet help in this matter. This information was relayed to [Leonid] Brezhnev.” That month, Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB, briefed his superiors on Allende. “Providing [Allende] with some mon-etary help, paying attention to him and executing his personal wishes,” Andropov wrote, “helped strengthen the trusting relationship between our employee and Allende.” See MITN 2/22, entries 77 and 377, Papers of Mitrokhin.
99 Devine, interview by author; Jack Devine and Vernon Loeb, Good Hunt-ing: An American Spymaster’s Story (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 43–44.
100 “Chilean Medical Report Calls Allende a Suicide,” Reuters, Oct. 31, 1973, www.nytimes.com. On the Eastern bloc’s interpretation of events in Chile, see Radoslav A. Yordanov, “Warsaw Pact Countries’ Involvement in Chile from Frei to Pinochet, 1964–1973,” Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 3 (2019): 56–87. For further reading on the Pinochet regime, see Kornbluh, Pinochet File; Dinges, Condor Years.
101 Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 114.
102 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intel-ligence Activities: Covert Action, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 4 and 5, 1975, 62, www.intelligence.senate.gov.

第四章 东德国安局改变历史

1 Westad summarizes the vision behind Brandt’s Ostpolitik as follows: “A careful building of trust among governments in the east and west of Europe, which would enable disarmament, increased trade, travel, and cultural contacts, and, eventually, German reunification and the full removal of Europe’s Cold War divides.” Westad, Cold War, 385.
2 David Binder, “Brandt Defeats Move to Oust Him,” New York Times, April 28, 1972, www.nytimes.com.
3 Kopp, interview by author, Berlin, Germany, July 26, 2017. I first reported on this in an article for Foreign Affairs (“A Cold War Case of Russian Collusion,” Foreign Affairs, April 5, 2019, www.foreignaffairs.com).
4 Gregg, interview by author, Armonk, N.Y., March 17, 2018. Gregg worked for the CIA from 1951 to 1982, and then as national security adviser to Vice President George H. W. Bush, and as U.S. ambassador to South Korea.
5 Kopp, interview by author; Jens Gieseke, The History of the Stasi: East Germany’s Secret Police, 1945–1990 (Brooklyn: Berghahn, 2015), 155; “Der Deutsche Bundestag 1949 bis 1989 in den Akten des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (MfS) der DDR,” Federal Commissioner for the Docu-ments of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic, Berlin, March 2013.
6 Julius Steiner Dossier, Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Sta-atssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR, BStU, Berlin, 4 (hereafter cited as Steiner Dossier). This file was provided to the author by the Stasi Records Agency (the BStU) in Berlin, Germany, in response to an archival request. It includes 299 pages of materials on Steiner documented by the Stasi.
7 Leo Wagner Dossier, Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssi-cherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR, BStU, Berlin, 21 (hereafter cited as Wagner Dossier). This file was provided to the author by the Stasi Records Agency (the BStU) in Berlin, Germany, in response to an archival request. It includes fifty-three pages of materials on Wagner documented by the Stasi.
8 Ibid.; “CSU-Spion enttarnt,” Der Spiegel, Nov. 27, 2000, www.spiegel.de; “Bis zu meinem Zusammenbruch,” Der Spiegel, Oct. 20, 1980, www d.sep.iegel.
9 Die Geheimnisse des Schönen Leo, directed by Benedikt Schwarzer (Ger-many: Lichtblick Film & TV Produktion, 2019), copy provided to author by director; “Bis zu meinem Zusammenbruch.” Conversion information for deutschemarks to dollars (1972) taken from Germany/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, fred.stlouisfed.org; conversion information for dollar values (1972 to 2020) taken from U.S. Inflation Calculator, www.usinflationcalculator.com.
10 Die Geheimmissee des Schöner Leo, directed by Schwarzer.
11 Kopp, interview by author; “CSU-Spion enttarnt.”12 Kopp, interview by author. A group of prosecutors, while investigating Wagner years later, found that he had been living extravagantly since the late 1960s, around when Fleissman began passing him cash and intel-ligence. See “Urteil,” Der Spiegel, Dec. 29, 1980, www.spiegel.de.
13 Die Geheimnisse des Schönen Leo, directed by Schwarzer.
14 Kopp, interview by author.
15 Willy Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1976), 198; Westad, Cold War, 365, 373–78; Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, 153; Harry Schwartz, “The Khrushchev/Brezhnev Doctrine at Helsinki,” New York Times, Aug. 5, 1975, www.nytimes.com. See also Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968–1970 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1997), chaps. 4–5; Jussi Hanhimaki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013), chap. 2; Leonid Brezhnev, On the Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation (New York: Doubleday, 1973).
On Western reactions to the Prague Spring, see John G. McGinn, “The Politics of Collective Inaction: NATO’s Response to the Prague Spring,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 3 (1999): 111–38. On the conception and evolution of the Brezhnev Doctrine, see Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). On détente, see Keith L. Nel-son, The Making of Détente: Soviet-American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). On the similarities between Leonid Brezhnev and Vladimir Putin, see Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 46–48; Susan Glasser, “Putin the Great: Russia’s Imperial Imposter,” Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2019, www.foreignaffairs.com.
16 Wippl, phone interview by author, Nov. 8, 2018; Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 343, 360; Gaddis, Cold War, chap. 3. See also Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (London: Longman, 2003).
17 In 1975, the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, and nearly every European state agreed to the Helsinki Final Act. Under the agreement, signatories pledged to respect the current European order and to “refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State” (a commitment, of course, that both of the superpowers had been violating, and would continue to do so, through covert electoral interference). Participating countries also agreed to “respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating states,” highlighting the sanctity of territorial rather than electoral sovereignty. See Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, August 1, 1975, in U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 1285. See also William J. Tompson, The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2003), 48; Judt, Postwar, 501. On China, see Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 226–45; Hanhimaki, Rise and Fall of Détente, 44; Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 300.
18 Judt, Postwar, 254. For further reading on Berlin as a Cold War hot spot, see Deborah Welch Larson, “The Origins of Commitment: Truman and West Berlin,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 1 (2011): 180–212; David Coleman, “Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem, 1953–1954,” Jour-nal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 1 (2000): 3–34; David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997). Also, Douglas Selvage and Hope Harrison, in separate articles, analyze and contextualize pertinent primary source materials in “New Evidence on the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (1998): 200–29.
19 Judt, Postwar, 27, 270.
20 Kopp, interview by author. In September 1969, just before the West Ger-man election, Moscow offered to open negotiations with Bonn. Egon Bahr, Brandt’s foreign policy adviser, then drafted a working paper detailing a potential reconciliation agreement with the Soviet Union. See Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Vintage, 1994), 67–68. For further reading on Ostpolitik, see Gottfried Niedhart, “Ostpolitik: Transformation Through Communica-tion and the Quest for Peaceful Change,” Journal of Cold War Studies 18, no. 3 (2016): 14–59.
21 Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 168.
22 Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong aptly define the pursuit of secu-rity as a state seeking to minimize threats to its survival, welfare, and identity in Human Security and the UN: A Critical History (Blooming-ton: Indiana University Press, 2006), 2.
23 Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 169; “Bonn-Soviet Text Leaked to Paper,” New York Times, June 13, 1970, timesmachine.nytimes.com. Still, in conjunction with détente in Europe, competition for influence persisted across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Westad explains, “The Soviets never intended détente with Washington to include an end to Mos-cow’s support for movements and regimes in the Third World.” Westad, Global Cold War, 195.
24 Julia Von Dannenberg, The Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty Between West Germany and the USSR (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 164–65.
25 Bernard Gwertzman, “Treaty Initialed by Moscow and Bonn,” New York Times, Aug. 8, 1970, www.nytimes.com.
26 Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 325–29. Additionally, the Moscow Treaty declared that each party sought “to maintain international peace and achieve détente,” and had agreed to “settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means” and to “regard the frontiers of all States in Europe as inviolable such as they are on the date of signature of the present Treaty, including the Oder-Neisse line.” See Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union (the Moscow Treaty) of August 12, 1970, in U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, 1103. West German negotiators had spent weeks tweaking the treaty’s language, to keep the door open to peacefully adjusting frontiers and, therefore, to reunifying Germany. For example, the Soviets had asked that Europe’s frontiers be labeled “unalterable”; West German negotiators suc-cessfully substituted “inviolable” in its place. See Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name,17.0–7

27 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland Concerning the Basis for Normalizing Their Mutual Relations (the Treaty of Warsaw) of December 7, 1970, in U.S. Department of State, Documents on Ger-many, 1944–1985, 1125. On the consequences of recognizing Poland’s western border, Brandt wrote, “Many of our German contemporaries accused us of being the first to crystallize what they refused to accept as an accomplished act and would rather have continued to ignore.” Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 181.
28 Authoritative histories of this period highlight the importance of Brandt’s gesture in Warsaw. Westad writes, “For Poles and others who watched in eastern Europe, it was a powerful symbol of a new German govern-ment intent on peace, headed by a man of a new generation who himself had no blame in Germany’s wartime atrocities. It went further than any treaty in creating an image of a new West Germany for peoples in the east.” Westad, Cold War, 386. Garton Ash likewise writes, “For many people around the world, Ostpolitik is Willy Brandt falling to his knees before the monument to the heroes of the Warsaw ghetto.” Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 298.
29 Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 332, 387; M. E. Sarotte, Deal-ing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 120–29, in which she also explains how the Quadripartite Agreement, finalized by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union in 1971, enabled the transit accord.
30 John Kess, “Brandt Wins Nobel Prize for His Efforts for Peace,” New York Times, Oct. 21, 1971, www.nytimes.com; “Memorandum of Con-versation,” Jan. 10, 1972, FRUS, 1969–1976 vol. 40, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, doc. 337, history.state.gov; Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 349; Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, 130.
31 Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 356.
32 Wippl, interview by author. Article 67 reads, “The Bundestag may express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a succes-sor by the vote of a majority of its Members and requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected.” See the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, May 8, 1949, art. 67, accessed through the Bundestag website, www.btg-bestellservice.de.
33 Rainer Barzel, Die Tür blieb offen: Mein persönlicher Bericht über Ost-verträge, Misstrauensvotum, Kanzlersturz (Berlin: Bouvier, 1998), 54. See also John O. Koehler, Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), 69.
34 Kalugin, interview by author, Rockville, Md., Aug. 7, 2018; Markus Wolf and Anne McElvoy, Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Commu-nism’s Greatest Spymaster (New York: Times Books, 1997), 135, 166–71.
35 “Telegram from the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State,” April 14, 1972, FRUS, 1969–1976 vol. 40, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, doc. 354, history.state.gov; Wolfgang Mueller, “Recognition in Return for Détente? Brezhnev, the EEC, and the Moscow Treaty with West Germany, 1970–1973,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 4 (2011): 79– 100; Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, 130–33. Barzel announced the vote of no confidence on April 24 after briefing his inner circle of his plans on April 19; see Barzel, Die Tür blieb offen, 97.
36 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 17696, 9–19 vol. 40, Germany and Berlin, 17926, 9–19 doc. 358, history.state.gov.
37 Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 336; “Editorial Note,” doc. 358; Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, 133.
38 Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit (Berlin: Blessing, 1998), 383. Based on avail-able sources, it is unclear whether authorities in Moscow briefed their counterparts in East Germany on this approach to Bahr.
39 M. E. Sarotte writes, based on her interview with Wolf, that he “remem-bered in 1996 that the instructions from Moscow at the time were clear: the [East German government] was to do everything possible to protect Brandt.” Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, 130. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin write that Wolf had Moscow’s “blessing” in seeking to interfere in the vote. Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 427.
40 Inman, interview by author, Austin, Tex., Nov. 2, 2018; Goss, interview by author, Florida Keys, Fla., Dec. 26, 2018. See also Gieseke, History of the Stasi, chap. 6.
41 Koehler, Stasi, 3–4. On the evolution of the Stasi’s domestic operations, see Gary Bruce, “The Prelude to Nationwide Surveillance in East Ger-many: Stasi Operations and Threat Perceptions, 1945–1953,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 2 (2003): 3–31; David Childs and Richard Popplewell, The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service (London: Macmillan, 1996).
42 Kopp, interview by author. Conversion information for deutschemarks to dollars (1972) taken from Germany/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, fred.stlouisfed.org; conversion information for dollar values (1972 to 2020) taken from U.S. Inflation Calculator, www.usinflationcalculator.com.
43 Kopp, interview by author; Die Geheimnisse des Schönen Leo, directed by Schwarzer.
44 Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 435. See also Hélène Miard-Delacroix, Willy Brandt: Life of a Statesman (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), 130.
45 Binder, “Brandt Defeats Move to Oust Him”; Die Geheimnisse des Schönen Leo, directed by Schwarzer.
46 Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, 133.
47 “Der Deutsche Bundestag 1949 bis 1989 in den Akten des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (MfS) der DDR.”48 “West Germany’s Treaties with Soviet and Poland Win Bundestag Approval,” New York Times, May 18, 1972, www.nytimes.com; “Exit Mr. Barzel,” New York Times, May 10, 1973, www.nytimes.com. On the subsequent evolution of the conservative bloc’s foreign policy, see Clay Clemens, Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989).
49 David Binder, “Brandt Coalition Is Swept Back In for Second Term,” New York Times, Nov. 20, 1972, www.nytimes.com.
50 Wippl, interview by author.
51 Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 376.
52 Binder, “Brandt Defeats Move to Oust Him.”53 Wippl, interview by author.
54 Franz Josef Strauss, Die Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1989), 398; Rainer Barzel, Ein gewagtes Leben (Berlin: Honenheim, 2001), 84; Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 435.
55 Steiner Dossier, 23; “Die sind ja alle so mißtrauisch,” Der Spiegel, June 4, 1973, www.spiegel.de; “Der Deutsche Bundestag 1949 bis 1989 in den Akten des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (MfS) der DDR.”56 Steiner Dossier, 21–23; “Die sind ja alle so mißtrauisch.” The Steiner Affair emerged just as the Watergate scandal—which caused Nixon to resign the presidency in August 1974—was escalating in the United States. On Watergate, see Keith W. Olson, Watergate: The Presidential Scandal That Shook America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003); Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, All the President’s Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974).
57 Steiner Dossier, 23, 35, 126; “Affäre Steiner: Rätsel über Rätsel,” Der Spiegel, July 23, 1973, www.spiegel.de; Miard-Delacroix, Willy Brandt, 131.
58 Kopp, interview by author; “Der Deutsche Bundestag 1949 bis 1989 in den Akten des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (MfS) der DDR.”59 Steiner Dossier, 20–150. One of the articles in the Stasi’s file poses the question—Watergate in Bonn?—in reference to the Steiner Affair, a com-mon comparison at the time.
60 “Affäre Wienand: ‘Der Kanzler hält sich raus,’ ” Der Spiegel, June 18, 1973, www.spiegel.de; Steiner Dossier, 26.
61 “Affäre Steiner: Rätsel über Rätsel”; Steiner Dossier, 23, 38. During the inquiry, many members of the CDU became attached to the allegation that Wienand had bribed Steiner, perhaps because this version of events most suited their political agenda; see Steiner Dossier, 76.
62 Steiner Dossier, 46; Detlef Kleinert, Wolfgang Schäuble, and Friedrich Shepherd, “Bericht und Antrag zu dem Antrag der Fraktion der CDU/CSU betr. Einsetzung eines Untersuchungsausschusses,” Bundestag, March 3, 1974, dipbt.bundestag.de.
63 “Bonn Aide Admits He Withdrew Funds in Bribery Inquiry,” New York Times, Sept. 6, 1973, www.nytimes.com.
64 “CSU-Spion enttarnt.”65 Kopp, interview by author; Wagner Dossier, 7. The entries, on pages 8 and 9, include “S7604981: Background on the restitution of the CSU parliamentary unit; SE7602099: Minutes for the 24th federal convention of the CDU—May 24th to 26th 1976; SE7602995: Visit of the Balkans by [whited out]; SE7604373: Background and documentation on CDU/CSU discussion.”66 Koehler, Stasi, 150–62, 200.
67 Kopp, interview by author.
68 “CSU-Spion enttarnt.”69 Ibid.; MITN 2/2, 52, Papers of Mitrokhin.
70 “CSU-Politiker Wagner soll Stasi-Spion gewesen sein,” Rheinische Post, Nov. 25, 2000, www.rp-online.de; “CSU-Spion enttarnt”; Sarotte, Deal-ing with the Devil, 133.
71 “CSU-Spion enttarnt”; “CSU-Politiker Wagner lässt Ämter ruhen,” Ger-man Press Agency, Nov. 27, 2000, www.schwaebische.de.
72 The German government found, “This leads to the conclusion that in 1972 Wagner was simply a corruptible parliamentarian whose financial problems the [Stasi] exploited through the journalist Georg Fleissman (IM ‘Dürer’). The [Stasi] manipulated the vote of no confidence in 1972 by targeting corrupt members of parliament With all due prudence, it is assumed today that the deputies Steiner and Wagner were bribed by the [Stasi] in 1972 and led to the failure of Barzel’s no-confidence vote. This assumption is based on testimonies, self-accusations, reports by the Bun-destag’s investigative committee, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office’s insights from the espionage trials of the nineties, and accounts of those involved at the time.” “Der Deutsche Bundestag 1949 bis 1989 in den Akten des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (MfS) der DDR.”73 Kopp, interview by author.

第五章 格别乌朝美国下手

1 Inman, interview by author, Austin, Tex., Nov. 2, 2018.
2 Kalugin, interview by author, Rockville, Md., Aug. 7, 2018. The Soviet Union was unique in that it consistently sought to interfere covertly in U.S. elections during the twentieth century, but it was not the only country to ever try. For example, Nazi Germany attempted—entirely ineffectively—to intervene covertly in America’s 1940 presidential election. See Bradley Hart, Hitler’s American Friends: The Third Reich’s Supporters in the United States (New York: St. Martin’s, 2018), chap. 5.
3 “The Kitchen Debate Transcript,” July 24, 1959, taken from the CIA General Records, www.cia.gov.
4 Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Statesman, 1953–1964, ed. Sergei Khrushchev (University Park: Pennsylvania State Uni-versity Press, 2007), 295. For further reading on Khrushchev’s views of Nixon, see William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), chap. 17.
5 Kalugin, interview by author.
6 Khrushchev, Memoirs, 295; Taubman, Khrushchev, 484; Kalugin, inter-view by author.
7 Taubman, Khrushchev, xix. On dynamics in Moscow following Stalin’s death, see Mark Kramer’s three-part series “The Early Post-Stalin Suc-cession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 1–3 (1999). On Khrushchev’s rise to power, see also Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
8 Khrushchev, Memoirs, 138.
9 This account of Stevenson’s meeting with Menshikov as well as the text of the letter to Menshikov is based on a memorandum that Stevenson wrote on January 25, 1960, which can be found in Walter Johnson, The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Continuing Education and the Unfin-ished Business of American Society, 1957–1961 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 386–89. On Stevenson’s last-minute and failed attempt to win the nomination at the Democratic National Convention, see Jean H. Baker, The Stevensons: A Biography of an American Family (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), 402–4.
10 Khrushchev, Memoirs, 295; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 238.
11 Kalugin, interview by author.
12 Lindesay Parrott, “U.S. Urges U.N. Vote Impartial Inquiry in Attack on R7,”B-4 New York Times, July 26, 1960, timesmachine.nytimes.com.America’s U-2 spy planes had, since 1956, been reporting back to Wash-ington that Khrushchev did not possess the long-range missile capabilities about which he so frequently boasted; see Gaddis, Cold War,.72–74

13 Khrushchev, Memoirs, 296; “U.S. Doubts Russians Will Free RB-47 Fli-ers,” New York Times, Sept. 10, 1960, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
14 Taubman, Khrushchev, 484.
15 W. H. Lawrence, “Moscow Frees 2 RB-47 Survivors; Kennedy Calls Khrushchev Move a Step Toward Better Relations,” New York Times, Jan. 26, 1961, timesmachine.nytimes.com; “Burial for Gary Powers Tomorrow,” New York Times, Aug. 7, 1977, www.nytimes.com.
16 Kalugin, interview by author.
17 Khrushchev, Memoirs, 296.
18 “Racist Hate Note Sent to U.N. Aides,” New York Times, Nov. 29, 1960, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
19 UN General Assembly Official Record, 15th Session, 944th Plenary Meet-ing, Agenda Item 87 (Dec. 13, 1960), legal.un.org.
20 Ibid.
21 MITN 1/6/5, p. 444, Papers of Mitrokhin.
22 Ibid., p. 432.
23 Kalugin, interview by author.
24 Ibid.; Kalugin, Spymaster, 54.
25 Kalugin, interview by author.
26 Ibid. On Brezhnev’s interest in détente, see chapter 4 of this book. For Humphrey’s reflections on his life and career generally, see Hubert H. Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976).
27 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 176.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Westad writes, “If it had not been for the new Nixon Administration itself engaging in renewed efforts at détente with the Soviets, Brandt’s policy could have been seen as positively treacherous in a NATO con-teaxdt,.” Wes Cold War, 386. For further reading on Nixon, see Stephen Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962–1972 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989); Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).
31 Goss, interview by author, Florida Keys, Fla., Dec. 26, 2018; McLaughlin, phone interview by author, Sept. 5, 2019. On press coverage of the CIA during the early Cold War, see David P. Hadley, “A Constructive Quality: The Press, the CIA, and Covert Intervention in the 1950s,” Intelligence and National Security 31, no. 2 (2016): 246–65. For further reading, see Loch K. Johnson, America’s Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); David M. Barrett, The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
32 Seymour Hersh, “C.I.A. Chief Tells House of $8-Million Campaign Against Allende in ’70–73,” New York Times, Sept. 8, 1974, www.nytimes.com; Brent Durbin, The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 135–37; Gustafson, Hostile Intent,.1–3

33 Jeffreys-Jones, CIA and American Democracy, 198; “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1969–1976 vol. 38, pt. 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, doc. 53, history.state.gov.
34 Seymour Hersh, “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Anti-war Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,” New York Times, Dec. 22, 1974, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
35 Jeffreys-Jones, CIA and American Democracy, 194.
36 Olav Njølstad, “The Carter Administration and Italy: Keeping the Communists Out of Power Without Interfering,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 3 (2002): 56, 69, which further explains that an internal U.S. government memorandum, issued when Carter was president, said that his administration would reject “such actions as dictating to Italians how they should vote, seeking to manipulate political events in Italy, or financing Italian political parties or personalities.” For further reading on foreign policy making during the Carter years, see Gaddis Smith, Moral-ity, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983).
37 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intel-ligence Activities: Covert Action, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 4 and 5, 1975, 54, www.intelligence.senate.gov.
38 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, www.intelligence.senate.gov; Executive Order 11905: United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, Feb. 18, 1976, www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov.
39 Oriana Fallaci, “What Did You Do to My Italy, Mr. Spy?,” Washington Star, March 7, 1976, taken from CIA General Records (declassified May 2012), www.cia.gov.
40 Ibid.
41 Devine, interview by author, New York, Feb. 21, 2019; Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy, 20; Kaeten Mistry, “Approaches to Understanding the Inaugural CIA Covert Operation in Italy: Exploding Useful Myths,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2–3 (2011): 249–50.
42 Gaddis, Cold War, 217. On Reagan’s presidency and character, see Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). For Reagan’s and Ford’s personal reflections, see Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).
43 Ronald Reagan, “To Restore America” (campaign address, California, March 31, 1976), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum, Simi Valley, Calif., www.reaganlibrary.gov.
44 Kalugin, interview by author.
45 MITN 1/6/5, p. 442, Papers of Mitrokhin.
46 Ford lost to Jimmy Carter, under whom détente collapsed anyway. For a primary source account, see James Hershberg, “U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977–1980: New Russian & East German Documents,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 8–9 (1996/1997): 103–28. See also Odd Arne Westad, The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations During the Carter Years (Oslo: Scan-dinavian University Press, 1997); James Blight and Janet Lang, “When Empathy Failed: Using Critical Oral History to Reassess the Collapse of U.S.-Soviet Détente in the Carter-Brezhnev Years,” Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 2 (2010): 29–74; Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994).
47 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield,22.41– 4

48 MITN 1/6/5, p. 438, Papers of Mitrokhin.
49 Ibid., p. 439.
50 Ibid., pp. 439–40.
51 Ibid., p. 438.
52 Kalugin, interview by author.
53 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 1951), 335. On the evolving use of the term “totalitarianism,” see Abbot Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
54 MITN 1/6/5, pp. 439–40, Papers of Mitrokhin.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 437.
57 Kalugin, interview by author.
58 MITN 1/6/5, p. 437, Papers of Mitrokhin.
59 Ibid., p. 432.
60 Ibid., p. 439.
61 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 237.
62 Fred Barbash, “U.S. Ties ‘Klan’ Olympic Hate Mail to KGB,” Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1983, www.washingtonpost.com.
63 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 237.
64 Barbash, “U.S. Ties ‘Klan’ Olympic Hate Mail to KGB.”65 Jim Anderson, “U.S. Says Soviets Sent Leaflets,” UPI Archives, July 11, 1984, www.upi.com; “Soviets Say ‘Delirious Myths’ in Reply to U.S. View KGB Wrote Klan Letters,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 9, 1987, taken from CIA General Records (declassified June 2010), www.cia.gov.
66 John E. Haynes and Harvey Klehr, “‘Moscow Gold,’ Confirmed at Last?,” Labor History 33, no. 2 (1992): 279–93; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield,22.87–9

67 Kalugin, interview by author; John Barron, Operation Solo: The FBI’s Man in the Kremlin (Washington, D.C.: Regenery Publishing, 1996). Distrust of the CPUSA was center stage during the Second Red Scare in the immediate postwar period. In 1949, after a nine-month trial, a New York court convicted eleven of its leaders for conspiring to overthrow the U.S. government. “The Communist Party is an illegal conspiracy,” Burr Harrison, a Democratic congressman, said at the time. See Russell Porter, “11 Communists Convicted of Plot,” New York Times, Oct. 15, 1949, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Lewis Wood, “Capital Officials Hail U.S. Victory,” New York Times, Oct. 15, 1949, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
68 Kalugin, interview by author. Trump has historically denied allegations that he has engaged in any such extracurricular activities while in Mos-cow. See Eric Beech, “Trump Calls Russia Reports ‘Fake News—a Total Political Witch Hunt,’ ” Reuters, Jan. 11, 2017, www.reuters.com; Jim Comey, A Higher Loyalty: Truth, Lies, and Leadership (New York: Flat-iron, 2018), 223–25. Of his 1987 trip to the Soviet Union, Trump writes, “In January 1987, I got a letter from Yuri Dubinin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, that began: ‘It is a pleasure for me to relay some good news from Moscow.’ It went on to say that the leading Soviet state agency for international tourism, Goscomintourist, had expressed interest in pursuing a joint venture to construct and manage a hotel in Moscow. On July 4, I flew with Ivana, her assistant Lisa Calandra, and Norma to Moscow. It was an extraordinary experience. We toured a half dozen potential sites for a hotel, including several near Red Square. We stayed in Lenin’s suite at the National Hotel, and I was impressed with the ambition of the Soviet officials to make a deal.” Donald Trump and Tony Schwartz, Trump: The Art of the Deal (New York: Random House, 1987), 364.
69 Kalugin, interview by author. For example, in a 2017 survey, sixty-six percent of Americans said that Trump—by then the U.S. president—had done more to divide than unify the United States. See Gary Langer, “Trump Seen by 66 percent in US as Doing More to Divide Than Unite Country,” ABC News, Sept. 24, 2017, abcnews.go.com.
70 See note 5 of chapter 3 of this book.
71 William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 160, 560; Philip Taubman, “C.I.A. Said to Aid Salvador Parties,” New York Times, May 12, 1984, www.nytimes.com.
72 Shultz, phone interview by author, Dec. 10, 2018. For Shultz’s personal recollections, see George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner’s, 1993).
73 Philip Taubman, “C.I.A. Chief Tells of Attempt to Aid Salvador Vote,” New York Times, July 30, 1982, www.nytimes.com. For elaboration on the 1984 election in El Salvador, and on the Reagan administration’s pos-ture toward Central America generally, see Evan McCormick, “Freedom Tide? Ideology, Politics, and the Origins of Democracy Promotion in U.S. Central America Policy, 1980–1984,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 4 (2014): 60–109.
74 Taubman, “C.I.A. Said to Aid Salvador Parties.”75 Shultz, interview by author.
76 Goss, interview by author.
77 Inman, interview by author.

第六章 提倡民主

1 Andrew Rosenthal, “Yeltsin Cheered at Capitol As He Pledges Era of Trust and Asks for Action on Aid,” New York Times, June 18, 1992, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
2 Literature on the end of the Cold War is boundless. For a synthetic account, see Jeremi Suri, “Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 4 (2002): 60–92. Of Gorbachev, the historian Vladislav Zubok concludes that his “personality had much to do with the peaceful death of communism in Eastern Europe (with the exception of Romania).” Vladislav Zubok, “New Evidence on the ‘Soviet Factor’ in the Peaceful Revolutions of 1989,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 12/13 (2001): 5–24. For firsthand accounts, see Anatoly S. Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gor-bachev (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000); Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995). For analysis of Gorbachev’s decision making, see Andrew Bennett, “The Guns That Didn’t Smoke: Ideas and the Soviet Non-use of Force in 1989,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 2 (2005): 81–109, which is part of an illuminating special issue, co-edited by Nina Tannenwald and William Wohlforth, on this historical moment. Mark Kramer further analyzes how the collapse of the Eastern bloc contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in his three-part series, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions Within the Soviet Union,” Journal of Cold War Stud-ies (Fall 2003, Fall 2004, Winter 2005). For further reading, see Walter Connor, “Soviet Society, Public Attitudes, and the Perils of Gorbachev’s Reforms: The Social Context of the End of the USSR,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (2003): 43–80; Astrid Tuminez, “Nationalism, Eth-nic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (2003): 81–136; Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
3 On German reunification and its consequences, see Konrad Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Trans-formed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1999); Stephen Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unifica-tion (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992). On the dynamic between the White House and the Kremlin, see Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).
4 On the dynamic between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, see Marc Zlotnik, “Yelt-sin and Gorbachev: The Politics of Confrontation,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 1 (2003): 128–64. For a firsthand account of U.S. policy making, see George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998). For further reading, see David Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (New York: Random House, 1993); Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
5 Robert Pear, “Congress Approves Aid Plan of $852 Million for Poland,” New York Times, Nov. 19, 1989, timesmachine.nytimes.com; George H. W. Bush, “Statement on Signing the FREEDOM Support Act,” White House, Oct. 24, 1992, www.govinfo.gov.
6 Thomas Friedman, “Bill to Aid Former Soviet Lands Is Stuck in Capitol Hill Quagmire,” New York Times, June 5, 1992, timesmachine.nytimes.com; James Baker, “What America Owes the Ex–Soviet Union,” New York Times, Aug. 5, 1992, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Adam Clymer, “House Votes Billions in Aid to Ex-Soviet Republics,” New York Times, Aug. 7, 1992, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
7 U.S. Congress, Senate, Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act of 1992, S. 2532, 102nd Cong., introduced in Senate April 7, 1992, www.congress.gov; “Transcript of 2nd TV Debate Between Bush, Clinton, and Perot,” New York Times, Oct. 16, 1992, www.nytimes.com.
8 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
9 Steinberg, phone interview by author, Oct. 30, 2019.
10 U.S. Congress, FREEDOM Support Act of 1992.
11 Marian L. Lawson and Susan B. Epstein, Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2019), fas.org; Susan B. Epstein, National Endowment for Democracy: Policy and Funding Issues, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1999), www.everycrsreport.com.
12 “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” White House, Bill Clinton, mandated report, Feb. 1996.
13 While IRI and NDI receive the bulk of their funding from USAID, NED has long issued grants to each organization; between 2009 and 2018, NED gave both IRI and NDI an annual allocation ranging from $13.8 to $16.2 million. See Lawson and Epstein, Democracy Promotion, 16. On initial debates over, and the major components of, overt election assis-tance, see Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), chap. 6.
14 USAID, USAID Political Party Development Assistance, Technical Pub-lication Series (Washington, D.C.: USAID, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research, Center for Democracy and Governance, 1999), 16–19, 41, www.usaid.gov.
15 Ibid., 20; 22 USC 4414: “Requirements Relating to the Endowment and Its Grantees,” uscode.house.gov.
For example, Jon Finer, a former State Department chief of staff and director of policy planning, said that while some U.S. democracy promo-tion initiatives “provid[e] technical support and training for people who are participating in elections,” a “condition of that is that it is offered to anybody across the political spectrum, that is how the United States gets around the notion that we are putting our thumb on the scale in an official capacity in an election: We say it’s available to anybody.” Jon Finer, interview by author, New York, Feb. 20, 2019.
16 USAID, USAID Political Party Development Assistance, 26, 33.
17 Nuland, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Feb. 22, 2019; Wollack, phone interview by author, Oct. 15, 2019.
18 USAID, USAID Political Party Development Assistance, 33; Interna-tional Republican Institute, Annual Report (Washington, D.C., 1996), 7.
19 USAID, USAID Political Party Development Assistance, 36.
20 Milošević was the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which included both Serbia and Montenegro. However, in accordance with other texts on this period, and because Montenegro boycotted the 2000 elec-tion, this book refers to the contest as involving Serbia specifically.
21 Jane Perlez, “NATO Authorizes Bomb Strikes; Primakov, in Air, Skips U.S. Visit,” New York Times, March 24, 1999, timesmachine.nytimes.com; Michael Scharf, “Indicted for War Crimes, Then What?,” Wash-ington Post, Oct. 3, 1999, www.washingtonpost.com; Michael Dobbs, “Serbian Nationalism Lifts Milosevic,” Washington Post, March 30, 1999, www.washingtonpost.com; Marlise Simons, “Court Declares Bosnia Killings Were Genocide,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 2007, www.nytimes.com; Jane Perlez, “‘Ethnic Cleansing’: Enormity of Atrocities Is Called ‘Shocking’ by Administration,” New York Times, March 28, 1999, www.nytimes.com; Ian Traynor, “Russia Moves to Ditch Old Ally,” Guardian, Sept. 26, 2000, www.theguardian.com.
For further reading on Milošević’s atrocities and America’s posture toward his regime, see Judt, Postwar, 665–85; Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), chaps. 9 and 12; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997); Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Modern Library, 1998); Madeleine Albright, Fascism: A Warning (New York: Harper-Collins, 2018), chap. 8; Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000).
22 Goss, interview by author, Florida Keys, Fla., Dec. 26, 2018; Panetta, phone interview by author, Nov. 12, 2019.
23 O’Brien, phone interview by author, April 23, 2019.
24 Roger Cohen, “Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?,” New York Times, Nov. 26, 2000, www.nytimes.com. Of Milošević, Albright writes, “Milošević, who insisted that he was a democrat, harbored a peculiar notion of what that calling entailed. He exercised a despot’s control over his country’s media, repressed political opposition, and created a paramilitary force to intimidate domestic rivals. Even when fueling the terrible fighting in Bosnia, he claimed to want peace; and even amid the slaughter of civilians in Sarajevo, he insisted that Serbs were the primary victims Without warning, he ordered his security forces into Kosovo to burn houses, arrest political leaders and journalists, and sow panic. His goal was to drive Albanians out of the country so that they would no longer be the majority in Kosovo. Within weeks, hundreds of thousands had been compelled to leave by train, by truck, by car, or on foot and to find temporary shelter in the hastily constructed tent cities that sprouted in surrounding fields and hills. As we had threatened, NATO initiated air strikes to force the Serbs to back down. After two and a half months of fighting, the alliance prevailed, Milošević gave in, the refugees returned, and, with international help, the Kosovars set up their own government.” Albright, Fascism, 103–4. For further reading on Albright, see Michael Dobbs, Madeleine Albright: Against All Odds (New York: Henry Holt, 1999); Thomas Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000).
25 O’Brien, interview by author. See also “Challenging Mr. Milosevic,” New York Times, Aug. 5, 2000, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
26 Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promo-tion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 54–55.
27 Wollack, interview by author; Michael Dobbs, “U.S. Advice Guided Milo-sevic Opposition,” Washington Post, Dec. 11, 2000, www.washington post.com; Cohen, “Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?”; National Endowment for Democracy, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: NED, 2000), 36, www.ned.org. See also Ray Salvatore Jennings, “Serbia: Evaluating the Bulldozer Revolution,” in Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective (Balti-more, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 98.
28 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Putin, Sept. 6, 2000 (New York City, Waldorf Astoria, President’s Suite), National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Clinton Digital Library. For further reading, see Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000); Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000); David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001), chaps. 41–43.
29 International Republican Institute, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: IRI, 2000), 8, www.iri.org.
30 O’Brien, interview by author.
31 Steven Erlanger, “Milosevic Concedes His Defeat; Yugoslavs Cele-brate New Era,” New York Times, Oct. 7, 2000, timesmachine.nytimes.com.
32 O’Brien, interview by author.
33 Clinton, phone interview by author, April 4, 2020.
34 Sipher, phone interviews by author, Oct. 18, 2019 and Feb. 3 and April 7, 2020.
35 Clinton, interview by author; Lott, phone interview by author, Oct. 31, 2019.
36 Hall, phone interview by author, Oct. 22, 2019.
37 Wise, phone interview by author, Oct. 21, 2019.
38 Sipher, interview by author; Wise, interview by author.
39 Wollack, interview by author; Wise, interview by author.
40 McLaughlin, phone interview by author, Sept. 5, 2019; O’Brien, phone interview by author, March 4, 2020.
41 Sipher, interview by author; Hall, interview by author; Wise, interview by author.
42 Clinton, interview by author.
43 David Sanger, “President Says Military Phase in Iraq Has Ended,” New York Times, May 2, 2003, www.nytimes.com. For casualty statistics, see Elizabeth Flock, “Five American Soldiers Killed in Iraq: Iraq by the Numbers,” Washington Post, June 6, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com; “Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence,” Iraq Body Count, www.iraqbodycount.org. As the years progressed, the number of Iraqis killed as a result of this war, while contested, entered into the hundreds of thou-sands. See Philip Bump, “15 Years After the Iraq War Began, the Death Toll Is Still Murky,” Washington Post, March 20, 2018, www.washington post.com.
44 George W. Bush, “Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy” (speech, Nov. 6, 2003), National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, D.C., www.ned.org.
45 Shultz, phone interview by author, Dec. 10, 2018.
46 Muñoz, phone interview by author, July 20, 2019.
47 International Republican Institute, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: IRI, 2004), 5–6, www.iri.org; National Democratic Institute, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: NDI, 2005), 32, www.ndi.org; Larry Dia-mond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 162. 5–12

48 McLaughlin, interview by author; Wise, interview by author. See also Thom Shanker and Steven R. Weisman, “Iran Is Helping Insurgents in Iraq, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, Sept. 20, 2004, www.nytimes.com; John F. Burns and Robert F. Worth, “Iraqi Campaign Raises Ques-tion of Iran’s Sway,” New York Times, Dec. 15, 2004, www.nytimes.com.
49 Negroponte, phone interview by author, May 21, 2019; Powell, email cor-respondence with author, Dec. 2, 2019, and with author, Feb. 19, 2020.
50 Daschle, phone interview by author, Aug. 12, 2019.
51 David Ignatius, “Bush’s Lost Iraq Election,” Washington Post, Aug. 30, 2007.
52 Negroponte, interview by author; McLaughlin, interview by author; Muñoz, interview by author.
53 Daschle, interview by author.
54 Ignatius, “Bush’s Lost Iraq Election.”55 Negroponte, interview by author.
56 McLaughlin, interview by author; Ignatius, “Bush’s Lost Iraq Election.”57 On Election Day, threats of violence kept many Iraqis home, and a series of attacks, including nine suicide bombings, killed forty-four people. Even so, millions turned out to vote. See Dexter Filkins, “Defying Threats, Millions of Iraqis Flock to Polls,” New York Times, Jan. 31, 2005, www.nytimes.com. On Iran’s ties to the new government, see John F. Burns, “Registering New Influence, Iran Sends a Top Aide to Iraq,” New York Times, May 18, 2005, www.nytimes.com; Edward Wong, “Allawi Tries to Regain Office with a Non-theocratic Bloc,” New York Times, Oct. 31, 2005, www.nytimes.com.
58 Kalugin, interview by author, Rockville, Md., Aug. 7, 2018; Phil McCaus-land, “Putin Interview: Did Russia Interfere in the Election, Collect Info on Trump,” NBC News, June 5, 2017, www.nbcnews.com.
59 Morell, phone interview by author, March 6, 2019; Petraeus, phone inter-view by author, Oct. 8, 2018; Cohen, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018; Brennan, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2018.
60 McLaughlin, interview by author; Blinken, interview by author, Washing-ton, D.C., Jan. 3, 2019; Haines, interview by author, New York, Feb. 23, 2019; Clapper, interview by author, Fairfax, Va., Jan. 3, 2019.
61 Panetta, interview by author; Muñoz, interview by author.
62 Panetta, interview by author.
63 Robarge, interview by author, McLean, Va., July 19, 2019; Negroponte, interview by author.
64 Goss, interview by author; Muñoz, interview by author. For further reading on the CIA in this transitional period, see George Tenet and Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
65 Morell, interview by author; Hayden, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Nov. 5, 2018; McLaughlin, interview by author.
66 Petraeus, interview by author; Haines, interview by author.
67 McLaughlin, interview by author.
68 Petraeus, interview by author.
69 Goss, interview by author; Cohen, interview by author; Barack Obama, “Barack Obama: As Your Friend, Let Me Say That the EU Makes Britain Even Greater,” Telegraph, April 23, 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk; Haines, interview by author.
70 Morell, interview by author; “National Endowment for Democracy (NED), NDI, IRI, CIPE, and Solidarity Center Welcome Increased Fund-ing from Congress,” National Endowment for Democracy, Dec. 21, 2019, ned.org. Lawson and Epstein, Democracy Promotion, 14–15; Hayden, interview by author.
71 Sarah Repucci, “Freedom in the World, 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy,” Freedom House, freedomhouse.org.
72 For further consideration, see Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf, “Lib-eral Democracy’s Crisis of Confidence,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 4 (2018): 136–50; Roberto Stefan Foa, “Modernization and Authoritar-ianism,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (2018): 129–40; Marc F. Plattner, “Illiberal Democracy and the Struggle on the Right,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (2019): 5–19; William A. Galston, “The Popu-list Challenge to Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 2 (2018): 5–19. For analysis specific to Europe, see Anna Grzymala-Busse, “The Failure of Europe’s Mainstream Parties,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (2019): 35–47; Péter Krekó and Zsolt Enyedi, “Explaining Eastern Europe: Orbán’s Laboratory of Illiberalism,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (2018): 39–51; Jacques Rupnik, “Explaining Eastern Europe: The Crisis of Liberalism,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (2018): 24–38. For analysis specific to Latin America, see Steven Levitsky, “Latin America’s Shifting Politics: Democratic Survival and Weakness,” Journal of Democ-racy 29, no. 4 (2018): 102–13. And for analysis specific to the former Soviet republics, see Henry E. Hale, “25 Years After the USSR: What’s Gone Wrong?,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (2016): 24–35.

第七章 从叶尔钦到普丁

1 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, April 21, 1996 (Moscow, the Kremlin), National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Digital Library. On Yeltsin’s domestic standing, see Carol J. Williams, “In Yeltsin vs. Parliament, the Likely Loser Is Russia,” Los Angeles Times, June 25, 1995, latimes .com.
2 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, May 10, 1995 (Moscow, the Kremlin), National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Digital Library.
3 Talbott, phone interview by author, Oct. 16, 2019; Panetta, phone inter-view by author, Nov. 12, 2019; Steinberg, phone interview by author, Oct. 30, 2019.
4 For further reading on NATO enlargement, see James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999). For a critical perspective, see John Lewis Gaddis, “The Senate Should Halt NATO Expansion,” New York Times, April 27, 1998, www.nytimes.com. For a firsthand account, see Warren Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime: A Memoir (New York: Scrib-ner, 2001), chap. 16.
5 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, May 10, 1995. NATO next enlarged in 1999, with the additions of Hun-gary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. See Jane Perlez, “Poland, Hungary, and the Czechs Join NATO,” New York Times, March 13, 1999, times machine.nytimes.com.
6 Ibid.; Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, April 21, 1996.
7 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, April 9, 1996, National Security Council and NSC Records Man-agement System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Digital Library.
8 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, Jan. 26, 1996, National Security Council and NSC Records Man-agement System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Digital Library.
9 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, Feb. 21, 1996, National Security Council and NSC Records Man-agement System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Digital Library.
10 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, May 7, 1996, National Security Council and NSC Records Man-agement System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Digital Library.
11 Pascual, phone interview by author, Nov. 20, 2019.
12 Summers, phone interview by author, Nov. 22, 2019.
13 Michael Gordon, “Russia and IMF Agree on a Loan for $10.2 Billion,” New York Times, Feb. 23, 1996, www.nytimes.com.
14 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002), 205.
15 Ibid., 447; Dick Morris and Eileen McGann, Because He Could (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), chap. 8. For a detailed breakdown of the types of support the Clinton administration did and did not provide Yeltsin prior to the 1996 election—and of the negligible influence of the private American consultants—see James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 147–156.
16 International Republican Institute, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: IRI, 1996), 13–14, www.iri.org; Sarah E. Mendelson, “Democracy Assis-tance and Political Transition in Russia: Between Success and Failure,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001), 75–78; Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, 154–155.
17 Clinton, phone interview by author, April 4, 2020; Panetta, interview by author. John Sipher and Steven Hall, two CIA operations officers sta-tioned in Russia in the 1990s, also insisted that the agency did not assist Yeltsin’s campaign. Hall said, “Based on my knowledge, that was not so.” Sipher, likewise, said, “There was nothing, we didn’t have a covert action finding, we did nothing from Moscow station to help support that elec-tion There was no actual clandestine covert means to support Yeltsin being elected.” And James Steinberg, the director of policy planning in 1996, gave a similar denial. “To my knowledge we did not do that,” he said. Sipher, Hall, and Steinberg, interviews by author.
18 Talbott papers, June 16, 1996 (provided to author by Talbott), minor spelling errors corrected by author.
19 Talbott, interview by author; Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revo-lution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 2. In February 2012, Dmitri Medvedev, the Rus-sian president, allegedly told a private audience that Yeltsin did not really win the 1996 election. See Simon Shuster, “Rewriting Russian History: Did Boris Yeltsin Steal the 1996 Presidential Election?,” Time, Feb. 24, 2012, content.time.com.
20 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, July 5, 1996, National Security Council and NSC Records Man-agement System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Digital Library.
21 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, Dec. 5, 1996, National Security Council and NSC Records Man-agement System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Digital Library.
22 Donilon, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 16, 2018.
23 Erlanger, interview by author, Brussels, Belgium, Dec. 18, 2018.
24 Talbott, interview by author; Summers, interview by author. For further reading, see Jeffrey Sachs, “Russia’s Failure to Reform,” Project Syndicate, Aug. 30, 1999, www.project-syndicate.org.
25 Celestine Bohlen, “Yeltsin Resigns; Putin Takes Over; Elections in March,” New York Times, Jan. 1, 2000, www.nytimes.com.
26 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, Nov. 19, 1999 (Istanbul, Turkey), and Memorandum of Telephone Con-versation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, Dec. 31, 1999, National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin,” Clinton Digital Library; Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between President Clinton and Acting President Putin, Jan. 1, 2000, National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Clinton Digital Library.
27 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, Nov. 19, 1999.
28 Talbott, interview by author.
29 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Sandy Berger and Vladimir Putin, June 15, 1999, National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Rus-sian President Vladimir Putin,” Clinton Digital Library; Memorandum of Conversation between President Clinton and Prime Minister Putin, Sept. 12, 1999 (Aukland, New Zealand), National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Clinton Digital Library.
30 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Putin, Nov. 15, 2000 (Brunei), National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Clinton Digital Library.
31 Memorandum of Conversation between President Clinton and Prime Minister Putin, Nov. 2, 1999 (Oslo, Norway), National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Con-cerning Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Clinton Digital Library.
32 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Putin, Sept. 6, 2000, and Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Putin, Dec. 27, 2000, National Security Council and NSC Records Management System, “Declassified Documents Con-cerning Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Clinton Digital Library.
33 Clinton, interview by author.
34 Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President, with Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000), 4, 18–22.
35 Ibid., 22.
36 Ibid., 47–52, 66–70.
37 On the collapse of East Germany, see Hans-Hermann Hertle, “The Fall of the Wall: The Unintended Self-Dissolution of East Germany’s Ruling Regime,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 12/13 (2001): 131–64; Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Commu-nism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); A. James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
38 Putin, First Person, 76–78; Zubok, “New Evidence on the ‘Soviet Factor’ in the Peaceful Revolutions of 1989,” 11–12.
39 Putin, First Person, 80, 82.
40 For further reading on the Soviet Union’s security services and military toward the end of the Cold War, see Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 1 (2003), in which Amy Knight captures the role and work of the KGB between 1985 and 1991 in “The KGB, Perestroika, and the Col-lapse of the Soviet Union,” 67–93; John Dunlop analyzes the failed coup d’état and its consequences in “The August 1991 Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics,” 94–127; and Brian Taylor examines the restraint of the Soviet armed forces in “The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR,” 17–66. See also Oleg Gordievsky, “The KGB After the Coup,” Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 3 (1993): 68–71.
41 For further reading on Putin’s rise, character, and worldview, see Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washing-ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013); Angela Stent, Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest (New York: Twelve, 2019); Steven Lee Myers, The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin (New York: Knopf, 2015); Masha Gessen, The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (New York: Riverhead, 2012).
42 Sipher, phone interview by author, Oct. 18, 2019; Fuerth, phone interview by author, Oct. 31, 2019. On the sustained influence of Russia’s security services, see Amy Knight, Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB’s Successors (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010); Yuriy Felshtinsky and Vladimir Pribylovskiy, The Corporation: Russia and the KGB in the Age of President Putin (New York: Encounter Books, 2008).
43 Fuerth, interview by author. For an alternative view, see Vladislav Ino-zemtsev, “The Kremlin Emboldened: Why Putinism Arose,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 4 (2017): 80–85.
44 Michael McFaul, “Why Russia’s Politics Matter,” Foreign Affairs, Janu-ary/February 1995, www.foreignaffairs.com; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “United States Relations with Russia after the Cold War,” https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85962.htm. Gold-geier and McFaul further explain, “Especially in the early years of aid to Russia, the lion’s share of Western assistance was devoted not to political reform but to economic reform Of the $5.45 billion in direct U.S. assistance to Russia between 1992 and 1998, only $130 million or 2.3 percent was devoted to programs involved directly in democratic reform.” Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, 114.
45 Steinberg, interview by author; Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, July 5, 1996.
46 Talbott papers, Aug. 31, 1998 (provided to author by Talbott).
47 Ibid.
48 Steinberg, interview by author; Summers, interview by author.
49 McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution, 323–27; McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 41–47, 54. Of this period, Timothy Snyder writes, “The wealthy few around Yeltsin, christened the ‘oligarchs,’ wished to manage democracy in his favor and theirs.” Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 53. See also Anders Åslund, Russia’s Crony Capi-talism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2019), 19–25; Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), chap. 3.
50 Talbott papers, Aug. 31, 1998 (provided to author by Talbott), minor spelling errors corrected by author. On Yeltsin and his presidency, see Timothy Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (New York: Basic Books, 2008); David Remnick, Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York: Ran-dom House, 1997).
51 Panetta, interview by author.
52 McLaughlin, phone interview by author, Sept. 5, 2019; Fuerth, interview by author; Clinton, interview by author. Of this moment of transition, McFaul writes, “That the fate of Russian democracy in 2000 was so tied to the ideas and actions of one individual underscores the failure of Yeltsin and the democrats to institutionalize democracy.” McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace, 56.
53 Summers, interview by author. Anne Applebaum made a similar case in 2014, arguing, “In truth, we’ve had very little influence on Russian internal politics since 1991, even when we’ve understood them. The most important changes—the massive transfer of oil and gas from the state to the oligarchs, the return to power of men formed by the KGB, the elimination of a free press and political opposition—took place against our advice. The most important military decisions—the invasions of Chechnya and Georgia—met with our protests.” Anne Applebaum, “A Need to Contain Russia,” Washington Post, March 20, 2014, www a.wshingtonpost.com.
54 Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Sur-real Heart of the New Russia (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014), Act I; William H. Cooper, Russia’s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2009), fas.org; Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, chap. 2. On Putin’s consolidation of power, see Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution (New York: Scribner, 2005); Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Putin, in these years, left the internet relatively unregulated, because it seemed relatively irrelevant. In 2005, just 15 percent of Russian citizens were using the internet, a strikingly low figure compared with the United States, where 68 percent of citizens were plugged into the web already. See “Russia Internet Users” and “United States Internet Users,” Internet Live Stats, www.internetlivestats.com. It was China, not Russia, that pioneered the concept of “digital authoritarianism,” defined as “the use of digital information technology by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate domestic and foreign populations” by Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole in “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese Models,” Brookings Policy Brief (Washington, D.C.: Brook-ings Institution), Aug. 2019, www.brookings.edu. See also Xiao Qiang, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: President Xi’s Surveillance State,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (2019): 53–67.
55 Kalugin, interview by author, Rockville, Md., Aug. 7, 2018.
56 Steven Lee Myers, “Pervasive Corruption in Russia Is ‘Just Called Busi-ness,’ ” New York Times, Aug. 13, 2005, www.nytimes.com.
57 Credit Suisse, “Global Wealth Databook 2014,” Oct. 2014, 125; Katy Barnato, “Russia Is the Most Unequal Major Country in the World,” CNBC, Sept. 1, 2016, www.cnbc.com.
58 Mansur Mirovalev, “Putin’s Best Friend Is at the Heart of Panama Papers Scandal,” Los Angeles Times, April 4, 2016; Luke Harding, “Sergei Rol-dugin, the Cellist Who Holds the Key to Tracing Putin’s Hidden Fortune,” Guardian, April 3, 2016; Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The Red Web: The Kremlin’s Wars on the Internet (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015), 312–19.
59 Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 280. For additional interpretations, see Miriam Lanskoy and Dylan Myles-Primakoff, “The Rise of Kleptocracy: Power and Plunder in Putin’s Russia,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 1 (2018): 76–85; Steven Fish, “The Kremlin Emboldened: What Is Putinism?,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 4 (2017): 61–75. On the concept and mechanics of kleptocracy, see Alexander Cooley, John Heathershaw, and J. C. Sharman, “The Rise of Kleptocracy: Laundering Cash, Whitewash-ing Reputations,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 1 (2018): 39–53; Oliver Bullough, “The Rise of Kleptocracy: The Dark Side of Globalization,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 1 (2018): 25–38; Christopher Walker and Melissa Aten, “The Rise of Kleptocracy: A Challenge for Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 1 (2018): 20–24.
60 Julie Ray and Neli Esipova, “Economic Problems, Corruption Fail to Dent Putin’s Image,” Gallup, March 28, 2017, news.gallup.com; “Russians Are Most Unhappy with Putin over Wealth Inequality—Poll,” Moscow Times, May 7, 2018, www.themoscowtimes.com.
61 In interviews, former CIA directors and operations officers emphasized this aspect of Putin’s worldview. For instance, Steven Hall, a former Mos-cow station chief, said, “Putin believes that the U.S. government writ large wants to do this, to foment a color revolution in the streets of Moscow, and it’s a conspiracy theory obviously, but I think Putin actually believes that it’s true.” Hall, phone interview by author, Oct. 22, 2019.
62 Sipher, interview by author; Hall, interview by author; McLaughlin, inter-view by author.
63 Wise, phone interview by author, Oct. 21, 2019; Hall, interview by author.
64 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Presidents Clinton and Putin, Sept. 30, 2000, National Security Council and NSC Records Man-agement System, “Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Clinton Digital Library.
65 Andrew Higgins and Alan Cullison, “Russia Alienates an Ally by Hesitat-ing in Yugoslavia,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 2000, www.wsj.com.
66 Ibid.; Hall, interview by author.
67 Putin, interviewed by Time magazine, Dec. 12, 2007, en.kremlin.ru.
68 Ibid.
69 Martin Chulov, “Gaddafi’s Last Moments: ‘I Saw the Hand Holding the Gun and I Saw It Fire,’ ” Guardian, Oct. 20, 2012, www.theguardian.com.
70 Ellen Barry, “Putin Criticizes West for Libya Incursion,” New York Times, April 26, 2011, www.nytimes.com.
71 Putin, interviewed by Charlie Rose, Sept. 29, 2015, en.kremlin.ru.
72 Steven Woehrel, Ukraine’s Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues (Wash-ington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2005), fas.org; Anne Applebaum, “Obama and Europe,” Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2015, www.foreignaffairs.com. See also Stephen Shulman and Stephen Bloom, “The Legitimacy of Foreign Intervention in Elections: The Ukrainian Response,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 2 (2012): 41.45–7

73 Emily Tamkin, “10 Years After the Landmark Attack on Estonia, Is the World Better Prepared for Cyber Threats?,” Foreign Policy, April 27, 2017, foreignpolicy.com; Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 80. On Russia’s evolving military strategy and cyber operations, see Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare,” CNA, March 2017, www.cna.org.
74 David Sanger, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age (New York: Crown, 2018), xiv.
75 Of this shift, Timothy Snyder writes, “Killing the political future forced the political present to be eternal,” and “making an eternity of the present required endless crisis and permanent threats.” Snyder, Road to Unfree-dom, 48.
76 Kathy Lally, “Russia Targets U.S.-Linked Election Monitor,” Washington Post, Nov. 30, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com; David Herszenhorn, “Russia Takes Legal Action Against Election Monitors,” New York Times, April 9, 2013, www.nytimes.com.
77 Ellen Barry, “Russian Authorities Pressure Elections Watchdog,” New York Times, Dec. 1, 2011, www.nytimes.com; Michael Schwirtz and David Herszenhorn, “Voters Watch Polls in Russia, and Fraud Is What They See,” New York Times, Dec. 5, 2011, www.nytimes.com.
78 Hall, interview by author.
79 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at a Town Hall with Georgian Women Lead-ers,” July 5, 2010, State Department, 2009–2017, state.gov; McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace, 96. For more on the reset, see McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace, chaps. 6–13.
80 Clinton, interview by author, New York, Dec. 4, 2019; Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Hillary Clinton, ‘Smart Power,’ and a Dictator’s Fall,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 2016, www.nytimes.com.
81 Matt Spetalnick, Arshad Mohammed, and Andrew Quinn, “U.S. Voices ‘Serious Concerns’ About Russia Vote,” Reuters, Dec. 5, 2011, www.reuters.com. In her interview with the author, Clinton characterized the election as “blatantly rigged.”82 Ellen Barry and David Herszenhorn, “Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest over Vote,” New York Times, Dec. 8, 2011, www.nytimes.com. Lilia Shevtsova of Chatham House argues, “[Putin’s] scramble for self-preservation also reaches beyond Russia’s borders. To a larger extent than most authoritarian regimes, the regime has turned its survival into an international problem by using its foreign policy for domestic ends. Confronted by challenges at home, it manufactures external threats in an attempt to sweep these domestic issues under the rug.” Lilia Shevtsova, “The Kremlin Emboldened: Paradoxes of Decline,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 4 (2017): 102. See also McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace, chap. 15.
83 Clinton, interview by author.
84 Steve Gutterman and Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Thousands of Russians Pro-test Against Putin,” Reuters, Dec. 10, 2011, www.reuters.com.
85 Morell, phone interview by author, March 6, 2019; Hall, interview by author.
86 Clinton, interview by author.
87 Barry, phone interview by author, June 19, 2019. On Putin’s hold over Russia, see Graeme Robertson and Samuel Greene, “The Kremlin Emboldened: How Putin Wins Support,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 4 (2017): 86–100.
88 David Herszenhorn and Ellen Barry, “Russia Demands U.S. End Support of Democracy Groups,” New York Times, Sept. 18, 2012, www.nytimes.com; Susan Cornwell, “U.S. Pro-democracy Groups Pulling Out of Rus-sia,” Reuters, Dec. 14, 2012, www.reuters.com; “Russia Internet Blacklist Law Takes Effect,” BBC, Nov. 1, 2012, www.bbc.com; “Overview: Rus-sia,” NDI.org.
89 In 2013, Victoria Nuland explained, “Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the United States has supported Ukrainians as they build demo-cratic skills and institutions, as they promote civic participation and good governance, all of which are preconditions for Ukraine to achieve its Euro-pean aspirations. We have invested over $5 billion to assist Ukraine in these and other goals that will ensure a secure and prosperous and demo-cratic Ukraine.” See Katie Sanders, “The United States Spent $5 Billion on Ukraine and Anti-government Riots,” PolitiFact, March 19, 2014, www.politifact.com.
90 “Top U.S. Official Visits Protesters in Kiev as Obama Admin. Ups Pres-sure on Ukraine President Yanukovich,” CBS News, Dec. 11, 2013, www.cbsnews.com; Andrew Higgins and Peter Baker, “Russia Claims U.S. Is Meddling over Ukraine,” New York Times, Feb. 6, 2014, www.nytimes.com; Nuland, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Feb. 22, 2019.
91 Andrew Kramer and Andrew Higgins, “Ukraine’s Forces Escalate Attacks Against Protesters,” New York Times, Feb. 20, 2014, www.nytimes.com; Andrew Kramer and Andrew Higgins, “Archrival Is Freed as Ukraine Leader Flees,” New York Times, Feb. 22, 2014, www.nytimes.com; Ivan Nechepurenko, “Ukraine’s Ex-leader Regrets Not Breaking Up Protests That Led to His Fall,” New York Times, Nov. 25, 2016, www.nytimes.com. For an especially vivid account of the movement against Yanu-kovych, see Marci Shore, The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2018).
92 Max Seddon, “Documents Show How Russia’s Troll Army Hit America,” BuzzFeed News, June 2, 2014, www.buzzfeednews.com.
93 Terrence McCoy, “Vladimir Putin Hates Everything About the Internet Except ‘Website Vladimir,’ ” Washington Post, April 25, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com; “Vkontakte Founder Pavel Durov Learns He’s Been Fired Through Media,” Moscow Times, April 22, 2014, www.the moscowtimes.com; Amar Toor, “How Putin’s Cronies Seized Control of Russia’s Facebook,” Verge, Jan. 31, 2014, www.theverge.com; Neil Mac-Farquhar, “Russia Quietly Tightens Reins on Web with ‘Bloggers Law,’” New York Times, May 6, 2014, www.nytimes.com; Alexei Anishchuk, “Russia Passes Law to Force Websites onto Russian Servers,” Reuters, July 4, 2014, www.reuters.com.
94 The journalist Adrian Chen explains, “Trolling has become a key tool in a comprehensive effort by Russian authorities to rein in a previously freewheeling Internet culture, after huge anti-Putin protests in 2011 were organized largely over social media. It is used by Kremlin apparatchiks at every level of government in Russia; wherever politics are discussed online, one can expect a flood of comments from paid trolls.” Adrian Chen, “The Real Paranoia-Inducing Purpose of Russian Hacks,” New Yorker, July 27, 2016. Leonid Volkov, a Russian opposition leader, told Chen that pro-Kremlin operatives infest social media to confuse rather than to change minds: “The point is to spoil it, to create the atmosphere of hate, to make it so stinky that normal people won’t want to touch it.”95 Putin, interview by Kelly, March 1–2, 2018, en.kremlin.ru.
96 Burns, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 9, 2018.
97 This zero-sum calculus is not new. In 1945, George Kennan, while sta-tioned in Moscow, warned Secretary of State James F. Byrnes of a simi-lar attitude within the Kremlin. He wrote, “There is nothing—I repeat nothing—in the history of the Soviet regime which could justify us in assuming that the men who are now in power in Russia, or even those who have chances of assuming power within the foreseeable future, would hesitate for a moment to apply this power against us if by doing so they thought that they might materially improve their own power position in the world.” See Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 207.
98 Panetta, interview by author.
99 Morell, interview by author. See also Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, chap. 5.
100 Morell, interview by author; Kalugin, interview by author. Lucas Kello of Oxford writes, “Russian strategists exhort actions that seek to deny adversaries the internal political cohesion necessary to act purposefully abroad. Cyberspace offers a rich plane onto which practitioners can extend this activity.” Lucas Kello, The Virtual Weapon and International Order (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2017), 227.
101 Vladislav Surkov, “Владислав Сурков: Долгое государство Путина,” Независимая газета, Feb. 11, 2019, www.ng.ru.
102 Hayden, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Nov. 5, 2018. For Hayden’s personal recollections, see Michael Hayden, The Assault on Intelligence: American National Security in an Age of Lies (New York: Penguin Press, 2018). Russia’s intelligence services have struck abroad in other ways in recent years. See David V. Gioe, Michael S. Goodman, and David S. Frey, “Unforgiven: Russian Intelligence Vengeance as Political Theater and Strategic Messaging,” Intelligence and National Security 34, no. 4 (2019): 561–75.
103 Tsybulska, interview by author, Kyiv, Ukraine, June 17, 2019.

第八章 新时代

1 “Putin Describes Secret Operation to Seize Crimea,” AFP, March 8, 2015, news.yahoo.com.
2 For further reading, see Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, chaps. 4 and 5; Lucan Ahmad Way, “Ukraine’s Post-Maidan Struggles: Free Speech in a Time of War,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 3 (2019): 48–60; Joanna Rohozinska and Vitaliy Shpak, “Ukraine’s Post-Maidan Struggles: The Rise of an ‘Outsider’ President,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 3 (2019): 33–47.
3 Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation” (speech, March 18, 2014), en.kremlin.ru.
4 Alberto Nardelli, Jennifer Rankin, and George Arnett, “Vladimir Putin’s Approval Rating at Record Levels,” Guardian, July 23, 2015, www.theguardian.com. Leon Aron explains, “Faced with the need to revital-ize his support, Putin seems to have made the most fateful choice of his political life: He sharply shifted the basis of his popularity—and thus his regime’s legitimacy—from economic growth to patriotic mobilization.” Leon Aron, “The Kremlin Emboldened: Putinism After Crimea,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 4 (2017): 76–79. For further reading, see Daniel Treisman, “Why Putin Took Crimea,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, www.foreignaffairs.com.
5 Steve Holland and Jeff Mason, “Obama, Merkel Vow Broader Russian Sanctions if Ukraine Election Derailed,” Reuters, May 2, 2014, af.reuters.com.
6 Margaret Coker and Paul Sonne, “Ukraine: Cyberwar’s Hottest Front,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 9, 2015, www.wsj.com; Mark Clayton, “Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton Destruction’ from Hack-ers,” Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 2014, www.csmonitor.com; Laurens Cerulus, “How Ukraine Became a Test Bed for Cyberweaponry,” Politico Europe, Feb. 14, 2019, www.politico.eu; Defense Intelligence Agency, “Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations,” 2017, dia.mil.
Of the virus detected on Election Day, the SBU, Ukraine’s security service, said in a statement that “offenders were trying by means of previ-ously installed software to fake election results in the given region and in such a way to discredit general results of elections of the President of Ukraine.” See Clayton, “Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton Destruction’ from Hackers.”7 Fedchenko, interview by author, Kyiv, Ukraine, June 17, 2019.
8 Oren Dorell, “Alleged Russian Political Meddling Documented in 27 Countries Since 2004,” USA Today, Sept. 7, 2017, www.usatoday.com. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., 2018, S. Rep. 115-21, www.foreign.senate.gov; Evan Osnos, David Remnick, and Joshua Yaffa, “Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War,” New Yorker, Feb. 24, 2017, www.newyorker.com.
9 Schadlow, phone interview by author, Nov. 9, 2018. I first reported on this in an article for The New Yorker (“Smaller Democracies Grapple with the Threat of Russian Interference,” New Yorker, Dec. 8, 2018, newyorker.com).
10 Gerasimov, “Value of Science Is in the Foresight.”11 Goss, interview by author, Florida Keys, Fla., Dec. 26, 2018; Heiestad, interview by author, Brussels, Belgium, Dec. 4, 2018.
12 Paul Sonne, “A Russian Bank Gave Marine Le Pen’s Party a Loan. Then Weird Things Began Happening,” Washington Post, Dec. 27, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com; Suzanne Daley and Maïa de la Baume, “French Far Right Gets Helping Hand With Russian Loan,” New York Times, Dec. 1, 2014, www.nytimes.com.
13 Burns, interview by author.
14 Putin, interview by John Micklethwait, Sept. 1, 2016, en.kremlin.ru.
15 Ðukanović, interview by author, Oxford, U.K., Nov. 26, 2018.
16 Aleksandar Vasovic, “Montenegro Opposition Rejects Election Outcome due to ‘Atmosphere of Fear,’” Reuters, Oct. 18, 2016, www.reuters.com; Petar Komnenic, “Montenegro Begins Trial of Alleged Pro-Russian Coup Plotters,” Reuters, July 19, 2017, www.reuters.com; Julian Barnes, “Ex–C.I.A. Officer’s Brief Detention Deepens Mystery in Montenegro,” New York Times, Nov. 23, 2018, www.nytimes.com; Ken Dilanian et al., “White House Readies to Fight Election Day Cyber Mayhem,” NBC News, Nov. 3, 2016, www.nbcnews.com; Michael Schwirtz, “Top Secret Russian Unit Seeks to Destabilize Europe, Security Officials Say,” New York Times, Oct. 8, 2019, www.nytimes.com.
17 Ðukanović, interview by author.
18 Wise, phone interview by author, Oct. 21, 2019; Nuland, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Feb. 22, 2019; Wallander, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2019.
19 John McCain, “Why Should You Care About Russian Interference? Look No Further than the Attempted Coup in Montenegro,” Medium, June 20, 2017, medium.com.
20 Ðukanović, interview by author.
21 Santos, interview by author, Oxford, U.K., Nov. 13, 2018; Nicholas Casey and Susan Abad, “Colombia Elects Iván Duque, a Young Populist, as President,” New York Times, June 17, 2018, www.nytimes.com; Azam Ahmed and Paulina Villegas, “López Obrador, an Atypical Leftist, Wins Mexico Presidency in Landslide,” New York Times, July 1, 2018, www.nytimes.com.
22 On the causes and consequences of Brexit, see Anne Applebaum, “Britain After Brexit: A Transformed Political Landscape,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 (2017): 53–58; Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, “Britain After Brexit: A Nation Divided,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 (2017): 17–30. On Russia’s tactics, see Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 104–9, in which Snyder explains, “Brexit was a triumph for Russian foreign policy, and a sign that a cyber campaign directed from Moscow could change reality.”23 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Signs of Russian Meddling in Brexit Referendum,” New York Times, Nov. 15, 2017, www.nytimes.com; Matthew Field and Mike Wright, “Russian Trolls Sent Thousands of Pro-Leave Messages on Day of Brexit Referendum, Twitter Data Reveals,” Telegraph, Oct. 17, 2018, www.telegraph.co.uk; Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 106.
24 Hannigan, interview by author, London, March 22, 2019.
25 On the covert nature of Russia’s operation, Snyder writes, “About a third of the discussion of Brexit on Twitter was generated by bots—and more than 90% of the bots tweeting political material were not located in the United Kingdom. Britons who considered their choices had no idea at the time that they were reading material disseminated by bots, nor that the bots were part of a Russian foreign policy to weaken their country.” Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 106.
26 Clapper, interview by author, Fairfax, Va., Jan. 3, 2019.
27 Anton TAroianovski and Karla Adam, “In Brexit, Putin Sees a Crisis of Democracy—Not That He Has Anything to Do with It,” Washington Post, Dec. 20, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com.
28 Mark Landler and Stephen Castle, “U.K. Parliament Advances Brexit Bill in Lopsided Vote, All but Assuring January Exit,” New York Times, Dec. 20, 2019, www.nytimes.com.
29 Hannigan, interview by author.
30 Wise, interview by author.
31 Erlanger, interview by author, Brussels, Belgium, Dec. 18, 2018.
32 On the decline of foreign reporting, see Justin D. Martin, “Loneliness at the Foreign ‘Bureau,’ ” Columbia Journalism Review, April 23, 2012, archives.cjr.org; Jodi Enda, “Retreating from the World,” AJR, Dec./Jan. 2011, ajrarchive.org.
33 Cohen, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018; Johnson, interview by author, New York, July 29, 2019; Hall, phone interview by author, Oct. 22, 2019.
34 Blinken, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Jan. 3, 2019.
35 Clapper, interview by author.
36 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, two Russian journalists, have explained that “Putin believed the Panama Papers attack was sponsored by Hillary Clinton’s people—this, in a way, provided him with a ‘justi-fication’ for a retaliatory operation.” See Adam Taylor, “Putin Saw the Panama Papers as a Personal Attack and May Have Wanted Revenge, Russian Authors Say,” Washington Post, Aug. 28, 2017, www.washington post.com.
37 Patrick O’Connor, “Hillary Clinton Exits with 69% Approval Rating,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 17, 2013, blogs.wsj.com; Hillary Rodham Clin-ton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 215.
38 Philip Rucker, “Hillary Clinton Says Putin’s Actions Are Like ‘What Hitler Did Back in the ’30s,’ ” Washington Post, March 5, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com; Liz Kreutz, “Vladimir Putin on Hillary Clinton: ‘Better Not to Argue with Women,’ ” ABC, June 4, 2014, abcnews.go.com.
39 Hall, interview by author.
40 For further reading, see David Remnick, The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama (New York: Knopf, 2010).
41 Barack Obama, speech in Chicago, Oct. 2, 2002, www.npr.org. In his inaugural address, Obama declared that “the state of our economy calls for action, bold and swift” and pledged to “begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan.” See Barack Obama, “Inaugural Address” (speech, Washington, D.C., Jan. 20, 2009), the Obama White House, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov.
42 “Transcript of the Third Presidential Debate,” New York Times, Oct. 22, 2012, www.nytimes.com. Anne Applebaum traces the evolution in U.S.-Russian relations from the start of the Obama presidency through the Ukraine crisis in “Obama and Europe.”43 Marvin Kalb, “Stumbling Toward Conflict with Russia?,” Brookings Institution, June 3, 2015, www.brookings.edu.
44 Petraeus, phone interview by author, Oct. 8, 2018; Joby Warrick, “More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says,” Wash-ington Post, Aug. 30, 2013, www.washingtonpost.com.
45 Ben Rhodes, “Inside the White House During the Syrian ‘Red Line’ Cri-sis,” Atlantic, June 3, 2018, www.theatlantic.com.
46 Paul Nitze, a former deputy secretary of defense, captured the essence of escalation dominance when he said that a “copybook principle in strat-egy” is that “the advantage tends to go to the side in a better position to raise the stakes by expanding the scope, duration or destructive intensity of the conflict.” See Robert Jervis, “The Madness Beyond MAD—Current American Nuclear Strategy,” PS 17, no. 1 (1984): 34. On Nitze, see Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Knopf, 1988). Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman define escalation dominance as “the ability to increase the threatened costs to the adversary while denying the adversary the opportunity to negate those costs or to counterescalate.” Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 38. For further reading on escalatory concerns in foreign policy, see Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
47 Nuland, interview by author.
48 Peter Baker and Andrew Higgins, “U.S. and European Sanctions Take Aim at Putin’s Economic Efforts,” New York Times, Sept. 12, 2014, www.nytimes.com; Jeremy Herb, “Obama Pressed on Many Fronts to Arm Ukraine,” Politico, March 11, 2015, www.politico.com.
49 Morell, phone interview by author, March 6, 2019.
50 Panetta, phone interview by author, Nov. 12, 2019.
51 Petraeus, interview by author.
52 Dina Smeltz and Ivo Daalder, “Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrench-ment,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 7, survey.thechicagocouncil.org.
53 Morell, interview by author.
54 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 6, www.justice.gov.
55 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure, vol. 1 of Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, 116th Cong., 1st sess., 2019, S. Rep. 116-XX, 3, www.intelligence.senate.gov.
56 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Assessment, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, Jan. 6, 2017, www.dni.gov.
57 Brennan, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2018. For a typical article on Trump’s campaign announcement, see Alex Altman and Charlotte Alter, “Trump Launches Presidential Campaign with Empty Flair,” Time, June 16, 2015, time.com.
58 Alan Gilbert, “The Far-Right Book Every Russian General Reads,” Daily Beast, Feb. 26, 2018, www.thedailybeast.com.
59 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Special Counsel Robert S. Muel-ler III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election (hereafter cited as Mueller Report), March 2019, 70–71. For further reading on Trump’s business pursuits in Russia, see David Ignatius, “A History of Donald Trump’s Business Dealings in Rus-sia,” Washington Post, Nov. 2, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com; Megan Twohey and Steve Eder, “For Trump, Three Decades of Chasing Deals in Russia,” New York Times, Jan. 16, 2017, www.nytimes.com/. For Trump’s response, see Linda Qiu, “Trump Denies Business Dealings With Russia. His Former Lawyer Contradicts Him,” New York Times, Nov. 29, 2018, www.nytimes.com.
60 Andrew Kramer, “Vladimir Putin Chides Turkey, Praises Trump, and Talks Up Russia’s Economy,” New York Times, Dec. 17, 2015, www.nytimes.com; Vladimir Putin, “Vladimir Putin’s Annual News Confer-ence,” Dec. 17, 2015, en.kremlin.ru.
61 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 17, www.justice.gov.
62 Maggie Haberman, “Super Tuesday Takeaways: Trump and Clinton Sprint, While Others Stumble,” New York Times, March 2, 2016, www.nytimes.com. Also in March, Trump hired Paul Manafort, a lob-byist who had made millions advising Viktor Yanukovych, the former Ukrainian president. Alexander Burns and Maggie Haberman, “Donald Trump Hires Paul Manafort to Lead Delegate Effort,” New York Times, March 28, 2016, www.nytimes.com. For further reading on Manafort, see Steven Lee Myers and Andrew Kramer, “How Paul Manafort Wielded Power in Ukraine Before Advising Donald Trump,” New York Times, July 31, 2016, www.nytimes.com; Andrew Kramer, Mike McIntire, and Barry Meier, “Secret Ledger in Ukraine Lists Cash for Donald Trump’s Campaign Chief,” New York Times, Aug. 14, 2016, www.nytimes.com; Franklin Foer, “The Plot Against America,” Atlantic, March 2018; Simon Shuster, “How Paul Manafort Helped Elect Russia’s Man in Ukraine,” Time, Oct. 31, 2017, www.time.com.
63 Mueller Report, 37–38; U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence, Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns (testimony by Thomas Rid), 115th Cong., March 30, 2017, 4, nwtwellwig.ience.senate.gov.
64 Amita Kelly, “Donald Trump Clinches GOP Nomination,” NPR, May 26, 2016, www.npr.org; Amy Chozick and Patrick Healy, “Hillary Clin-ton Has Clinched Democratic Nomination, Survey Reports,” New York Times, June 6, 2016, www.nytimes.com.
65 Mueller Report, 72–78; Kalugin, interview by author, Rockville, Md., Aug. 7, 2018; note 59 of this chapter. For Trump’s account of his 1987 trip to Moscow, see note 68 of chapter 5 of this book. Additionally, Rob-ert Mueller, in his final report, concluded: “Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.” Mueller Report, 5. For foundational reporting on Russian interference in the 2016 election and on ties between Trump, his associates, and Russia, see David Corn and Michael Isikoff, Russian Roulette: The Inside Story of Putin’s War on America and the Election of Donald Trump (New York: Twelve, 2018); Greg Miller, The Apprentice: Trump, Russia, and the Subversion of American Democracy (New York: Custom House, 2018).
66 Cohen, interview by author.

第二部份 二○一六年

1 U.S. Congress, Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure, 3.
2 Pope, phone interview by author, June 26, 2019.
3 Andrew Perrin, “Social Media Usage: 2005–2015,” Pew Research Center, Oct. 8, 2015, www.pewresearch.org; “Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, June 12, 2019, www.pewresearch.org.

第九章 延迟攻击

1 In a PBS interview on August 9, 2017, Clapper said, “It was during the summer or so of 2015 that we began to see these indications, and certainly the hacking attempts at the DNC, which primarily involved the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security engaging with the DNC. Other things that began to unfold from then on through the election, of course, were the instances of what I would call reconnoitering by the Russian intelligence services into state-level databases, primarily voter registration rolls, in many cases maintained by contractor by each of the states. . . . [Obama] was thoroughly briefed up on this. And we had been doing PDB [President’s Daily Brief] articles on this throughout, starting in 2015, about this activity as it unfolded and as we were able to understand it.” See Clapper, interview by Jim Gilmore, Aug. 9, 2017, www.pbs.org. Clap-per further said, in his interview with the author, “We had been reporting on [Russia’s activities] throughout in the PDB and other intelligence, but it was all individual vignettes” rather than a complete picture.
2 Clapper, interview by author, Fairfax, Va., Jan. 3, 2019.
3 Hall, phone interview by author, Oct. 22, 2019; McLaughlin, phone interview by author, Sept. 5, 2019; Morell, phone interview by author, March 6, 2019.
4 “Increased Public Support for the U.S. Arming Ukraine,” Pew Research Center, Feb. 23, 2015, www.people-press.org; Jeffrey Jones, “Americans Increasingly See Russia as Threat, Top U.S. Enemy,” Gallup, Feb. 16, 2015, news.gallup.com; Kyle Dropp, Joshua Kertzer, and Thomas Zeit-zoff, “The Less Americans Know About Ukraine’s Location, the More They Want U.S. to Intervene,” Washington Post, April 7, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com.
5 “Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call,” BBC, Feb. 7, 2014, www.bbc.com.
6 Nuland, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Feb. 22, 2019.
7 Ellen Nakashima, “Russian Government Hackers Penetrated DNC, Stole Opposition Research on Trump,” Washington Post, June 14, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com. See also Dmitri Alperovitch, “Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee,” CrowdStrike, June 15, 2016, www.crowdstrike.com; Sheera Frenkel, “Meet Fancy Bear, the Russian Group Hacking the US Election,” BuzzFeed News, Oct. 15, 2016, www.buzzfeednews.com.
8 Mueller Report, 42–43; Monaco, interview by author, New York, Sept. 25, 2019.
9 Colin Wilhelm, “Sanders Taunts Clinton Again on Wall Street Ties,” Politico, April 17, 2016, www.politico.com; Amy Chozick, Patrick Healy, and Yamiche Alcindor, “Bernie Sanders Endorses Hillary Clinton, Hop-ing to Unify Democrats,” New York Times, July 12, 2016, www.nytimes.com.
10 Mueller Report, 45–46; Michael D. Shear and Matthew Rosenberg, “Released Emails Suggest the D.N.C. Derided the Sanders Campaign,” New York Times, July 22, 2016, www.nytimes.com. On the GRU’s social media activities, see Renée DiResta and Shelby Grossman, “Potemkin Pages & Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014–2019,” Stanford Cyber Policy Center, Nov. 2019, 8, 73, fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com.
11 Zakaria, phone interview by author, July 18, 2019.
12 Aaron Blake, “Here Are the Latest, Most Damaging Things in the DNC’s Leaked Emails,” Washington Post, July 25, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com; Alana Abramson and Shushannah Walshe, “The 4 Most Damaging Emails from the DNC WikiLeaks Dump,” ABC News, July 25, 2016, abcnews.go.com; Eric Bradner, “Clinton’s Campaign Manager: Russia Helping Trump,” CNN, July 25, 2016, www.cnn.com.
13 There were exceptions—first among them, Anne Applebaum, who said in late July that the DNC hack and release was “exactly out of the Rus-sian security service’s playbook” and that “this is a very established Russian tactic that’s been used multiple times in democratic elections, mostly in Europe.” She similarly said, in another interview in late July, that the DNC release “looks like almost exactly the same pattern is now in play in the United States that we’ve seen play out in other European countries.” Later, in September, Applebaum wrote a column elaborating upon what Russia’s electoral interference operation could entail through Election Day, citing the experiences of various European countries. See Applebaum, interview by Jacob Weisberg, Slate, July 28, 2016, slate.com; Olivia Lazarus and T. J. Raphael, “Trump: The President Russia Wants?,” PRI, July 26, 2016, www.pri.org; Anne Applebaum, “How Russia Could Spark a U.S. Electoral Disaster,” Washington Post, Sept. 8, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com. On Ukraine, see note 6 of chapter 8 of this book.
14 Eliot Nelson, “Sanders Calls DNC Leak ‘Outrageous,’ Calls for New DNC Chair,” Huffington Post, July 24, 2016, www.huffpost.com; Matt Flegenheimer, “Democratic Convention Day 4 Takeaways: Over? She’s Just Starting,” New York Times, July 28, 2016, www.nytimes.com; Anne Gearan, Philip Rucker, and Abby Phillip, “DNC Chairwoman Will Resign in Aftermath of Committee Email Controversy,” Washington Post, July 24, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com; Will Drabold, “DNC Apologizes to Bernie Sanders and Supporters over Leaked Emails,” Time, July 25, 2016, time.com.
15 Clinton, interview by author, New York, Dec. 4, 2019; Jake Rudnitsky, John Micklethwait, and Michael Riley, “Putin Says DNC Hack Was a Public Service, Russia Didn’t Do It,” Bloomberg, Sept. 2, 2016, www.bloomberg.com.
16 Department of Justice, Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller, “Inter-view of Richard Gates 4/11/18,” 21, released via FOIA on Nov. 1, 2019, www.documentcloud.org.
Donald McGahn, counsel to the Trump campaign, declined to be inter-viewed for this book, saying that he did not know what he was at liberty to disclose. Reince Priebus, then the RNC chairman, did not respond to multiple interview requests.
17 Wise, phone interview by author, Oct. 21, 2019; Daniel, phone interview by author, July 19, 2019.
18 Johnson, interview by author, New York, July 29, 2019; Nuland, inter-view by author.
19 Johnson, interview by author; Daniel, interview by author. Brennan, in his testimony before Congress in May 2017, said, “When it became clear to me last summer that Russia was engaged in a very aggressive and wide-ranging effort to interfere in one of the key pillars of our democracy, we pulled together experts from CIA, NSA, and FBI in late July to focus on the issue, drawing in multiple perspectives and subject matter experts with broad expertise to assess Russian attempts to interfere in the U.S. presidential election.” See Tim Hains, “Brennan: ‘It Should Be Clear to Everyone That Russia Brazenly Interfered in Our 2016 Election,’” Real Clear Politics, May 23, 2017, www.realclearpolitics.com.
20 Rice, phone interview by author, Aug. 27, 2019; Blinken, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Jan. 3, 2019. Information warfare is defined as “a strategy for the use and management of information to pursue a competitive advantage, including both offensive and defensive opera-tions.” Catherine A. Theohary, Defense Primer: Information Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2018), R45142, fas.org.
21 Wallander, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2019. For elaboration on the perceived significance of the DNC email release from inside the White House, see chapter 11 of this book.
22 David Sanger, “Harry Reid Cites Evidence of Russian Tampering in U.S. Vote, and Seeks F.B.I. Inquiry,” New York Times, Aug. 29, 2016, www.nytimes.com; Dustin Volz and Jim Finkle, “FBI Detects Breaches Against Two State Voter Systems,” Reuters, Aug. 29, 2016, www.reuters.com.
23 U.S. Congress, Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure, 6, 22–24.
24 United States v. Viktor Netyksho et al., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1030, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 26, www.justice.gov; Mueller Report, 50.
25 U.S. Congress, Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure, 22.
26 Monaco, interview by author; Daniel, interview by author; Pope, phone interview by author, June 26, 2019.
27 Rice, interview by author.
28 Wallander, interview by author; Daniel, interview by author; Nuland, interview by author.
29 Wallander, interview by author; Nuland, interview by author. On Putin’s wealth, see Adam Taylor, “Is Vladimir Putin Hiding a $200 Billion For-tune? (And If So, Does It Matter?),” Washington Post, Feb. 20, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com; Adrian Blomfield, “$40bn Putin ‘Is Now Europe’s Richest Man,’ ” Telegraph, Dec. 21, 2007, www.telegraph.co.uk.
30 Nuland, interview by author.
31 Daniel, interview by author; Wallander, interview by author.
32 Haines, interview by author, New York, Feb. 23, 2019.
33 Clapper, interview by author.
34 Blinken, interview by author; Brennan, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2018.
35 Blinken, interview by author; Johnson, interview by author.
36 Blinken, interview by author.
37 Ibid.
38 U.S. Congress, House, Help America Vote Act of 2002, H.R. 2395, 107th Cong., introduced in House Nov. 14, 2001, www.congress.gov.
39 Monaco, interview by author. Outside experts have also concluded that voter registration databases presented an accessible point of entry for Russia in 2016. Professor Charles Stewart III explains, “The rising num-ber of centralized and Internet-reliant registration systems offers more targets for widespread attacks.” Charles Stewart III, “The 2016 U.S. Elec-tion: Fears and Facts About Electoral Integrity,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 2 (2017): 58. See also Sarah Eckman, Election Security: Voter Registration System Policy Issues (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2019), fas.org; Ben Buchanan and Michael Sulmeyer, “Hacking Chads: The Motivations, Threats, and Effects of Electoral Insecurity,” Cybersecurity Project, Harvard Kennedy School, Oct. 2016, www.belfercenter.org.
40 Pope, interview by author; Blinken, interview by author; Brennan, inter-view by author.
41 Brennan, interview by author; Monaco, interview by author.
42 Clapper, interview by author.
43 Trump had introduced strongman tactics to Republican Party politics: mocking his primary opponents, developing a cult of personality, and embracing “Lock her up!” chants at his rallies. Beyond presidential politics, event after event was tearing at the fabric of American society. On June 12, 2016, a gunman killed forty-nine people at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, the latest of a years-long string of mass shootings in the United States. A little over a week later, Democratic lawmakers staged a twenty-five-hour sit-in on the floor of the House of Representatives, trying, to no avail, to persuade their Republican counterparts to vote on gun control legislation. On July 5 and 6, police officers fatally shot two black men, Alton Sterling and Philando Castile, in interactions that were filmed and posted online, prompting widespread protests against police shootings of black Americans. On July 7, a gunman in Dallas killed five police officers and injured nine more; he targeted white members of law enforcement in retaliation for the recent shootings of black Americans. See Manny Fernandez, Richard Pérez-Peña, and Jonah Engel Bromwich, “Five Dallas Officers Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says,” New York Times, July 8, 2016, www.nytimes.com; Matt Furber and Richard Pérez-Peña, “After Philando Castile’s Killing, Obama Calls Police Shootings ‘an American Issue,’” New York Times, July 7, 2016, www.nytimes.com; Richard Fausset, Richard Pérez-Peña, and Campbell Robertson, “Alton Sterling Shooting in Baton Rouge Prompts Justice Dept. Investigation,” New York Times, July 6, 2016, www.nytimes.com; Lizette Alvarez and Richard Pérez-Peña, “Orlando Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub, Leaving 50 Dead,” New York Times, June 12, 2016, www.nytimes.com; Peter W. Stevenson, “A Brief History of the ‘Lock Her Up!’ Chant by Trump Supporters Against Clinton,” Washington Post, Nov. 22, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com; Jose A. Del Real, “Blasting ‘Pathetic’ Agreement, Trump Mocks and Taunts Rivals Cruz and Kasich,” Washington Post, April 25, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com; David M. Herszenhorn and Emmarie Huetteman, “House Democrats’ Gun-Control Sit-in Turns into Chaotic Showdown with Republicans,” New York Times, June 22, 2016, www.nytimes.com.
44 Ashley Parker and David Sanger, “Donald Trump Calls on Russia to Find Hillary Clinton’s Missing Emails,” New York Times, July 27, 2016, www.nytimes.com.
45 Mueller Report, 49; Bannon, interview by author, New York, Sept. 21, 2019.
46 Tessa Berenson, “Donald Trump: ‘The Election’s Going to Be Rigged,’” Time, Aug. 1, 2016, time.com.
47 Pope, interview by author.
48 Obama’s quotation about Clinton comes from former FBI director Jim Comey’s memoir, A Higher Loyalty: Truth, Lies, and Leadership (New York: Flatiron, 2018), 190.
49 Daniel, interview by author.
50 McDonough, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018.
51 Pope, interview by author; Finer, interview by author, New York, Feb. 20, 2019.
52 Chris Kahn, “Clinton Leads Trump by 12 Points in Reuters/Ipsos Poll,” Reuters, Aug. 23, 2016, www.reuters.com.
53 Johnson, interview by author; Clapper, interview by author; Sarah Bloom Raskin, phone interview by author, Feb. 3, 2020.
54 Wallander, interview by author; Wallander, phone interview by author, Jan. 24, 2020.
55 Monaco, interview by author; Haines, interview by author; Rice, inter-view by author.

第十章 采取守势

1 McDonough, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018; Monaco, interview by author, New York, Sept. 25, 2019.
2 Johnson, interview by author, New York, July 29, 2019.
3 Christina Cassidy, “AP Fact Check: Voter Registration Problems Do Not Equate to Fraud,” PBS, Oct. 25, 2016, www.pbs.org; R. Sam Garrett, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview (Wash-ington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2018), fas.org; White House, “Our Government: Elections & Voting,” www.whitehouse.gov. See also note 5 of the introduction of this book.
4 Johnson, interview by author.
5 Daniel, phone interview by author, July 19, 2019; Pope, phone interview by author, June 26, 2019.
6 “Trust in Government: 1958–2015,” Pew Research Center, Nov. 23, 2015, www.people-press.org. For further context, see Alec Tyson, “Obama Job Approval Higher, but Views of Him Are Still the Most Polarized in Recent History,” Pew Research Center, Oct. 28, 2016, www.pewresearch.org; “Partisan Views of 2016 Candidates, Barack and Michelle Obama, Views of the Election,” Pew Research Center, June 22, 2016, www.people-press.org.
7 Johnson, interview by author.
8 Anna Mulrine, “Homeland Security Chief Weighs Plan to Protect Voting from Hackers,” Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 3, 2016, www.csmonitor.com.
9 Johnson, interview by author.
10 Department of Homeland Security, “Readout of Secretary Johnson’s Call with State Election Officials on Cybersecurity,” Aug. 15, 2016, www.dhs.gov.
11 Johnson, interview by author.
12 Rice, phone interview by author, Aug. 27, 2019.
13 Johnson, interview by author.
14 Miller, Apprentice, 149–54; Monaco, interview by author; Brennan, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2018.
15 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Flash: Targeting Activity Against State Board of Election Systems,” Aug. 18, 2016, info.publicintelligence.net; U.S. Congress, Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure, 7, 12; Michael Isikoff, “FBI says foreign hackers penetrated state election sys-tems,” Yahoo News, Aug. 29, 2016, www.yahoo.com; Daniel, interview by author.
16 Daniel, interview by author.
17 Monaco, interview by author; Eric Geller, “Elections Security: Federal Help or Power Grab?,” Politico, Aug. 28, 2016, www.politico.com; Ali Breland, “State Declines DHS Security for Voting Machines,” Hill, Aug. 26, 2016, thehill.com.
18 Johnson, interview by author; Rice, interview by author.
19 Pope, interview by author.
20 Panetta, phone interview by author, Nov. 12, 2019; Lott, phone interview by author, Oct. 31, 2019; David Rogers, “Some Good Old Boys Honor Trent Lott,” Politico, Sept. 17, 2009, www.politico.com.
21 Glenn Kessler, “When Did McConnell Say He Wanted to Make Obama a ‘One-Term President’?,” Washington Post, Sept. 25, 2012, www.washingtonpost.com. The feeling was mutual. In 2013, just after winning reelection, Obama mocked McConnell at the White House Correspon-dents’ Dinner: “Some folks still don’t think I spend enough time with Congress. ‘Why don’t you get a drink with Mitch McConnell?’ they ask. Really? Why don’t you get a drink with Mitch McConnell? I’m sorry. I get frustrated sometimes.” See “Transcript: Obama Speaks at WHCD,” Politico, April 28, 2013, www.politico.com.
22 Burgess Everett and Glenn Thrush, “McConnell Throws Down the Gauntlet: No Scalia Replacement Under Obama,” Politico, Feb. 13, 2016, www.politico.com; Mitch McConnell, The Long Game: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2016), 185.
23 Jonathan Chait, “Five Days That Shaped a Presidency,” New York, Oct. 3, 2016, nymag.com.
24 Brennan, interview by author. For the specific dates of Brennan’s brief-ings to each member of the Gang of Eight, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election Volume 3: U.S. Government Response to Russian Activities, 116th Congress, 2nd ses-sion, 2020, S. Report 116-XX, 13, s.wsj.net/public /resources /documents e/Snate_Russia_Report_Volume3.pdf?mod=article_inline.
25 Brennan, interview by author.
26 Reid, interview by author, Las Vegas, July 24, 2019.
27 Reid to Comey, Aug. 27, 2016, www.documentcloud.org; David Sanger, “Harry Reid Cites Evidence of Russian Tampering in U.S. Vote, and Seeks F.B.I. Inquiry,” New York Times, Aug. 29, 2016, www.nytimes.com.
28 Reid, interview by author.
29 Podesta, interview by author, Washington, D.C., June 15, 2018.
30 McDonough, interview by author; Haines, interview by author, New York, Feb. 23, 2019.
31 Reid, interview by author; Haines, interview by author.
32 McDonough, interview by author.
33 Johnson, interview by author.
34 Reid, interview by author.
35 Podesta, interview by author; Panetta, interview by author.
36 McDonough, interview by author.
37 Haines, interview by author.
38 “Transcripts: Intel Chief Testifies Amid New Russia Revelation,” CNN, May 23, 2017, transcripts.cnn.com.
39 Johnson, interview by author; Blinken, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Jan. 3, 2019.
40 Haines, interview by author.
41 White House, “Press Conference by the President,” Dec. 16, 2016, obama whitehouse.archives.gov.
42 Monaco, interview by author.
43 McDonough, interview by author; Wallander, interview by author, Wash-ington, D.C., July 17, 2019; Morell, phone interview by author, March 6, 2019.
44 Blinken, interview by author; Monaco, interview by author; Wallander, interview by author; Daniel, interview by author.
45 Comey, Higher Loyalty, 190.
46 Haines, interview by author.
47 Johnson, interview by author.
48 Ibid.; Comey, Higher Loyalty, 189–90, in which he elaborates, “I also acknowledged to the president that an inoculation effort might acciden-tally accomplish the Russians’ goal of undermining confidence in our election system. If you tell Americans that the Russians are tampering with the election, have you just sowed doubt about the outcome, or given one side an excuse for why they lost?” Ultimately, Comey declined to sign the statement alongside Johnson and Clapper. Of this decision, he writes, “A month later, in early October, the Obama team decided some kind of formal statement from the administration was in order after all. The director of national intelligence, Jim Clapper, and the secretary of Home-land Security, Jeh Johnson, were prepared to sign it. The FBI leadership team and I decided that there was not an adequate reason for us to also sign on.” Comey, Higher Loyalty, 191. Of Comey’s thinking at the time, then FBI deputy director Andrew McCabe later told the Senate, “Direc-tor Comey felt that [the op-ed] was important to do when he suggested it.” However, “
y the time he kind of got around to thinking about it seriously, he felt like the opportunity had passed and we were too close [to the election] at that point to have the intended effect on the elector-ate.” See U.S. Congress, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election Volume 3: U.S. Government Response to Russian Activities, 35.

49 Cohen, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018; Johnson, interview by author; Haines, interview by author.
50 Johnson, interview by author; Clapper, interview by author, Fairfax, Va., Jan. 3, 2019.
51 Johnson, interview by author.
52 Ibid.
53 Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President: What We Don’t, Can’t, and Do Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 153–54. See also U.S. Depart-ment of Homeland Security, “Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security,” Oct. 7, 2016, www.dhs.gov; David A. Fahrenthold, “Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation About Women in 2005,” Washington Post, Oct. 7, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com.
54 Rucker, phone interview by author, Sept. 2, 2018.
55 Clapper, interview by author; Johnson, interview by author.
56 Bannon, interview by author, New York, Sept. 21, 2019.
57 “Full Transcript: Third 2016 Presidential Debate,” Politico, Oct. 20, 2016, www.politico.com.
58 Johnson, interview by author.
59 Blair, phone interview by author, May 27, 2019.
60 Comey, Higher Loyalty, 191.
61 Johnson, interview by author.
62 McDonough, interview by author.
63 John F. Kelly to Senator Claire McCaskill, June 13, 2017, www.hsgac.senate.gov.
64 Alexander Tin, “Ahead of Elections, States Reject Federal Help to Combat Hackers,” CBS News, Oct. 28, 2016, www.cbsnews.com.
65 Mueller Report, 51; Patricia Mazzei, “Russians Hacked Voter Systems in 2 Florida Counties. But Which Ones?,” New York Times, May 14, 2019, www.nytimes.com; Patricia Mazzei, “F.B.I. to Florida Lawmakers: You Were Hacked by Russians, but Don’t Tell Voters,” New York Times, May 16, 2019, www.nytimes.com; Dustin Volz, “Hackers Breached Voter Databases in Two Florida Counties Ahead of 2016 Election,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2019, www.wsj.com.
66 Wallander, interview by author; Daniel, interview by author.
67 On Election Day concerns, see chapter 11 of this book.

第十一章 投票日

1 Johnson, interview by author, New York, July 29, 2019.
2 Pope, phone interview by author, June 26, 2019.
3 Daniel, phone interview by author, July 19, 2019; Monaco, interview by author, New York, Sept. 25, 2019; Rice, phone interview by author, Aug. 27, 2019.
4 See chapter 8 of this book.
5 Brennan, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2018; Pope, interview by author; Johnson, interview by author.
6 Johnson, interview by author; Haines, interview by author, New York, Feb. 23, 2019; Monaco, interview by author. Of this scenario, Monaco explained, “What I was very concerned about and what we spent a lot of time worrying about as a worst-case scenario was manipulation of voter registration databases such that what we were seeing was that they were obviously very diffuse and not subject to any kind of uniform set of cyber-security standards or controls. Encryption was spotty, not uniform. . . . We had seen Russia scanning and probing voter registration databases, and I think we were all worried again, as in any threat situation, what is it that we don’t know? My worst-case scenario was John Smith goes to vote on Election Day and appears at his polling place and says I am John Smith from First Street here to vote and on the database and on their records they have him listed somewhere else or don’t have him.”7 Josh Katz, “Who Will Be President?,” New York Times, Nov. 8, 2016, www.nytimes.com.
8 “Full Transcript: Third 2016 Presidential Debate.”9 McDonough, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018.
10 Pope, interview by author.
11 Clapper, interview by author, Fairfax, Va., Jan. 3, 2019.
12 Brennan, interview by author; Clinton, interview by author, New York, Dec. 4, 2019.
13 Wallander, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2019.
14 Philip Bump, “Donald Trump Will Be President Thanks to 80,000 People in Three States,” Washington Post, Dec. 1, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com.
15 Clapper, interview by author.
16 Reid, interview by author, Las Vegas, July 24, 2019.
17 Clapper, interview by author; Rice, interview by author; McDonough, interview by author.
18 “ ‘This Week’ Transcript: President Barack Obama,” ABC News, Jan. 8, 2017, abcnews.go.com.
19 Nuland, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Feb. 22, 2019.
20 Wallander, interview by author; Comey, Higher Loyalty, 190; Haines, interview by author. Lucas Kello explores the intricacies of deterrence in the digital age in Virtual Weapon and International Order, chap. 7, in which he writes, “The principal problem with current doctrine is that it is designed to punish individual acts,” and so, “when applied to the current context, adversaries understand that so long as no single cyber action unambiguously crosses the bar of war, they will escape its certain penalties.”21 Rice, interview by author.
22 Brennan, interview by author; Podesta, interview by author, Washington, D.C., June 15, 2018.
23 Miller, phone interview by author, July 11, 2019; Rucker, phone interview by author, Sept. 2, 2018.
24 Jamieson, Cyberwar, 150, 156.
25 Amy Chozick et al., “Highlights from the Clinton Campaign Emails: How to Deal with Sanders and Biden,” New York Times, Oct. 10, 2016, www.nytimes.com. Other headlines included “Leaked Speech Excerpts Show a Hillary Clinton at Ease with Wall Street”; “Hillary Clinton Aides Kept de Blasio at Arm’s Length, WikiLeaks Emails Show”; “Hacked Transcripts Reveal a Genial Hillary Clinton at Goldman Sachs Events”; “Email about Qatari Offer Shows Thorny Ethical Issues Clinton Foundation Faced”; “ ‘We Need to Clean This Up’: Clinton Aide’s Newly Public Email Shows Concern”; “Donations to Foundation Vexed Hillary Clinton’s Aides, Emails Show”; “Chelsea Clinton’s Frustrations and Devotion Shown in Hacked Emails”; and “WikiLeaks Lays Bare a Clinton Insider’s Emphatic Cheers and Jeers.”26 Sonne, phone interview by author, June 20, 2019.
27 Wallander, interview by author.
28 Eric Lipton, David Sanger, and Scott Shane, “The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S.,” New York Times, Dec. 13, 2016, www.nytimes.com.
29 Podesta, interview by author; Bannon, interview by author, New York, Sept. 21, 2019.
30 Mueller Report, 48; Goff, interview by author, New York, Aug. 22, 2019.
31 Podesta, interview by author.
32 Baker, phone interview by author, Oct. 17, 2018; Rucker, interview by author.
33 Clapper, interview by author.
34 Applebaum went on, “But whatever resources Putin wagered on Trump, they are paying off. For even if Trump never becomes president, his can-didacy has already achieved two extremely important Russian foreign policy goals: to weaken the moral influence of the United States by under-mining its reputation as a stable democracy, and to destroy its power by wrecking its relationships with its allies.” Anne Applebaum, “How a Trump Presidency Could Destabilize Europe,” Washington Post, July 21, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com.
35 Daniel, interview by author. In a statement provided to the U.S. Senate on March 1, 2019, the FBI said, “In October 2016, the Counterintel-ligence Division tasked a contractor to identify Russian influence activity on Twitter. The FBI contractor collected and analyzed a sample of Twit-ter activity conducted by an overtly pro-Russian network of 13 Twit-ter accounts and their followers, including automated accounts, which promoted US election-related news and leaked Democratic party emails published by WikiLeaks.” See U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Russia’s Use of Social Media, vol. 2 of Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, 116th Cong., 1st sess., 2019, S. Rep. 116-XX, 73, www.intelligence.senate.gov.
36 Cohen, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018; Brennan, interview by author.
37 Morell, phone interview by author, March 6, 2019; Wise, phone interview by author, Oct. 21, 2019; Panetta, phone interview by author, Nov. 12, 2019.
38 Nuland, interview by author.
39 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activi-ties and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, 1.
40 Sanger, “Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking.”41 Wallander, interview by author; Morell, interview by author; Haines, interview by author.
42 Clapper, interview by author; Blinken, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Jan. 3, 2019; Sarah Bloom Raskin, phone interview by author, Feb. 3, 2020; Finer, interview by author, New York, Feb. 20, 2019.
43 Adam Entous, Elizabeth Dwoskin, and Craig Timberg, “Obama Tried to Give Zuckerberg a Wake-up Call over Fake News on Facebook,” Wash-ington Post, Sept. 24, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com.
44 “ ‘This Week’ Transcript: President Barack Obama,” Jan. 8, 2017.

第十二章 社群媒体

1 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 12–13.
2 Ibid., 6–7; U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 22–24. For fur-ther reading on Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Russian oligarch who bankrolled the IRA, see Neil MacFarquhar, “Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is Known as ‘Putin’s Cook,’ ” New York Times, Feb. 16, 2018, www.nytimes.com.
3 Stamos, phone interview by author, May 28, 2018.
4 Adrian Chen, “The Agency,” New York Times, June 2, 2015, www.nytimes.com. Even earlier, in 2014, BuzzFeed published an article about how the IRA, with a staff of more than six hundred people and a yearly budget of more than $10 million, was using social media to influence public opinion at home and abroad, including in the United States. See Seddon, “Documents Show How Russia’s Troll Army Hit America.”5 By July 2016, Adrian Chen wrote, “The Internet Research Agency appears to have quieted down significantly.” Chen, “Real Paranoia-Inducing Pur-pose of Russian Hacks.”6 Hall, phone interview by author, Oct. 22, 2019.
7 An indictment issued by the office of Robert Mueller described another aspect of the GRU’s social media activities: “Unit 74455 assisted in the release of stolen documents through the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 per-sonas, the promotion of those releases, and the publication of anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by the GRU.” See United States v. Viktor Netyksho et al., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1030, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 5.
8 Officials at Twitter had a similar experience. The company’s general counsel told the U.S. Senate, in January 2019, that “to the best of our knowledge, Twitter received no information from the U.S. government in advance of the 2016 election about state sponsored information opera-tions.” See U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 73.
9 Stamos, interview by author; Gleicher, phone interview by author, Feb. 25, 2020. On those exceptions at Facebook, see David Smith, “How Key Republicans Inside Facebook Are Shifting Its Politics to the Right,” Guardian, Nov. 3, 2019, www.theguardian.com. For one of the many speculative pieces about Sandberg’s political future, see Ben White, “Sheryl Sandberg Rising in Treasury Watch,” Politico, Sept. 15, 2016, www.politico.com. For Sandberg’s public response, see Christina Pas-sariello, “Facebook’s Sheryl Sandberg Says She Won’t Be Joining Govern-ment,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 11, 2016, www.wsj.com.
10 The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that “the Russian government tasked and supported the IRA’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election,” that “the IRA sought to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election by harming Hillary Clinton’s chances of success and supporting Donald Trump at the direction of the Kremlin,” and that “IRA social media activity was overtly and almost invariably supportive of then-candidate Trump, and to the detriment of Secretary Clinton’s campaign.” See U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 4–5.
11 Stamos, interview by author.
12 Sandberg, interview by author, New York, June 2018. (Ms. Sandberg gave the author this brief remark spontaneously when asked at a coffee shop in Manhattan.) On Facebook’s internal quarrels and decision-making process after the 2016 election, see Sheera Frenkel et al., “Delay, Deny, and Deflect: How Facebook’s Leaders Fought Through Crisis,” New York Times, Nov. 14, 2018, www.nytimes.com.
13 See U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 45–50, which fur-ther explains that on Facebook the 76.5 million engagements included 30.4 million shares, 37.6 million likes, 3.3 million comments, and 5.2 mil-lion reactions and that on Instagram almost half of the IRA’s 133 accounts had more than 10,000 followers, and 12 had more than 100,000.
14 Renée DiResta et al., “The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” New Knowledge, Dec. 17, 2018, 7, www.newknowledge.com.
15 U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 59–62.
16 Stanford researchers found that across the GRU’s Facebook accounts “engagement was minimal. Across all posts, there were 4,830 Likes, 5,469 reactions, 3,432 shares, and 902 comments While GRU-attributed Facebook posts spanned a period from 2014 to 2018—a time when the IRA was operational and actively spending money and effort on audience engagement—only one of the GRU-attributed Pages bought ads The effort expended on attracting audiences, even via obvious strategies like running ads, was conspicuously minimal; the marked lack of engagement is indeed somewhat perplexing. There are a few possible explanations for this: the first is that social influence was not the focus nor the goal of GRU activity, which was primarily concerned with media hacking. . . . A second explanation is that they didn’t fully understand the dynam-ics of social platforms. A third is that they were simply ineffectual or incompetent in their execution.” On the IRA and GRU, the researchers conclude, “The extent of coordination between the various entities with influence operations capabilities—in this case, the GRU and the IRA—is an open question [T]here has been no concrete evidence of collabora-tion between the two entities.” See DiResta and Grossman, “Potemkin Pages & Personas,” 5, 7, 9, 91.
17 Goss, interview by author, Florida Keys, Fla., Dec. 26, 2018. Several former CIA officers have written about continuities in Russia’s covert influence operations. See David V. Gioe, “Cyber Operations and Useful Fools: The Approach of Russian Hybrid Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 33, no. 7 (2018): 954–73; John Sipher, “Russian Active Measures,” CHACR Global Analysis Programme Briefing 14 (2018).
18 Haley, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 23, 2018. (Ambas-sador Haley granted the author this brief comment spontaneously when asked at a restaurant in Foggy Bottom.) 19 Shannon Greenwood, Andrew Perrin, and Maeve Duggan, “Social Media Update 2016,” Pew Research Center, Nov. 11, 2016, www.pewresearch.org. Michael Hayden, the NSA director from 1999 to 2005, told me that, at the turn of the twenty-first century, he expected a digitally connected world to “create a common dialogue and bring people together toward a middle, deeper, and richer understanding.” Still, some thinkers, like Jack Goldsmith, Tim Wu, and Lawrence Lessig, sensed that a globalized internet, with all its potential, had much potential for abuse. “Everything you do on the Net produces data,” Lessig wrote in 2006, “about what you do and what you say,” which can be used to influence “you in a direct and effective way.” See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 216. Goldsmith and Wu, in their 2006 book, warned that authoritarian countries like China would maintain a “model of political control” through a “sphere of influence over network norms,” while the United States would adopt a “free and open model” of internet activity. As a result, Wu and Goldsmith forecast “a technological version of the cold war, with each side pushing its own vision of the Internet’s future.” See Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 101, 184.
20 Clapper, interview by author, Fairfax, Va., Jan. 3, 2019. Kira Vrist Rønn and Sille Obelitz Søe reflect on questions of privacy and social media platforms, arguing, “While they feel private to users, they are in fact public spaces.” See Kira Vrist Rønn and Sille Obelitz Søe, “Is Social Media Intelligence Private? Privacy in Public and the Nature of Social Media Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 34, no. 3 (2019): 363–78. On the undemocratic consequences of social media, see Ronald Deibert, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: Three Painful Truths About Social Media,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (2019): 25–39; Larry Diamond, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: The Threat of Postmodern Totalitarianism,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (2019): 20–24.
21 Scott Detrow, “What Did Cambridge Analytica Do During the 2016 Elec-tion?,” NPR, March 20, 2018, www.npr.org. Cecilia Kang and Sheera Frenkel, “Facebook Says Cambridge Analytica Harvested Data of Up to 87 Million Users,” New York Times, April 4, 2018, www.nytimes.com.
22 Robert Bond et al., “A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization,” Nature 489, no. 7415 (2012): 295–98, which concludes that “the results show that the messages directly influenced political self-expression, information seeking and real-world voting behavior of millions of people,” and that “the messages not only influ-enced the users who received them but also the users’ friends, and friends of friends.” Also, prior to America’s 2012 election, Facebook researchers manipulated the feeds of 1.9 million users to promote more “hard news” stories; those users subsequently demonstrated increased civic engagement and turnout on Election Day. See Micah Sifry, “Facebook Wants You to Vote on Tuesday. Here’s How It Messed with Your Feed in 2012,” Mother Jones, Oct. 31, 2014, www.motherjones.com.
For further reading on messaging in America’s evolving information environment, see Bruce Hardy, Kate Kenski, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, The Obama Victory: How Media, Money, and Message Shaped the 2008 Election (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Yue Tan and David H. Weaver, “Agenda Diversity and Agenda Setting from 1956 to 2004: What Are the Trends Over Time?” Journalism Studies 14, no. 6 (2013): 773–89; Richard Johnston, Michael Hagen, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, The 2000 Presidential Election and the Foundations of Party Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Adam Kramer, Jamie Guillory, and Jeffrey Hancock, “Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks,” PNAS, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111, no. 24 (2014): 8788–90.
23 Kate Kaye, “Data-Driven Targeting Creates Huge 2016 Political Ad Shift: Broadcast TV Down 20%, Cable and Digital Way Up,” AdAge, Jan. 3, 2017, adage.com.
24 Bannon, interview by author, New York, Sept. 21, 2019; Goff, interview by author, New York, Aug. 22, 2019. On the persistent influence of TV news, see Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no. 2 (2017): 211–36.
25 Gottfried and Shearer, “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016.”26 Surkov, “Владислав Сурков.”27 Inman, interview by author, Austin, Tex., Nov. 2, 2018; Santos, interview by author, Oxford, U.K., Nov. 13, 2018.
28 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 6, 14. The Senate Select Committee on Intel-ligence concluded, “Analysis of the behavior of the IRA-associated social media accounts makes clear that while the Russian information warfare campaign exploited the context of the election and election-related issues in 2016, the preponderance of the operational focus, as reflected repeat-edly in content, account names, and audiences targeted, was on socially divisive issues—such as race, immigration, and Second Amendment rights—in an attempt to pit Americans against one another and against their government.” U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 6.
29 Stamos, interview by author.
30 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” Science 359, no. 6380 (2018): 1146–51, science .sciencemag.org, in which the authors find that “falsehood diffused sig-nificantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false political news.” This pattern of behavior extended into 2016. See Craig Silverman, “This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News on Facebook,” BuzzFeed News, Nov. 16, 2016, www.buzzfeednews.com.
31 McMaster, phone interview by author, Oct. 17, 2018.
32 DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 9, 21, 76–80, in which these researchers also explain that Clinton and Trump, while a persistent theme, were not the IRA’s focus: Just 18 percent of its Instagram posts, 7 percent of its Facebook posts, and 6 percent of its tweets mentioned either candidate by name. The priority was to sow division, amass followers, and, at key moments, release election-related content.
33 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 17.
34 DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 56.
35 Jamieson, Cyberwar, 5, 68; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, 3. Donald Trump, as a presidential candidate, granted an interview to RT during which he criticized the American press; see Adam Taylor and Paul Farhi, “A Trump Interview May Be Crowning Glory for RT, a Network Funded by the Russian Government,” Washington Post, Sept. 9, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com. For further reading on RT and Sputnik, see Jim Rutenberg, “RT, Sputnik, and Russia’s New Theory of War,” New York Times, Sept. 13, 2017, www.nytimes.com.
36 Jamieson, Cyberwar, chap. 5; Philip Howard, Bharath Ganesh, Dimi-tra Liotsiou, John Kelly, and Camille François conclude, in their study of IRA-run accounts, that “it is evident that the campaigns sought to demobilize African Americans, LGBT, and liberal voters” and that “mes-saging to African Americans sought to divert their political energy away from established political institutions by preying on anger with structural inequalities faced by African Americans, including police violence, pov-erty, and disproportionate levels of incarceration. These campaigns pushed a message that the best way to advance the cause of the African American community was to boycott the election and focus on other issues instead.” Phil Howard et al., “The IRA, Social Media, and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012–2018,” Computational Propaganda Research Project, Oxford Internet Institute, Dec. 2018, 19, 34.
37 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 18. The IRA also targeted Native Ameri-cans. See Ryan Brooks, “How Russians Attempted to Use Instagram to Influence Native Americans,” BuzzFeed News, Oct. 23, 2017, www.buzzfeednews.com.
38 DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 85.
39 MITN 1/6/5, p. 436, Papers of Mitrokhin.
40 Stamos, interview by author. See also Ahmer Arif, Leo Graiden Stewart, and Kate Starbird, “Acting the Part: Examining Information Operations Within #BlackLivesMatter Discourse,” Proceedings of the ACM on Homupmuatner-CInteraction 2, no. CSCW (2018).
41 Seddon, “Documents Show How Russia’s Troll Army Hit America”; Anton Troianovski, “A Former Russian Troll Speaks: ‘It Was like Being in Orwell’s World,’ ” Washington Post, Feb. 17, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com; Shaun Walker, “The Russian Troll Factory at the Heart of the Med-dling Allegations,” Guardian, April 2, 2015, www.theguardian.com.
42 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 14–15.
43 Troianovski, “Former Russian Troll Speaks.”44 U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 43–44. To examine actual IRA-run ads, see Scott Shane, “These Are the Ads Russia Bought on Facebook in 2016,” New York Times, Nov. 1, 2017, www.nytimes.com.
45 U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 40, 77, in which Senate investigators found “that paid advertisements were not key to the IRA’s activity, and moreover, are not alone an accurate measure of the IRA’s operational scope, scale, or objectives The nearly 3,400 Facebook and Instagram advertisements the IRA purchased are comparably minor in relation to the over 61,500 Facebook posts, 116,000 Instagram posts, and 10.4 million tweets that were the original creations of IRA influence operatives, disseminated under the guise of authentic user activity.”46 DiResta, phone interview by author, May 22, 2019.
47 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 15.
48 Howard et al., “IRA, Social Media, and Political Polarization,” 12; Craig Timberg and Shane Harris, “Russian Operatives Blasted 18,000 Tweets Ahead of a Huge News Day During the 2016 Presidential Campaign. Did They Know What Was Coming?,” Washington Post, July 20, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com.
49 Tom Parfitt, “My Life as a Pro-Putin Propagandist in Russia’s Secret ‘Troll Factory,’ ” Telegraph, June 24, 2015, www.telegraph.co.uk.
50 Leon Yin et al., “Your Friendly Neighborhood Troll: The Inter-net Research Agency’s Use of Local and Fake News in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign,” SMaPP Lab, Nov. 19, 2018, www.nyu.edu. Spreading the content of news sources perceived as trustworthy has its advantage; MIT researchers have found that laypeople are “quite good at distinguishing between lower-and higher-quality sources” online. See Gordon Pennycook and David G. Rand, “Fighting Misinformation on Social Media Using Crowdsourced Judgments of News Source Quality,” PNAS, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 116, no. 7 (2019): 2521–26.
51 For example, as of November 2019, The Hartford Courant—hetlargest daily newspaper in Connecticut—had roughly 160,000 Twitter follow-ers and 21,800 Instagram followers, the San Francisco Chronicle had 188,000 Twitter followers and 93,400 Instagram followers, and the Pitts-burgh Post-Gazette had 166,500 Twitter followers and 54,300 Instagram followers.
52 U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 45, 49, 54.
53 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 14; Philip Bump, “At Least Five People Close to Trump Engaged with Russian Twitter Trolls from 2015 to 2017,” Wash-ington Post, Nov. 2, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com; Mueller Report, 28, 33–34.
54 Mike Glenn, “Dozens Turn Out to Support Houston Muslims,” Hous-ton Chronicle, May 21, 2016, www.chron.com. See also U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 47; Claire Allbright, “A Russian Facebook Page Organized a Protest in Texas. A Different Russian Page Launched the Counterprotest,” Texas Tribune, Nov. 1, 2017, www.texastribune.org.
On the purpose of GRU-run social media accounts, one set of research-ers found, “The operations were primarily focused on creating long-form state-aligned propaganda content and seeding it for distribution within other media properties, including authentic media in the local ecosystem. This is distinct from the social-media-first strategy of the International Research Agency (IRA) Pages, which focused primarily on memetic pro-paganda with high virality potential to attract the like-minded and facili-tate tribalism The GRU narrative strategy also involved the creation of think tanks and ‘alternative news’ sites to serve as initial content drops, from which the content was syndicated or republished on other sites.” DiResta and Grossman, “Potemkin Pages & Personas,” 7.
55 Mueller Report, 29–31.
56 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 22–23, 29. Critically, Robert Mueller con-cluded, in his final report, that his team had “not identified evidence that any Trump Campaign official understood the requests were coming from foreign nationals.” Mueller Report, 35.
57 Morgan, phone interview by author, May 3, 2019; DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 34; Stamos, interview by author.
58 United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A (D.D.C. 2018), 13, 29.
59 DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 34–35. Still, Colin Stretch, a senior Facebook official, emphasized in his written testimony to the U.S. Senate that the IRA’s method was in certain ways unsophisticated: “The targeting for the IRA ads that we have identi-fied and provided to the Committee was relatively rudimentary, targeting broad locations and interests, and did not use a tool known as Contact List Custom Audiences.” See U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 41.
60 Kalugin, interview by author, Rockville, Md., Aug. 7, 2018.
61 DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 91.
62 U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 6, which went on: “The Committee found that no single group of Americans was targeted by IRA information operatives more than African-Americans.”63 Ibid., 6, 61; DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 16. See also Arif, Stewart, and Starbird, “Acting the Part.”64 Kalugin, interview by author.
65 DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 72.
66 Robarge, interview by author, McLean, Va., July 19, 2019.
67 DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 69; David Weigel, “The Life and Death of the Seth Rich Conspiracy Theory,” Washington Post, May 24, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com.
The investigative reporter Michael Isikoff connects the genesis of the Seth Rich conspiracy theory to Russian intelligence, in “Exclusive: The True Origins of the Seth Rich Conspiracy Theory. A Yahoo News Investi-gation,” Yahoo News, July 9, 2019, news.yahoo.com. For further reading on Russian efforts to foment fear and division around the safety of vac-cines, see David A. Broniatowski et al., “Weaponized Health Commu-nication: Twitter Bots and Russian Trolls Amplify the Vaccine Debate,” American Journal of Public Health 108, no. 10 (2018): 1378–84.
68 DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 821. –9

69 Wallander, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2019; Stamos, interview by author.
70 U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 34.
71 Jane Mayer, “How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump,” New Yorker, Sept. 24, 2018, www.newyorker.com. See also Jamieson, Cyber-war.
72 James Clapper and Trey Brown, Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence (New York: Viking, 2018), 395, in which Clapper argues, “Of course the Russian efforts affected the outcome. Surprising even themselves, they swung the election to a Trump win. To conclude otherwise stretches logic, common sense, and credulity to the breaking point. Less than eighty thousand votes in three key states swung the elec-tion. I have no doubt that more votes than that were influenced by this massive effort by the Russians.”73 Yochai Benkler, “Cautionary Notes on Disinformation and the Origins of Distrust,” MediaWell, Oct. 22, 2019, mediawell.ssrc.org, in which he further writes, “Nonstop coverage of propaganda efforts and specula-tion about their impact, without actual evidence to support that impact, feeds the loss of trust in our institutions to a greater extent than the facts warrant.” Stephen McCombie, Allon Uhlmann, and Sarah Morrison similarly argue that the IRA’s impact on the outcome of the election was “minimal,” but that the discovery of its operation has generated much discord inside the United States: “The Russian information operation—of which the IRA action was a major component—has served Russian goals indirectly by ostensibly failing to retain its cover and being perceived and presented as having played a potentially decisive role in the election.” Ste-phen McCombie, Allon Uhlmann, and Sarah Morrison, “The U.S. 2016 Presidential Election & Russia’s Troll Farms,” Intelligence and National Security 35, no. 1 (2019): 95–114.
Several studies have examined the limited reach and impact of fake news on American discourse ahead of the 2016 election. See Allcott and Gentzkow, “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election”; Andrew Guess, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua Tucker, “Less than You Think: Prevalence and Predictors of Fake News Dissemination on Facebook,” Sci-ence Advances 5, no. 1 (2019); Nir Grinberg et al., “Fake News on Twit-ter During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election,” Science 363, no. 6425 (2019): 374–78.
74 McMaster, interview by author.
75 DiResta, interview by author.
76 DiResta et al., “Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” 93. The U.S. Senate, in its investigation of Russia’s information warfare operation, found, “The data reveal increases in IRA activity across mul-tiple social media platforms, post–Election Day 2016: Instagram activity increased 238 percent, Facebook increased 59 percent, Twitter increased 52 percent, and YouTube citations went up by 84 percent.” U.S. Congress, Russia’s Use of Social Media, 8.
77 Cohen, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018.
78 Sullivan, interview by author, New York, April 17, 2019.
79 Hannah Levintova, “Russian Journalists Just Published a Bombshell Investigation About a Kremlin-Linked ‘Troll Factory,’ ” Mother Jones, Oct. 18, 2017, www.motherjones.com.
80 Inman, interview by author; Cohen, interview by author; Donilon, inter-view by author, Washington, D.C., July 16, 2018.
81 Reid, interview by author, Las Vegas, July 24, 2019; Stamos, interview by author.
82 Thomas Escritt, “Germany Fines Facebook for Under-reporting Com-plaints,” Reuters, July 2, 2019, www.reuters.com; Natasha Singer, “Ger-many Restricts Facebook’s Data Gathering,” New York Times, Feb. 7, 2019, www.nytimes.com.
83 Hannigan, interview by author, London, March 22, 2019. On the liberal and illiberal potential of social media, see Joshua A. Tucker et al., “From Liberation to Turmoil: Social Media and Democracy,” Journal of Democ-racy 28, no. 4 (2017): 46–59. On the weaponization of social mediaabroad, see Samantha Bradshaw and Philip Howard, “Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation,” Computational Propaganda Research Project, the Oxford Internet Insti-tute, July 20, 2018, comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk.
84 Brennan, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2018.
85 Sullivan, interview by author; Stamos, interview by author; Schadlow, phone interview by author, Nov. 9, 2018.

第十三章 毫无作为

1 For example, Peter Gourevitch, in a 1978 essay on external influences over domestic politics, labeled “meddling” as “obvious conceptually” and not “requir[ing] much investigation.” He briefly mentioned instances of coup plotting, including in “Iran in 1954, Guatemala in the same year, [and] Chile in 1973.” Gourevitch, like other thinkers, thus broached the subject of covert interference without mentioning the far more specific subject of covert electoral interference. See Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978): 883.
2 Schadlow, phone interview by author, Nov. 9, 2018.
3 Brennan, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2018.
4 “Full Transcript: Mueller Testimony Before House Judiciary, Intelligence Committees,” NBC News, July 25, 2019, www.nbcnews.com; Doina Chiacu, “FBI Director Wray: Russia Intent on Interfering with U.S. Elec-tions,” Reuters, July 23, 2019, www.reuters.com.
5 Fiona Hill, “Opening Statement of Dr. Fiona Hill to the House of Repre-sentatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,” Nov. 21, 2019, s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/hillopeningstatement1121.pdf.
6 Dan Mangan and Kevin Breuninger, “Trump Talked to Roger Stone About WikiLeaks, Rick Gates Says in Testimony Contradicting the Presi-dent,” CNBC, Nov. 12, 2019, www.cnbc.com.
7 Mueller Report, 5, 49.
8 Department of Justice, Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller, “Inter-view of Hope Hicks 3/13/18,” 583, released via FOIA on Dec. 2, 2019, www.cnn.com.
9 Philip Bump, “Actually, Trump Has Almost Never Blamed Russia Exclu-sively for 2016 Interference,” Washington Post, July 19, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com.
10 McMaster, phone interview by author, Oct. 17, 2018; Mark Landler, “For McMaster, Pomp Under Bittersweet Circumstances,” New York Times, April 6, 2018, www.nytimes.com.
11 Duke, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Nov. 5, 2018.
12 Jen Kirby, “Poll: Only 32 Percent of Republicans Think Russia Interfered in the 2016 Election,” Vox, July 19, 2018, www.vox.com.
13 On investigations and reporting into Trump’s ties to Russia, Trump’s deni-als of any such ties, and the conclusions of the Mueller investigation, see note 65 of chapter 8 of this book.
14 McMaster, interview by author; Amy Held, “Trump Chides McMaster for Saying Evidence of Russian Interference ‘Incontrovertible,’” NPR, Feb. 17, 2018, www.npr.org.
15 Duke, interview by author.
16 Michael Wines, “$250 Million to Keep Votes Safe? Experts Say Billions Are Needed,” New York Times, Sept. 25, 2019, www.nytimes.com.
17 Wray, email correspondence with author, May 27, 2019.
18 Karen Yourish and Troy Griggs, “8 U.S. Intelligence Groups Blame Russia for Meddling, but Trump Keeps Clouding the Picture,” New York Times, Aug. 2, 2018, www.nytimes.com.
19 U.S. Congress, Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure, 52; Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian Troll Factory on Day of 2018 Midterms,” Washington Post, Feb. 27, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com.
20 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats Establishes Intelligence Community Election Threats Executive,” July 19, 2019, www.dni.gov; McMaster, interview by author.
21 Abby Phillip, “Trump Signs What He Calls ‘Seriously Flawed’ Bill Impos-ing New Sanctions on Russia,” Washington Post, Aug. 2, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com.
22 McMaster, interview by author.
23 “Read Trump’s Phone Conversation with Volodymyr Zelensky,” CNN, Sept. 26, 2019, www.cnn.com.
24 Adam Taylor, “Trump Has Spoken Privately with Putin at Least 16 Times. Here’s What We Know About the Conversations,” Washington Post, Oct. 4, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com.
25 For example, on January 11, 2017, Trump Tweeted: “Russia has never tried to use leverage over me. I HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH RUSSIA-NO DEALS, NO LOANS, NO NOTHING!” Twitter user @ realdonaldtrump, Jan. 11, 2017, www.twitter.com. For elaboration on Trump’s business pursuits in Russia, see note 59 of chapter 8 of this book.
26 Carroll Doherty, “Key Findings on Americans’ Views of the U.S. Politi-cal System and Democracy,” Pew Research Center, April 26, 2018, www.pewresearch.org; “The Public, the Political System, and American Democ-racy,” Pew Research Center, April 26, 2018, www.people-press.org.
27 Duke, interview by author.
28 Tom Stites, “About 1,300 U.S. Communities Have Totally Lost News Coverage, UNC News Desert Study Finds,” Poynter, Oct. 15, 2018, www.poynter.org.
29 Goss, interview by author, Florida Keys, Fla., Dec. 26, 2018; Cohen, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018.
30 Aaron Zitner et al., “Democrats and Republicans Aren’t Just Divided. They Live in Different Worlds,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 19, 2019, www.wsj.com.
31 Milan Svolik, “Polarization Versus Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 3 (2019): 20–32, in which he continues, “In sharply polarized electorates, even voters who value democracy will be willing to sacrifice fair democratic competition for the sake of electing politicians who cham-pion their interests. When punishing a leader’s authoritarian tendencies requires voting for a platform, party, or person that his supporters detest, many will find this too high a price to pay. Polarization thus presents aspiring authoritarians with a structural opportunity: They can under-mine democracy and get away with it.”32 McMaster, interview by author; Rice, phone interview by author, Aug. 27, 2019.
33 Finer, interview by author, New York, Feb. 20, 2019.
34 Candace Smith, “Jeb Bush on Donald Trump: He’s a ‘Chaos Candidate’ and He’d Be a ‘Chaos President,’” ABC News, Dec. 15, 2015, abcnews.go.com; Glenn Thrush and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Gives White Supremacists an Unequivocal Boost,” New York Times, Aug. 15, 2017, www.nytimes.com; Jonathan M. Katz and Farah Stockman, “James Fields Guilty of First-Degree Murder in Death of Heather Heyer,” New York Times, Dec. 7, 2018, www.nytimes.com; Katie Rogers and Nicho-las Fandos, “Trump Tells Congresswomen to ‘Go Back’ to the Countries They Came From,” New York Times, July 14, 2019, www.nytimes.com; Kyle Balluck and Aris Folley, “Trump Suggests Pelosi Committed Treason, Should Be ‘Immediately Impeached,’ ” Hill, Oct. 7, 2019, thehill.com.
35 Brennan, interview by author.
36 Blinken, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Jan. 3, 2019; Muñoz, phone interview by author, July 20, 2019.
37 Duke, interview by author; Wise, phone interview by author, Oct. 21, 2019.
38 “Public, the Political System, and American Democracy”; Richard Wike et al., “Democracy Widely Supported, Little Backing for Rule by Strong Leader or Military,” Pew Research Center, Oct. 16, 2017, www.pew research.org. Americans are not unique in contemplating alternatives to the democratic model. See Wike and Fetterolf, “Liberal Democracy’s Cri-sis of Confidence”; Richard Wike, Laura Silver, and Alexandra Castillo, “Dissatisfaction with Performance of Democracy Is Common in Many Nations,” Pew Research Center, April 29, 2019, www.pewresearch.org.
39 Blinken, interview by author.
40 “It Was a Campaign Trap,” New York Times, Nov. 7, 1888, timesmachine.nytimes.com. T. C. Hinckley, “George Osgoodby and the Murchison Letter,” Pacific Historical Review 27, no. 4 (1958): 359–70.
41 Marco R. Newmark, “The Murchison Letter Incident,” Quarterly: Historical Society of Southern California 27, no. 1 (1945): 17–21; Robert Mitchell, “The Fake Letter Historians Believe Tipped a Presidential Elec-tion,” Washington Post, June 21, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com.
42 Nicole Perlroth and David Sanger, “Iranian Hackers Target Trump Cam-paign as Threats to 2020 Mount,” New York Times, Oct. 4, 2019, www.nytimes.com.
43 Goss, interview by author; Brennan, interview by author.

结语 突破重围

1 Tony Judt and Timothy Snyder, Thinking the Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin, 2012), 306.
2 “Full Transcript: Mueller Testimony Before House Judiciary, Intelligence Committees.”3 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 149.
4 The Brennan Center concluded in August 2019 that it would cost roughly $2.15 billion, doled out over five years, for states to meet key election security needs, such as upgrading voter registration databases and voting machines. See Lawrence Norden and Edgardo Cortés, “What Does Elec-tion Security Cost?,” Brennan Center for Justice, Aug. 15, 2019, www.brennancenter.org. Ahead of the 2020 election, it will cost just Pennsylva-nia roughly $150 million to replace its voting machines. See Sasha Hupka and Jonathan Lai, “After Pa. Gov. Tom Wolf Announces $90 Million to Upgrade Voting Machines, GOP Pushes Back,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 9, 2019, www.inquirer.com. See also Kate Rabinowitz, “Election Security a High Priority—Until It Comes to Paying for New Voting Machines,” ProPublica, Feb. 20, 2018, www.propublica.org; Christo-pher R. Deluzio et al., “Defending Elections: Federal Funding Needs for State Election Security,” Brennan Center for Justice, July 18, 2019, wwwre.benntenranc.org.
5 Duke, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Nov. 5, 2018. For analysis of McConnell’s position, see Amber Phillips, “Why Is Mitch McCon-nell Blocking Election Security Bills? Good Question,” Washington Post, July 30, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com. On the uneven election security standards across states, see David Sanger, Reid J. Epstein, and Michael Wines, “States Rush to Make Voting Systems More Secure as New Threats Emerge,” New York Times, July 26, 2019, www.nytimes.com.
6 Schadlow, phone interview by author, Nov. 9, 2018; Haines, interview by author, New York, Feb. 23, 2019; Johnson, interview by author, New York, July 29, 2019.
7 Carl Hulse, “After Resisting, McConnell and Senate G.O.P. Back Elec-tion Security Funding,” New York Times, Sept. 19, 2019, www.nytimes.com.
8 The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 included a series of requirements for election administration, such as that states maintain a “single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list.” See U.S. Congress, House, Help America Vote Act of 2002, H.R. 2395.
Congress should, today, update those standards, in accordance with the digital age. The Securing America’s Federal Elections (SAFE) Act, approved by the House in 2019, would install, per its official summary, “requirements for voting systems, including that systems (1) use indi-vidual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots; (2) make a voter’s marked ballot available for inspection and verification by the voter before the vote is cast; (3) ensure that individuals with disabilities are given an equivalent opportunity to vote, including with privacy and independence, in a man-ner that produces a voter-verified paper ballot; (4) be manufactured in the United States; and (5) meet specified cybersecurity requirements, including the prohibition of the connection of a voting system to the internet.” These criteria and more—designed to bolster the security both of voting systems and of voter registration databases—should be passed into law. See U.S. Congress, House, Securing America’s Federal Elections Act, H.R. 2722, 116th Cong., introduced in House May 14, 2019, www.congress.gov.
On the politics of the SAFE Act, see Hailey Fuchs and Karoun Demir-jian, “Divided House Passes Election Security Legislation over Republican Objections,” Washington Post, June 27, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com. For additional recommendations, see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2018), www.nap.edu.
9 Cohen, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018.
10 Rucker, phone interview by author, Sept. 2, 2018.
11 Baker, phone interview by author, Oct. 17, 2018.
12 Rachel Donadio, “Why the Macron Hacking Attack Landed with a Thud in France,” New York Times, May 8, 2017, www.nytimes.com; Alex Hern, “Macron Hackers Linked to Russian-affiliated Group Behind US Attack,” Guardian, May 8, 2017, www.theguardian.com; Mark Hosen-ball, “U.S. Increasingly Convinced that Russia Hacked French Election: Sources,” Reuters, May 9, 2017, www.reuters.com.
13 Burns, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 9, 2018.
14 Guy Rosen, Katie Harbath, Nathaniel Gleicher, and Rob Leathern, “Helping to Protect the 2020 U.S. Elections,” Facebook, Oct. 21, 2019, about.fb.com. On an especially extensive network of Russian accounts across Africa, see Davey Alba and Sheera Frenkel, “Russia Tests New Disinformation Tactics in Africa to Expand Influence,” New York Times, Oct. 30, 2019, www.nytimes.com. On the IRA’s use of smaller platforms to test specific messaging strains, see Josephine Lukito, “Coordinating a Multi-platform Disinformation Campaign: Internet Research Agency Activity on Three U.S. Social Media Platforms, 2015 to 2017,” Politi-cal Communication 37, no. 2 (2019): 238–55. On more recent Russian activity on Reddit, see Madeleine Carlisle, “Reddit Says Leaked U.S.-U.K. Trade Documents Posted on the Site Are Linked to a Russian Information Campaign,” Time, Dec. 7, 2019, time.com.
15 McMaster, phone interview by author, Oct. 17, 2018.
16 Stamos, phone interview by author, May 28, 2018; Gleicher, phone inter-view by author, Feb. 25, 2020.
17 Since 2016, lawmakers have passed no legislation in this space—not even the Honest Ads Act, a bill with bipartisan support that would require social media companies to disclose who paid for political advertisements, just as television, radio, and print providers do. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong., introduced in Senate Oct. 19, 2017, www.congress.gov. Senator Amy Klobuchar has further proposed U.S. Congress, Senate, Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong., introduced on Jan. 17, 2019, www.congress.gov. Another major bill on the Hill is the Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act, which would crack down on the use of automated bot accounts for political purposes; see Rachel Frazin, “Feinstein Intro-duces Bill to Prohibit Campaigns from Using Social Media Bots,” Hill, July 16, 2019, thehill.com.
For a bipartisan set of recommendations, see U.S. Congress, Rus-sia’s Use of Social Media, 78–83. For additional recommendations, see McFaul, Securing American Elections, chaps. 3–5. Philip Howard, the director of the Oxford Internet Institute, recommends requiring tech-nology companies to store all advertisements in a public archive, in “A Way to Detect the Next Russian Misinformation Campaign,” New York Times, March 27, 2019, www.nytimes.com. And finally, Anne Apple-baum makes an impassioned case for social media regulation in “Regulate Social Media Now. The Future of Democracy Is at Stake,” Washington Post, Feb. 1, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com.
18 Clapper, interview by author, Fairfax, Va., Jan. 3, 2019.
19 For further reading on America’s entrenched polarization and ways to alleviate it, see Nathaniel Persily, Solutions to Political Polarization in America (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
20 Report for America, www.reportforamerica.org. Between 2008 and 2018, the number of newspaper newsroom employees in America declined from seventy-one thousand to thirty-eight thousand. Elizabeth Grieco, “U.S. Newsroom Employment Has Dropped by a Quarter Since 2008, with Greatest Decline at Newspapers,” Pew Research Center, July 9, 2019, www.pewresearch.org. On the connection between a decline in local news and a rise in polarization, see Joshua Darr, Johanna Dunaway, and Matthew Hitt, “Want to Reduce Political Polarization? Save Your Local Newspaper,” Nieman Lab, Feb. 11, 2019, www.niemanlab.org. See also Penelope Abernathy, “The Expanding News Desert,” www.usnewsdeserts.com.
21 Ryan Foley, “Efforts Grow to Help Students Evaluate What They See Online,” AP, Dec. 30, 2017, apnews.com.
22 Goss, interview by author, Florida Keys, Fla., Dec. 26, 2018; Hayden, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Nov. 5, 2018.
23 Eliza Mackintosh, “Finland Is Winning the War on Fake News. What It’s Learned May Be Crucial to Western Democracy,” CNN, May 2019, edition.cnn.com; Chris Good, “Ahead of Election, Sweden Warns Its Vot-ers Against Foreign Disinformation,” ABC News, Sept. 8, 2018, abcnews.go.com; Emma Charlton, “How Finland Is Fighting Fake News—in the Classroom,” World Economic Forum, May 21, 2019, www.weforum.org.
24 Inman, interview by author, Austin, Tex., Nov. 2, 2018.
25 Blinken, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Jan. 3, 2019; McMaster, interview by author.
26 “Read Jim Mattis’s Letter to Trump: Full Text,” New York Times, Dec. 20, 2018, www.nytimes.com. In his memoirs, Mattis writes, “In my first dozen years in the Marines, I commanded two platoons and two companies, deploying to thirteen countries on a half dozen ships. Every-where we sailed, at every landing and every exercise in foreign countries, I was introduced to the enormous value of allies.” Jim Mattis and Bing West, Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead (New York: Random House, 2019), 9.
27 Haines, interview by author; Nuland, interview by author, Washington, D.C., Feb. 22, 2019.
28 Rice, phone interview by author, Aug. 27, 2019; McMaster, interview by author.
29 Sullivan, interview by author, New York, April 17, 2019; Morell, phone interview by author, March 6, 2019; Summers, phone interview by author, Nov. 22, 2019; Nuland, interview by author.
30 Nuland, interview by author.
31 McLaughlin, phone interview by author, Sept. 5, 2019; Reid, interview by author, Las Vegas, July 24, 2019; Panetta, phone interview by author, Nov. 12, 2019.
32 Petraeus, phone interview by author, Oct. 8, 2018; Finer, interview by author, New York, Feb. 20, 2019; Sullivan, interview by author.
33 Brennan, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2018; Morell, interview by author.
34 Brennan, interview by author. Further, Harold Koh, a former dean of Yale Law School, argues that covert electoral interference violates international law: “Coercive interference in another country’s electoral politics—including the deliberate spreading of false news—constitutes an intervention that violates international law.” Harold Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 83.
35 Hall, phone interview by author, Oct. 22, 2019; Schadlow, interview by author.
36 For further reading on the modern authoritarian challenge, see Christo-pher Walker, “The Authoritarian Threat: The Hijacking of ‘Soft Power,’” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1 (2016): 49–63; Ivan Krastev, “The Specter Haunting Europe: The Unraveling of the Post-1989 Order,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 4 (2016): 88–98; Kagan, “Strongmen Strike Back.”37 McDonough, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2018; Schadlow, interview by author.
38 Joshua Kurlantzick, “How China Is Interfering in Taiwan’s Election,” Council on Foreign Relations, Nov. 7, 2019, www.cfr.org; Ben Blanchard, “Taiwan President Says China Interfering in Election ‘Every Day,’” Reuters, Nov. 19, 2019, www.reuters.com; Colin Packham, “Exclusive: Australia Concluded China Was Behind Hack on Parliament, Political Parties—Sources,” Reuters, Sept. 15, 2019, www.reuters.com; John Gar-naut, “How China Interferes in Australia,” Foreign Affairs, March 9, 2018, www.foreignaffairs.com.